2013 Iraq Update #6: Protesters stage ‘Friday of No Dictator’

February 8, 2013

By Stephen Wicken and Marisa Sullivan

Anti-government protests continued for the sixth week in Anbar, Ninewa, and Salah ad-Din, with major protests in Fallajuh, Ramadi, Mosul, Samarra, and Tikrit. Protests also took place in Hawija in Kirkuk, Baquba in Diyala, and in the Baghdad neighborhoods of Doura and Ghazaliyah. Protests on Friday, February 8, were labeled variously the “Friday of No Dictator” or “Friday of Restoring Rights,” with protesters denouncing the “tyranny and oppression” of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Anbari tribal leader Ali Hatem al-Suleiman stated that the demonstrations in Anbar will continue until the “legitimate demands” of the protesters are met. Demonstrators in Hawija shouted the slogan, “no to the repressive regime and no to the federal court.”

Tribal leaders in Anbar province held a conference on February 7 in which they rejected sectarianism. They also condemned an attack by a small number of protesters against a delegation of southern tribal chiefs visiting the Anbar protests on February 4. The condemnation drew support from Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) head Ammar al-Hakim, who called for the government to meet the “legitimate” demands of the demonstrators “as soon as possible, in accordance with constitutional and legal mechanisms.” These calls were echoed on February 7 by a number of provincial government heads from predominantly Shi’a southern provinces. These responses suggest that political and tribal leaders continue to oppose violent escalation, even though the Maliki government is failing to address protesters’ demands and al-Qaeda in Iraq is attempting to incite broader violence. 

A number of car bombs also on February 8 targeted Shi’a areas in central and southern Iraq. Although no one immediately claimed responsibility, the attacks bear the hallmark of the Islamic State of Iraq, al-Qaeda’s front group in Iraq. Two car bombs targeted a bird market in Baghdad’s Kadhimiyah neighborhood killing at least 17; two more exploded in the town of Shomali, in Babel province, killing at least 14; and one detonated on the outskirts of Karbala city, killing two. ISI has previously demonstrated its capacity to attack the southern provinces of Iraq. In September 2012, the terrorist group launched a wave of attacks the targets of which included the southern cities of al-Nasiriyah and Basra, as well as the shrine of Ali al-Sharqi near al-Amarah in Maysan province. Friday’s attacks demonstrate ISI’s ability to launch attacks into normally well-protected Shi’a areas such as Kadhamiyah and Karbala, suggesting expanded logistical support and coordination. In the context of what has become an increasingly sectarian political crisis, any increase in attacks against Iraq’s Shi’a population has the potential of provoking retaliatory sectarian violence.

Sadrist takes over Finance Ministry from Issawi

Iraqiyya’s ministers continued their boycott of cabinet meetings—a move that has encouraged Prime Minister Maliki to place them on “compulsory leave” and replace them with acting ministers. This week, Muqtada al-Sadr approved the appointment of Ali al-Shukri, the current Minister of Planning, as acting finance minister in place of Iraqiyya leader Rafia al-Issawi. In a statement, Sadr insisted that the decision was taken “to serve national interests.” The decision suggests that the threat issued by Sadr to withdraw his existing ministers from the cabinet if the demands of anti-government protesters were not met was, in fact, a gambit intended to gain concessions from Maliki. It may also shed light on rumors that the head of the Sadrist Ahrar parliamentary bloc, Bahaa al-Araji, is to be replaced. Last week, Araji publicly refused Maliki’s request that Sadrists take up the posts of the Iraqiyya ministers. This raises the possibility that Araji is at odds with Sadr over whether the Sadrists should cooperate with Maliki and is being sidelined. Jaafar al-Moussawi is reported to be one of the contenders to replace Araji as Sadrist parliamentary leader, although Araji was still referred to as head of the Ahrar bloc in the media and on his Facebook page as of February 8.

Shukri’s appointment in Issawi’s place dealt a significant blow to Iraqiyya and raises further questions about how that bloc will posture as protests continue. Iraqiyya has portrayed itself as the primary advocate for the demonstrators’ demands and launched the boycott of cabinet as leverage to achieve them.   Maysoon al-Damalouji, Iraqiyya’s spokeswoman, announced on February 6 that Iraqiyya ministers would only return to cabinet sessions if the protesters’ demands were met, echoing the terms articulated by other Iraqiyya leaders. The same day, however, Ayad Allawi, Damalouji’s coalition and party leader, set a new and higher bar for Iraqiyya’s renewed involvement, imposing the adoption of a cabinet bylaw as a condition for Iraqiyya’s ministers to return. The cabinet bylaw was an item included at Iraqiyya’s behest in the Erbil Agreement during the 2010 government formation process, and was intended to clarify the responsibilities of the prime minister, ministers, and ministerial committees. A draft of the bylaw was presented to the cabinet in August 2012, but was rejected by Iraqiyya. Still, Allawi seems to have inserted his own demands into the debate in bringing up the Erbil Agreement. His action likely represents an attempt to regain greater influence or control over the bloc that he formally heads, but within which he has been marginalized by Issawi and Parliamentary Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi.

