2013 Iraq Update #14: Political Calculations Trump Security Concerns

April 5, 2013

by Stephen Wicken

Tikrit bombing bears al-Qaeda hallmarks

A suicide bomber detonated an oil tanker packed with explosives inside a compound housing government administrative offices in central Tikrit on April 1, killing at least nine people. Police at the scene suggested that guards may not have inspected the tanker because of the daily inflow of fuel trucks – the Baiji oil refinery is near Tikrit. Violence in northern Salah ad-Din province has been common in recent months, with a major suicide bombing killing 35 people at a funeral in Tuz Khurmatu district in January, and another killing at least seven people in a two-car bombing in central Dujail district this week. Although no group has taken responsibility for the Tikrit attack, a spectacular attack against government offices suggests that the perpetrators were likely linked to the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), al-Qaeda in Iraq’s front group. The group is known to monitor the movements of tanker drivers, forcing them to pay protection money. Furthermore, dozens of ISI members escaped from a prison in Tikrit in September 2012 after an ISI-coordinated attack in which militants destroyed the prison archives relating to the group’s members. ISI recently claimed 49 attacks in Anbar province between January 13 and February 10, including the suicide bombing that killed MP and former Awakening leader Ayfan Sa‘doun al-Issawi and the IED attack on the convoy for former Finance Minister Rafia al-Issawi. The Tikrit attack came on the same day that Manaf Abd al-Rahim al-Rawi, thought to have been ISI’s ‘governor’ in Baghdad, was executed along with three other ISI members. 

ISI has used tankers in the past, filling trucks with chlorine gas in order to kill police and Awakening members in Anbar in 2007. The Tikrit tanker bombing suggests that the group remains adaptive in its attempts to carry out spectacular attacks against government officials, security forces, local politicians, and civilians. It is possible that the high-profile Tikrit bombing constitutes part of a campaign to degrade security in Salah ad-Din in order to encourage Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government to postpone elections in the province, as it has done in the other predominantly Sunni provinces of Anbar and Ninewa. Sunni boycotts of the 2005 elections, at that time voluntary rather than compelled by the government, favored ISI by exacerbating the sense of Sunni disenfranchisement and lack of representation in ways that increased active and passive support for the insurgency. 

Maliki avoids security questioning in parliament

Despite the official explanation that the security situation in northern and western Iraq had prompted the decision to delay elections, Prime Minister Maliki declined a Sadrist request to attend a parliament on April 1 to discuss the recent violence. Maliki cited “the confidentiality of security information” as his reason for refusing to answer MPs’ questions, and instead proposed to discuss security at a cabinet meeting with the heads of political blocs and parliamentary committees. The proposal, and Maliki’s alternative, drew criticism from political opponents, with Parliamentary Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi accusing Maliki of marginalizing the role of parliament by preferring the cabinet. With Sunni opponents of the prime minister continuing to boycott cabinet meetings and Kurdish parties boycotting both government and parliament, addressing the subject at a cabinet meeting would ensure that only Maliki’s allies would attend. Haider al-Mulla, spokesman for Maliki’s erstwhile ally Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlak who recently returned to cabinet meetings along with two allies from his Arab Iraqiyya faction,, suggested that Maliki was seeking to avoid questions about monopolizing security files and merging militias with security forces, thus contributing to unprofessional and ineffective security forces. Maliki’s refusal to appear also drew criticism from Sadrist MPs. 

Maliki has appeared in parliament to discuss security before. The prime minister attended in September 2007, answering questions and delivering an optimistic assessment despite a more unstable security environment than exists today. He returned in December 2009 to engage in a closed-door session after an ISI bombing killed more than 120 people and wounded more than 400 in Baghdad. Since that time, however, Maliki has avoided questioning in parliament, particularly since a campaign to withdraw confidence in the premier gained momentum in early 2012. The constitutional procedure for moving towards a no-confidence vote involves the ‘interrogation’ (istjiwab) of a minister; recent requests for Maliki to discuss security breaches in parliament have concerned ‘questioning’ (masala) the premier, a separate constitutional provision that is unrelated to no-confidence proceedings. Maliki cannot afford to be seen by potential voters as weak on security before the provincial elections, however, particularly having used security as the justification for postponing provincial elections in Anbar and Ninewa. 