Iraqiyya is now in an exceedingly difficult situation: Maliki has made clear that he will not accept Iraqiyya ministers continuing to run their ministries without attending cabinet sessions. Iraqiyya has rebuffed this demand because continued involvement in government and the compromises this participation would require would only further alienate Iraqiyya from the protesters that form the chief constituency for many of the bloc’s members. Yet the current boycott has given Maliki the opportunity to oust Iraqiyya from its most important ministry, namely, finance. The Sadrists have agreed to go along with Maliki’s effort to replace Issawi, unlike in early 2012, when the prime minister tried a similar move and failed. Issawi’s ouster deprives Iraqiyya of its only significant ministerial portfolio and its ability to limit the power of the prime minister through financial oversight. It also leaves Speaker Nujaifi as the only leading Iraqiyya member with a position of national significance.

Iraqiyya’s influence within the parliament is also under pressure. Parliament voted on February 5 not to dismiss Youth and Sports Minister Jassim Muhammed Jaafar, a member of the Turkman Islamic Union and Maliki’s State of Law Coalition who faces corruption charges. The parliamentary session attracted an unusually high attendance, with 255 MPs turning out compared to an average of 180-200; only 102 votes were cast against Jaafar. The high turnout and low proportion of votes to remove Jaafar suggest significant mobilization of Maliki’s allies, and was likely intended to underscore support for the prime minister in parliament. The strong pro-Maliki showing is a response to two initiatives aimed at limiting the prime minister’s power, both of which face legal hurdles and are unlikely to succeed. In early January, Nujaifi initiated the first stage in a no-confidence vote against Maliki; weeks later, MPs voted to limit the terms of the prime minister, president, and parliamentary speaker.

The next test of Maliki’s strength in parliament likely will be the vote over the 2013 budget, which is reported to have been postponed until February 9 on account of continued disputes between parliamentary blocs. In 2009, disparate anti-Maliki parties came together to limit the prime minister through the allocation of financial resources. For example, they threatened funding for Maliki initiatives, such as the tribal support councils and the Counter-Terrorism Bureau. The outcome of the upcoming budget debate will depend on the relative strengths of the pro- and anti-Maliki blocs in parliament. Right now, the pendulum appears to have swung in Maliki’s favor. If this situation persists, the pro-Maliki bloc may place significant pressure on Nujaifi (and potentially threaten his removal), while ensuring funding for Maliki-favored projects and diverting resources away from his political rivals.

Another major political test will be the provincial elections, currently slated for April 20, 2013. This week, Muqdad al-Sharifi, the chief electoral officer of the Iraqi High Electoral Commission (IHEC) board and a member of the Shi’a National Alliance, suggested that elections might be delayed on account of the security concerns prompted by the ongoing anti-government protests. Sharifi claimed that IHEC staff in northern and western Iraq had received threatening letters, which could hinder their ability to conduct the vote on schedule. Sharifi also stated that the names of a number of candidates in the upcoming provincial election had been submitted to the Accountability and Justice Commission for audit. He gave no further information on the names or affiliations of the barred candidates. The move echoes the de-Baathification crisis that preceded the 2010 parliamentary election, in which mostly Sunni candidates were disqualified in an opaque and politicized process. The termination of de-Baathification law has been one of the protesters’ demands. The threat of postponing elections or removing Sunni Arabs through de-Baathification raises concerns that Sunni Arabs will be further alienated from the political process and may choose to pursue their objectives through violence.

2013 Iraq Update #5a: Largest Turnout of Sunni Protesters in Iraq Since Crisis Began

February 2, 2013

By Marisa Sullivan and Omar Abdullah

Tens of thousands of Sunnis participated on Friday, February 1, in a day of demonstrations called the “Friday of Loyalty to Fallujah’s Martyrs,” a reference to the violent protest in Fallujah the week prior during which Iraq Army forces killed eight demonstrators.  Friday’s anti-government protests were the largest since the movement began in late December. Demonstrators in Anbar, Ninewa, Salah ad-Din, Diyala, and Baghdad reiterated their demands that the government cancel Article 4 of the Counter-Terrorism Law (which facilitates arrests on security charges), release Sunni detainees held under that law for extended periods without charges or trials, and reform the de-Baathification legislation that has barred many Sunnis from government employment. Crowds also denounced the Fallujah incident and called for the removal of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Students in Mosul condemned the “invasion” of university campuses by Iraqi Army forces, and demanded that security forces act in the national interest and be less aggressive with Iraqi citizens. Demonstrators in Mosul also burned the Iranian flag and carried signs demanding “Nouri, Leave!”

The largest protest occurred in Anbar, where popular committees protected the crowds and searched attendees in order to ensure that they were unarmed, lest anyone attempt to escalate into violence.  Sizable demonstrations also took place in Ninewah and Samarra, with smaller protests in Bayji, Salah ad Din; Baqubah, Diyala; and Baghdad’s Adhamiyah, Ameriya and Doura neighborhoods. The protests remained notably peaceful, and clerics rebuffed calls from al-Qaeda in Iraq for Sunnis to take up arms against the Maliki government. While pro-government protests staged during the early weeks of the crisis have since tapered off, supporters of the Iranian-backed, militant proxy group Asaib Ahl al-Haq gathered in Kut on Friday to denounce Turkey and recent statements by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to form an “rational government” in Iraq.

Amidst the demonstrations, Deputy Prime Minister Saleh Mutlaq met to discuss the current crisis and the protesters demands with several Shi’ite politicians from the National Alliance, including Ibrahim al-Jaafari, Hadi al-Ameri, and Khalid al-Attiyah. Mutlaq said the meeting was productive, unlike previous ones, and that they reached an agreement to follow up on detainee cases and transfer those held by the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior to facilities run by the Ministry of Justice.

Also on Friday, Muqtada al-Sadr called his ministers to Najaf to discuss the possibility of withdrawing from the government if the protesters’ demands are not addressed. Sadr last pulled his ministers in January 2007, after Maliki refused to set a timetable for the US withdrawal. It is not clear how serious Sadr is in threatening a similar boycott. The move may be an effort to exert leverage over Maliki, and Sadr may not follow through on his rhetoric. Last year, for example, under pressure from other Shi’a parties and Iran, Sadr pulled back from previous threats to side with Iraqiyya and the Kurds in the no-confidence effort even after a much-publicized visit to Erbil.  Nevertheless, the Sadrists are not cooperating with Maliki right now.  On Thursday January 31, Sadrist MP Bahaa al-Araji refused Maliki’s request that Sadrists fill the posts of Iraqiyya ministers who are currently boycotting the cabinet. Prominent Iraqiyya leader and Finance Minister Rafa al-Issawi applauded the Sadrists’ actions and said that Maliki’s effort to enforce compulsory leave for Iraqiyya ministers was unconstitutional.

On Saturday, Maliki called for dialogue to resolve the political crisis in a news conference with Ammar al-Hakim, the head of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. Maliki stressed that the current standoff does not serve anyone, while Hakim urged the Iraqiyya list to end its parliamentary boycott in order to “create the right climate to speed implementation and application of the resolutions of the Council of Ministers and meet the needs of the demonstrators." Hakim had recently returned from a trip to Iran where he consulted with leaders including Iranian parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on the current political crisis.

Also on Saturday, hackers calling themselves “Team Kuwait” targeted the prime minister’s website, posting a picture of two mourning women declaring their support for Iraqis who were fighting Maliki’s oppression. The pictures were removed within several hours, and the Maliki government did not comment on the incident, which was the second cyber-attack against Maliki’s office in the last two weeks.

Friday’s protests show that Sunni tribal and religious leaders are continuing their strategy of peaceful demonstrations, despite fears that the current political crisis would escalate into widespread violence following last week’s incident. The peaceful nature of the protests also suggest that tribal leaders have retained control and influence, and that thus far al-Qaeda has not been able to capitalize on disaffected Sunnis to broaden armed resistance.  Reports of outreach between tribal leaders in Anbar, Ninewah, and Salah ad-Din and southern tribes in an effort to foster a dialogue about the protesters demands also indicates a broader movement amongst Iraqi tribes to resolve the crisis. The Maliki government’s response also continues to be one of restraint. Ongoing negotiations between political blocs as well as Iraq’s tribal leaders suggest that all sides have concluded that a violent escalation is not in their interest, at least for now. Still, Maliki is unlikely to accede fully to protesters’ demands, as doing so would undermine a key pillar in his strategy for maintaining security and political dominance.

2013 Iraq Update #5: Friday's Protests Will Gauge Direction of Iraqi Crisis

February 1, 2013

By Stephen Wicken and Sam Wyer

The Iraqi Army’s fatal shooting of eight anti-government protesters in Fallujah on Friday, January 25, has increased fears that violence will escalate further. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has attempted to use a combination of concession and repression to deescalate tensions and gradually force the reduction of anti-government protests.

The Iraqi Ministry of Defense, for example, quickly opened an investigation into the Fallujah shooting. The army also withdrew from Fallujah to avoid further confrontations with angry protesters or radical elements. Maliki then held a joint security meeting with provincial security officials in order to stress the Iraqi Government’s “keenness to deal positively with the demonstrations and the demonstrators.” Meanwhile, the head of the committee tasked with addressing demonstrators’ demands, Deputy Prime Minister Hussein al-Shahristani, announced on January 29 that the government would increase the salaries of around 41,000 members of the Sahwa movement. The move is likely aimed at discouraging Sunni tribesmen from joining or supporting al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).