Electoral commission proposes new date for Anbar and Ninewa votes

The Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) announced on April 2 that it had submitted a proposal to Maliki suggesting that elections in Anbar and Ninewa be held on May 18, just under a month after they are held elsewhere. IHEC electoral administration head Mekdad al-Sharifi stated that he had consulted with the Supreme Security Committee overseeing electoral security, the head of which, Major General Ahmed al-Khafaji, referred to plans by al-Qaeda to disrupt elections, likely as a means of justifying the postponement. IHEC stated prior to the postponement that it had completed technical preparations for voting in all provinces: the announcement is likely intended to affirm the body’s independence and professionalism ahead of the elections. 

The IHEC proposal must now be addressed by Maliki. Under the terms of the election postponement, the delayed polls must be held within six months of April 20, when the elections will take place in all other provinces but Kirkuk, which is excluded from the vote because of ongoing disputes about ethnic representation. If Maliki agrees to hold the elections within a month of the original date, it would suggest that Maliki feels he has gained enough politically from the delay by slowing the momentum of the anti-government protest movement and its political allies while aiding preferred Sunni figures such as Saleh al-Mutlak. In the period since the delay was announced on March 19, significant cleavages have emerged between key Sunni Arab rivals, with Mutlak and Jamal al-Karbouli accusing their former allies Osama al-Nujaifi and Rafia al-Issawi of seeking to divide Iraq along sectarian lines at the behest of regional powers. The split has been mirrored among anti-government protesters over the question of negotiation with Maliki. With key Sunni politicians attacking one another and the protest movement divided, Maliki may now see a purpose in going ahead with elections sooner rather than later. With violence continuing to spike both in the areas where elections have been postponed and beyond, Maliki’s response to IHEC’s proposal will illustrate whether he believes he has sufficiently arrested the momentum of the protest movement and its political allies, or whether he assesses that he needs more time to weaken his opponents. It will also indicate whether Maliki will heed or continue to overrule IHEC’s recommendations, an important indicator of how the premier may respond to the elections body during and after the provincial elections later this month. 

Stephen Wicken is a Research Analyst at the Institute for the Study of War.

2013 Iraq Update #13: Sunni Split as Sadrists Return to Government

April 2, 2013

By Stephen Wicken

Long-standing divisions between Sunni Arab politicians came to a head last week as Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlak and allied ministers returned to cabinet sessions, breaking with their former allies. Mutlak’s return confirms the split between his Arab Iraqiyya list and the Uniters (Mutahidun) coalition of Parliamentary Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi and former Finance Minister Rafia al-Issawi. Justifying his return to government, Mutlak accused Nujaifi and Issawi of seeking to divide Iraq. Divisions over the question of engagement with the Maliki government are also increasingly evident among anti-government protesters in predominantly Sunni provinces, with opposing views coming from the protests in Ramadi and Fallujah. In contrast, ministers belonging to the Sadrist Trend ended their boycott of Maliki’s government within a week, highlighting the political nature of the move ahead of provincial elections while demonstrating that the Sadrists remain firmly within the Shi‘a bloc despite a number of similar attempts to draw a line between their movement and the Maliki government. 

Divisions among protesters on government negotiation

Serious divisions appeared among anti-government protesters in Anbar last week over the direction of the protest movement and the question of negotiation with the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The split was exemplified by the differing names attached to protests held on Friday, March 29: the organizers of the protest in Fallujah gathered under the banner ‘No Negotiation,’ while protests in Ramadi and elsewhere took the label ‘Hand-in-Hand We Reclaim our Rights.’ While previous Friday protests have been given more than one name, this is the first time that representatives for the protests have openly acknowledged the difference. A press spokesman for the Fallujah sit-in, Sheikh Mohammed al-Bajaari, told journalists that the Fallujah protesters, in agreement with protesters in Mosul, Salah ad-Din, Diyala, and Kirkuk, had agreed on the ‘No Negotiation’ banner to demonstrate their rejection of negotiation with the government, noting that only the Ramadi protesters had decided upon the alternative name for the day’s protests. 

The division emerged after the head of the Anbari protesters’ political committee, Abd al-Razzaq al-Shammari, announced on March 24 that the anti-government protesters in each province would begin the process of assembling a delegation to negotiate with the Maliki government. Shammari stated that the delegation would comprise between two and five representatives from each province in which protests are taking place, carrying with them a list of 14 demands. Among the demands, Shammari specifically mentioned the call for the government to hand over the members of the security forces responsible for shooting protesters at Fallujah on January 25. The remaining 13 demands are likely those outlined on January 6, to which the government has already shown reticence in responding; the addition of the demand to surrender the Fallujah shooters diminishes further the likelihood of significant concessions from Maliki. Nonetheless, the prime minister welcomed the decision to form a negotiating committee, likely noting that the decision to negotiate implies recognition of his authority and provides him with an opportunity to make targeted concessions. 