Maliki has also begun to move against the tribal leaders who have assumed leadership of the protest movement, however. Maliki was reported to have removed the security detail of prominent Anbari Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha on January 30. In response, the Council of Anbar Tribes pledged to protect Abu Risha in the absence of government protection. Then on January 31, an Iraqi Army force—reportedly deployed from Baghdad—arrested Sheikh Meshaal Nawaf al-Hassan and his two sons in Tikrit. Hassan is thought to be a strong supporter and prominent organizer of the Salah ad-Din protests.

Sunni tribal leaders largely have refrained from calling for a violent reaction to the Fallujah incidents, and many have urged restraint. It is possible that Abu Risha and Dulaimi tribal leader Ali Hatem al-Suleiman are awaiting Maliki’s response to the former’s ultimatum that the government turn over the troops responsible for killing protesters in Fallujah within seven days – a deadline that would expire this coming weekend. Various Iraqi tribal representatives held a Conference of Iraqi Unity in Najaf  on January 28,in which they called for the rejection of sectarianism, the release of uncharged detainees, the unity of Iraq, and the de-escalation of the tension in Anbar. The possibility remains, however, that tribal leaders are quietly mobilizing forces in anticipation of further clashes.

As tribal leaders take an increasingly prominent role in Sunni political landscape, Sunni parliamentarians appear to be receding in importance. This is likely due to their inability to formulate or communicate a clear response to the political crisis. This is particularly evident in the case of Saleh al-Mutlak, who was reported on January 28 to have resigned from his post as Deputy Prime Minister in protest at the government’s failure to meet demonstrators’ demands. Subsequent facts challenge this report, however.  On January 30 Mutlak’s website stated that he had received the Jordanian Ambassador to Iraq, Mohammed Mustafa Qura’an, in his capacity as Deputy Prime Minister. Mutlak was also said to have met with U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Robert Stephen Beecroft on Thursday 31 January to discuss bilateral relations.

Mutlak’s ambiguous status further obscures Iraqiyya’s response to the ongoing crisis. Iraqiyya’s ministers are thought to have been boycotting cabinet meetings but continuing to run their ministries. After Maliki announced on January 24 that he would place boycotting ministers on “compulsory leave” and replace them, Iraqiyya denied boycotting the meetings, insisting that it would attend “all sessions” concerning the interests of Iraqi citizens. On Thursday, January 31, however, Iraqiyya MP Liqa’a Wardi appeared to confirm that Iraqiyya members were boycotting both the cabinet and parliament “in solidarity with the demonstrators.” The absence of a coherent and clearly communicated strategy on the part of Sunni politicians stands in contrast to their apparent unity in parliament on January 27, when they joined Kurdish, Sadrist, and ISCI MPs to garner 170 votes to limit the terms of the president, prime minister, and parliamentary speaker – a symbolic vote clearly aimed at Maliki. Iraqiyya’s MPs seem to have turned out in force and voted in unison for the measure.

The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), the umbrella group of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and other radical groups will likely find more opportunities to exploit widespread disillusionment about Sunni political marginalization, increasing the potential for violent confrontation. In retaliation last Friday’s shooting in Fallujah, ISI militants attacked Iraqi Army posts around Fallujah, forcing the army to withdraw. Following these attacks, on January 30 ISI released an audio statement calling for Iraqi Sunnis to take up arms against the Maliki government. ISI spokesman Abu Mohammed al-Adnani urged Sunnis to “continue with your blessed demonstrations, and prepare to hold weapons, which the apostate will force you to carry.... only at that time will we restore our dignity.” This raises the possibility that AQI might attempt to provoke further confrontations by attacking security forces during Friday’s protests.

Protests planned for Friday, February 1 have been labeled ‘Friday of Loyalty to Fallujah’s Martyrs’. These protests, particularly in Fallujah, will indicate whether demonstrators are committed to nonviolent opposition to the Maliki government. The behavior of the crowds will illustrate how much control tribal leaders are able to maintain. The protests will also test security forces’ ability to maintain restraint in the face of heated rhetoric and popular anger. Friday’s protests will therefore provide a significant indicator of whether the anti-government protest movement escalating on a path to confrontation and violence.

2013 Iraq Weekly Update #4c: Iraq Moves Toward Civil War

January 26, 2013

By Marisa Sullivan

Thousands of Iraqis gathered in Fallujah on Saturday, 26 January, to bury the protesters killed the day before by Iraqi Army fire. At a protest following the funerals, demonstrators denounced the government in language reminiscent of the early stages of the uprising in Syria, chanting "Listen Maliki, we are free people" and "Take your lesson from Bashar.” Many protesters displayed Saddam-era flags, signaling their sympathy with the former Ba’ath regime.  Photos from the funeral also show demonstrators waving the black flag of al-Qaeda.

In a televised interview broadcast on Saturday, prominent Anbari tribal leader Ahmed Abu Risha issued an ultimatum giving the government seven days to turn over those responsible for killing the protesters or face "losses among their ranks." Abu Risha’s statements echoed threats that other prominent tribal sheikhs, including Ali Hatem al-Suleiman, had issued on Friday.  Tribal leaders, rather than local or national Sunni politicians, are likely guiding the crowds’ responses to the crisis, for now.  But it is difficult to see how Maliki can meet the sheikhs’ ultimatum.

Also on Saturday, militants continued their attacks against Iraqi army positions in and around Fallujah. Iraqi media reported clashes between gunmen and security forces in the Moheet and Julan neighborhoods of eastern Fallujah. Militants also overran a military post in northern Fallujah after attacking it with mortars and RPGs. In a separate incident, the Iraqi Security Forces, via the Anbar Operations Command, reported that protesters overran and set fire to an army checkpoint, but that no one was hurt in the incident. Three off-duty soldiers en route to Baghdad were also kidnapped south of the city that day.

The al-Qaeda linked Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), which claimed responsibility for Friday’s attacks against government forces, is likely linked to Saturday’s incidents.  The group has tried to escalate current crisis through provocative attacks, and it is possible that it could draw increased support from disaffected Sunnis as the standoff with the government turns violent.  It is also possible that the group’s actions are being tolerated right now by Anbari tribal leaders who have sought to maintain control of their constituents while satisfying demands for revenge.

The Iraqi Army seems to be attempting to exercise restraint rather than escalating the confrontation.  The Iraqi government announced it had pulled army forces from the Fallujah following the deaths of six soldiers and police were killed in incidents on Saturday and another early Sunday.  Other anti-government demonstrations took place in Mosul, but the federal police forces withdrew from the protest area fearing a violent confrontation. 

As the events unfolded in Fallujah, the Iraqi parliament passed legislation barring the prime minister from seeking a third term in office—a move prompted by the violent events, as well as longstanding fears over his consolidation of power and authoritarian tendencies. The bill drew support from 170 parliamentarians, including those from Iraqiyya, the Kurdish parties, and the Sadrist Trend. The move was significant for opponents of Maliki, who have previously struggled to gain a 163-vote majority required for a no-confidence vote in the prime minister.  Political parties do seem to be rallying against the Prime Minister in the wake of the shootings.

Yet the term limit initiative is unlikely to result in real limitations on the prime minister. In 2010, the judiciary ruled that only the cabinet could draft new legislation, effectively limiting the legislative power of the parliament. Members of Maliki’s State of Law coalition have already indicated they will challenge the bill and will likely receive judicial support for their appeal. The Federal Supreme Court might also strike down the term limits on grounds that it attempts to alter constitutional provisions while bypassing the prescribed amendment process.  The Parliament has in fact demanded that Maliki show his hand and his intent to retain or relinquish power through electoral means.  Maliki has refused.

Maliki had previously tried to contain the protests through non-violent means. Maliki had offered notional concessions by standing up a committee led by Maliki ally Deputy Prime Minister Hussein al-Shahristani to investigate protest demands and releasing some detainees.  He had also closed the Jordanian border, a critical commercial node in Anbar’s economy, in order to strangle off the protests and logistics supporting them. Yet Maliki had also warned that he would not allow the demonstrations to continue indefinitely.

The recent violence leaves Maliki with few good options to prevent the conflict’s escalation while retaining power. He is not likely to be able to meet the sheikhs’ demands to turn over the Iraqi soldiers responsible for the violence, because to do so would enervate his entire army.  He might offer promptly to pay compensation or involve tribal leaders in a joint investigation, but such concessions will not likely suffice even if made rapidly.

Friday’s escalation and the subsequent attacks against Iraqi Security Forces may ultimately require Maliki to respond with force, even though he may not wish to do so as of today.  The violent confrontation will likely persist as both sides take retaliatory measures.  Anbari tribal sheikhs’ restraint is not likely to last more than the seven days that they have given Maliki to act.  Increasing sectarian polarization has deterred meaningful negotiation and compromise, and reduces the likelihood of a political solution to the crisis.  Iraq may be tipping toward a destructive civil war.

2013 Iraq Weekly Update #4b: Fallujah Protests Turn Violent

January 25, 2013

By Marisa Sullivan, Stephen Wicken, and Sam Wyer

Anti-government demonstrations turned violent today as Iraqi security forces fired on protesters in Fallujah. The confrontation began when protesters in eastern Fallujah attempted to join Friday’s demonstration and were blocked by security forces deployed from Baghdad. The demonstrators began to throw rocks and water bottles at the security forces at the checkpoint.  In videos from the scene, the protesters appear to be unarmed, though Prime Minister Maliki later accused the demonstrators of firing on security forces. Iraqi army forces escalated by firing warning shots into the air, but soon they began to fire directly at the crowd. Protesters also escalated by torching several army vehicles and two cars, including one belonging to an Iraqiyya politician and another to a local politician. Initial reports indicate as many as seven protesters were killed and more than 60 were wounded in the incident.

Click map to enlarge (PDF)

The Iraqi government responded by instituting a vehicle ban and curfew in Fallujah. The Ministry of Defense also announced it would launch an investigation into the incident and that federal police would replace Iraqi army units in Fallujah within 24 hours. The Iraqi Army unit involved in the confrontation is not known. Soldiers from the 1^st Division (also known as the 1^st Rapid Intervention Force) are present in Fallujah, but the force may have been from the 6^th or 9^th Iraqi Army Divisions, which are stationed in and north of Baghdad. The 6^th Iraqi Army Division has a brigade stationed in Abu Ghraib, not far from Fallujah.

Several hours later, clashes between gunmen and security forces occurred in the al-Askari neighborhood in eastern Fallujah and the al-Shuhada neighborhood in southern Fallujah. In the latter incident, unknown gunmen attacked an army checkpoint in southern Fallujah, killing three soldiers. The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), a group linked to al-Qaeda in Iraq, is claiming responsibility for the attacks and calling for people to join the "jihad" in Fallujah on Twitter. On Friday evening, they declared that "gunmen [were] deployed in the streets of Fallujah to protect the protesters."

That evening, tribal leaders in Ramadi attempted to calm demonstrators after the Fallujah events. Angry crowds in Ramadi chanted “the people want to declare jihad against the government,” rebuffing tribal figures. However, the tribal sheikhs responded by condemning members of the Anbar Provincial Council for being corrupted by association with the central government.

Prominent Anbari tribal sheikh Ali Hatem al-Suleiman called for an immediate investigation to name those responsible for killing the protesters. He insisted that the protesters were unarmed and had committed no crime. He threatened to take his armed men to Fallujah to confront the army the next day if the perpetrators of the violence were not named.

Maliki initially accused “a group of misguided people” of attacking an army checkpoint in a “deliberate act”. However, he also warned of attempts by intelligence services of regional actors, “remnants of the former regime,” and al-Qaeda “to drag the armed forces into a confrontation with the demonstrators.” The premier called on tribal figures from Anbar to “move to extinguish the fire of sedition,” and asked demonstrators to abstain from provoking the army.

After a meeting of Iraqiyya leaders at the residence of Parliamentary Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi on Friday evening, Iraqiyya called for the Shi’a Iraqi National Alliance and the religious authority in Najaf to replace Maliki. Nujaifi stated that the coalition held the National Alliance responsible for Maliki’s actions, and demanded that the bloc provide an alternative candidate who “respects Iraqi blood and preserves the unity, stability, and security of Iraq.” Nujaifi added that political dialogue was unfeasible with Maliki in place. Saleh al-Mutlak, a founding Iraqiyya leader who has become estranged from the rest of the bloc’s leadership in recent weeks, announced the withdrawal of his National Dialogue Front (Hiwar) from the upcoming provincial elections in protest at the “crimes” against the demonstrators. This is not the first time Mutlak has threatened an electoral boycott: he made similar statements during the de-Ba’athification crisis ahead of the 2010 parliamentary elections, although he later retracted his threats. Mutlak was attacked by protesters in Anbar in late December, suggesting that his support among Sunni Arabs has declined recently.

Muqtada al-Sadr denounced the “assault” on the demonstrators and called on the security forces to “exercise the highest degree of restraint”, stressing the need to “provide security and protection for the demonstrators and maintain their safety.”

Today’s events suggest a significant escalation in Iraq’s ongoing crisis after weeks of anti-government protests. Sunni protesters and tribal leaders in Anbar are now threatening to abandon politics and return to violence as the primary means for addressing their grievances. A violent response by Sunni groups or security forces could prompt security and stability in Iraq to unravel.

2013 Iraq Weekly Update #4: The Islamic State of Iraq Increases Spectacular Attacks

January 24^th, 2013

By Sam Wyer

Iraq SIGACTs January 1-23, 2013

The heat map displays attacks in Iraq from January 1-23, 2013. Data was compiled from open-source reporting from Western and Iraqi sources. This map does not provide an exhaustive account of security incidents in Iraq during the period in question; rather, it represents geographic concentrations of violence.

The volume and lethality of terrorist attacks in Iraq has risen in January 2013 compared to the final three months of 2012. In the context of Iraq’s current political crises, these attacks threatened to ignite growing sectarian, ethnic, and political tensions and suggest a concerted effort by radical Sunni elements to undermine the peaceful anti-government movement and eliminate its tribal leadership.

So far, there have been more deaths in January 2013 than in December, November, or October of 2012. According to the AFP count, at least 218 people have been killed since the New Year, up from 144 in December, 160 in November, and 136 in October of last year. The British NGO Iraq Body Count marks January’s death toll at over 300. According to the Olive Group, the week of January 14 – 20, 2013 saw the highest number of reported security incidents in Iraq in the last 12 months, with the number of incidents in the North Central Region (Sulaymaniyah, Kirkuk, Salah ad-Din, and Diyala) nearly double the weekly average. The rise in this month’s volume of attacks and number of causalities demonstrates the enduring capacity of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), the umbrella organization of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the group likely responsible for the majority of the attacks.

In the summer of 2012, ISI launched the so-called “Destroying the Walls” campaign in an attempt to free Sunni prisoners and regain lost territory in Iraq. In particular, the campaign featured three attack waves in July, August, and September, each hitting a wide range of targets in a single day, in some cases from Basra to Mosul. This month’s attacks, however, have not occurred as a single attack wave, but have come in the form of weekly spectacular attacks that have included suicide bombings, shootings, and political assassinations.

ISI likely launched high-profile, targeted attacks in order to thwart the political and tribal leadership of the current anti-government movement in northern and western Iraq and take revenge against former Sahwa members. In the past week, suspected al-Qaeda gunmen assassinated two Sunni tribal leaders, Saber Ahmed al-Abassi in Salah ad-Din and Mohammed Hadi al-Julaimi in Anbar. Both individuals are former Sahwa leaders and reportedly helped organize the recent anti-government protests. These targeted attacks follow last week’s assassinations of Mohammed Abdul Rabbo al-Jubouri in Ninewa and Iraqiyya MP Ayfan Saadun al-Issawi in Anbar, both prominent supporters of the ongoing demonstrations. As Iraqi Sunnis become increasingly disillusioned with the failures of political participation, ISI will likely increase its attempts to radicalize the anti-government movement and sideline Sunni tribal leaders.

In a statement released on January 20^th, ISI claimed responsibility for the assassination of Ayfan Saadun al-Issawi. The group labeled al-Issawi as a traitor and a “dog of the Americans,” stating that his death should “be an example and a lesson for those after him.” Voicing its support for the rebel forces in Syria, ISI justified attacks in Anbar as a means to “cut off the vein that is extending the life of the [Assad] regime to kill your brothers in the Levant.” ISI has demonstrated its intent to conduct both targeted political assassinations and large scale bombings, in order to take advantage of the growing sectarian crisis in Iraq and Syria and seek retribution against former Sahwa leaders.

ISI attacks are not limited to Sunni areas. Several recent high-profile attacks have targeted Shi’ite and Kurdish areas of Salah ad-Din and Kirkuk, and they coincide with a tense military standoff between the Iraqi central government and the Kurdish Peshmerga forces in the disputes territories along the Green Line, threatening to exacerbate tensions.

On January 23, a suicide bomber infiltrated a funeral procession in the Shi’ite Sayyid al-Shuhada Mosque in the northern town of Tuz Khurmatu. At least 42 people were killed and dozens more wounded, making the attack the deadliest since ISI’s late summer “Destroying the Walls” campaign. Tuz Khurmatu sits on the ethno-sectarian fault line between the Kurdish Regional Government in the north and the Iraqi central government and has been a primary target for ISI attacks in the past because of its demographics. The town is home to a number of Turkmen Shi’ites and Kurds. In recent weeks, ISI has targeted Kurdish political offices, including the local office of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in Tuz Khurmatu on January 16.

The geographic spread of ISI’s recent attacks is consistent with the group’s historic areas of operation in northern and central Iraq. This month’s attacks are concentrated around Fallujah and Abu Ghraib west of Baghdad; towns in southern Diyala province; areas along the Tigris river in Salah ad-Din province; and the cities of Kirkuk and Mosul in the north. These areas are also the focal points for the anti-government demonstrations. In statements released this month, ISI has voiced its support of the anti-government movement, while continuing to assassinate the tribal leaders organizing the efforts. Unsurprisingly, many prominent tribal leaders, including Ali Hatem al-Suleiman in Anbar, have rejected ISI’s support for the protests. This month’s attacks are a reminder that ISI is a powerful actor with the capability to threaten the fragile ethno-sectarian balance in Iraq. As the political crises in Iraq progress, ISI will continue to take advantage of growing tensions and exacerbate the already flammable situation in Iraq.

2013 Weekly Iraq Update #3: Mapping the Iraq Protests- Week 4

January 12 – January 17, 2013

by Sam Wyer

A series of attacks this week targeted prominent Sunni leaders and Kurdish political offices as anti-government demonstrations continued in Iraq for a fourth week. While no group has thus far claimed responsibility, the attacks have the potential to escalate the political crisis in Iraq and may suggest a move by al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) to exacerbate already strained ethno-sectarian tensions. The targeting of Sunni officials will likely raise questions within the Sunni population regarding the possibility of the government of Iraq’s involvement and its inability to provide adequate security. AQI may also be attempting to ignite the military standoff between Iraqi and Peshmerga military forces in the north. Thus, the attacks add to the complexity of the ongoing political and security crises in Iraq.

Click map to enlarge.

The first attack took place on January 13^th when Iraqi Finance Minister Rafia al-Issawi’s convoy wastargeted by a roadside improvised explosive device (IED) near the city of Fallujah, just west of Baghdad. Issawi was traveling between Fallujah and Abu Ghraib when the IED detonated, hitting a vehicle in the convoy but resulting in no fatalities. While no group has claimed responsibility for the attack, it bears the hallmarks of AQI; however, Iraqiyya has blamed the Maliki government. Two days after the attack, Iraqiyya parliamentarian Muthar al-Janabi accused the Muthanna Brigade (also known as the 24^th Infantry Brigade of the Iraqi 6^th Army Division) of orchestrating the attack against Issawi. Janabi claimed that the Muthanna Brigade, which operates around Abu Ghraib, has a precedent of targeting or facilitating attacks against Maliki’s political opponents, citing two attempts against Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq in the area over the last year, including an IED attack last August. Following the assassination attempt, the Iraqiyya bloc called for a full investigation, stating that it holds Maliki responsible for security lapses as commander-in-chief.

A day later, on January 14^th, unidentified gunmen assassinated tribal leader Mohammed Taher Abdul Rabbo al-Jubouri near his house outside the town of Badush in Ninewa province, northwest of Mosul. Rabbo was reportedly one of the main organizers of the ongoing anti-government demonstrations in Ninewa province. He also headed the Independent Elder Spears Bloc that is registered to participate in the upcoming provincial elections as part of the Iraqi Nakhweh Coalition in Ninewa province, a coalition consisting of tribal and religious groups in Ninewa. Atheel Nujaifi, the governor of Ninewa and a supporter of the anti-government demonstrations, and his first deputy attended Rabbo’s funeral on January 16^th.

Attacks also targeted senior Sunni Awakening leaders in Anbar. On January 15^th, a suicide bomber disguised as a construction worker assassinated Iraqiyya MP Ayfan Saadun al-Issawi near the town of Fallujah. The explosion killed Saadun and six others, including members of his security detail. Saadun was a prominent leader of the Awakening movement and a previous target of attacks by al-Qaeda in Iraq. He was not related to Rafia al-Issawi.In a separate incident, mortars targeted the home of Hamid al-Hayes on January 16^th, a prominent Anbar Awakening leader and the chairman of the Anbar Salvation Council, which is registered for the provincial elections in Anbar. Hamid al-Hayes has generally been politically aligned with Maliki; the Anbar Salvation Council backed his candidacy for premiership in 2010. AQI is likely using the current environment both to exacerbate sectarian tensions between Sunni protesters and Maliki’s Shi’ite government and to settle old scores with the Awakening.

Following this week’s attacks, however, numerous political parties and tribal groups have focused their blame on Maliki’s government for failing to provide adequate security against terrorist attacks. In a statement, the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) declared that the two recent assassinations “aim at hindering the calls for reformations and silencing the masses’ voice.” Others have accused Iran of playing a role in the attacks in order to deter anti-government demonstrations. Awakening leader Abu Risha blamed the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) for facilitating the assassinations under the guise of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Furthermore, tribal leader Ali Hatem al-Suleiman warned of the use of Iranian militias to break up protests. Despite the lack of evidence of Iranian involvement in the attacks, such statements demonstrate the growing sectarian framing of the conflict.

AQI may also be attempting to aggravate ethnic tensions as car bombs targeted Kurdish political offices on January 16^th in northern Iraq. In the disputed city of Kirkuk, a suicide truck bomb detonated outside the local office of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the Kurdish political party led by President of the Kurdistan Regional Government Massoud Barzani. On the same day, a suicide car bomb targeted the offices of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in Tuz Khurmatu, a city south of Kirkuk. Over the past few months, tension between Baghdad and Erbil has remained high as negotiations have failed to diffuse the military standoff around Kirkuk. Violent attacks, therefore, increase the danger of miscalculation.

AQI has a long history of targeting Sunni, Kurdish, and Shi’a government officials, and this week’s attacks may be an attempt by the terrorist group to take advantage of the heightened political crisis to exacerbate ethno-sectarian tensions. Even if AQI is responsible, Maliki’s government will likely be blamed for failing to provide security, and the continued targeting of Sunni officials may fuel greater Sunni discontent in Anbar, Salah ad-Din, and Ninewa. At the same time, Iraqi security forces continue to encircle the anti-government demonstrations in an effort to prevent their spread. The Iraq-Jordan border remains closed, despite pledges of its reopening. In the north, Iraq stated that it has closed the Rabia and Walid border crossings with Syria until January 20^th for unspecified security reasons. The Tigris Operations Command also announced plans to restrict protests in Hawija. Maliki has already warned demonstrators of terrorist plots in Fallujah and Ramadi, a move meant to deter protests. This week’s attacks may provide Maliki an excuse to further increase security cordons around the anti-government demonstrations, which could ultimately lead to miscalculation and confrontation with the protesters. Despite measures to contain the demonstrations, anti-government protests continue and preparations for this Friday’s rallies are well underway. AQI continued efforts to fuel the political crisis heighten the danger for escalation.