Divisions among the protesters became apparent on March 27 when protest representatives met in Ramadi at the home of MP Ahmed al-Alwani to choose their delegates for the negotiating team. At the same time, the Free Iraqi Uprising, an influential group within the protest movement based in Ninewa, sent a 30-person delegation from Mosul to the Fallujah protest. Arriving in Fallujah, the delegation announced its rejection of negotiations with the government and stressed that any delegation sent to Baghdad would not represent them. Supporters of the group withdrew from the Ramadi protests on March 26, relocating to Fallujah in protest at the desire of proponents of negotiation to “sell” the protest movement. Members of the group may also have been among the 10 or so protesters who were handed over to police in Ramadi on March 22 after chanting sectarian slogans and calling for violence against the government. Protest spokesman Said al-Lafi said that the organizing committee had asked the protesters to refrain from repeating sectarian slogans, only for the small group to pelt the stage with bottles and rocks. They were then surrounded by protesters, who handed four of the group over to the police. 

The split among the protesters over negotiation with Maliki increasingly is mirroring divisions between Sunni Arab politicians over involvement in government. Those divisions were made clearer when Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlak returned to cabinet meetings on March 27, abandoning the boycott policy of the Sunni Iraqiyya coalition. Mutlak was joined by Education Minister Mohammed Tamim, a member of his Hiwar party, and Industry and Minerals Minister Ahmed al-Karbouli of al-Hal, also part of Mutlak’s Arab Iraqiyya coalition for the upcoming provincial elections. Mutlak justified his renewed cabinet attendance in a statement by portraying himself as a mediator on behalf of the protesters, listing concessions he had gained from Maliki that included an end to the “secret informer law” that has been used as a vehicle for personal denunciations. While the repeal of the law has been among the protesters’ key demands, the concessions Mutlak claimed to have won are unlikely to do much to endear him to Sunni anti-government protesters, and in any case the explicit split between pro- and anti-negotiation factions will limit his reach to the latter. Mutlak has long been seen as the leading Sunni Arab politician closest to Maliki, and has been forced to balance the demands of appealing to Sunni Arabs and maintaining the relationship with the prime minister that has seen him avoid the fates of Issawi and fugitive vice president Tariq al-Hashemi. Mutlak’s return therefore raises the possibility of other inducements from the prime minister, particularly the position of defense minister with which Mutlak has been linked recently. 

In a subsequent interview, Mutlak’s spokesman Haider al-Mulla insisted that Mutlak was seeking to advance the protesters’ “legitimate demands,” using the opportunity to attack Mutlak’s former allies and key electoral rivals in predominantly Sunni provinces, Osama al-Nujaifi’s Uniters (Mutahidun) list. Where Mutlak’s Arab Iraqiyya are secular nationalists who support the unity of Iraq, claimed Mulla, Nujaifi’s coalition are Islamists who support Kurdish independence and Sunni secession from Iraq. Mutlak picked up Mulla’s line in an interview with al-Iraqiyah state television in which he accused Nujaifi of seeking to form a Sunni federal region from Anbar and Ninewa provinces. Mutlak also alluded to the existence of “serious and important information” about Nujaifi’s electoral ally, former Finance Minister Rafia al-Issawi, recently the target of an apparent arrest attempt. The allusion to Issawi also highlights Mutlak’s proximity to Maliki, who is thought to have been behind the move against the former finance minister. Nujaifi’s coalition responded by accusing Mutlak of selling his conscience in returning to cabinet sessions, while both Tariq al-Hashemi, an ally of Mutlak and Nujaifi in 2010, and Iraqiyya spokeswoman Maysoon al-Damalouji of Ayad Allawi’s Wifaq party, criticized Mutlak’s government participation. Mutlak, in turn, underscored the break with his Sunni former partners by discussing national unity with the leader of the Shi‘a National Alliance, meeting with former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari on March 29.

Sadrist boycott ends within a week

The Sadrist Trend’s threat to boycott cabinet sessions in protest at the Maliki government’s security and service failures was revealed as a populist gambit when the Sadrists resumed participation within a week. The brevity of the boycott highlights once more the slim prospects of the Sadrists taking any serious action to curb Maliki’s consolidation of power, even in the face of Maliki’s apparent unilateral decision to postpone provincial elections in two of Iraq’s provinces. 

Only Sadrist Minister of Social Works Nassar al-Rubaie attended the cabinet session on March 26 in order to present the Sadrists’ conditions for participation. These demands included ratifying a bylaw for the cabinet, reviewing the security arrangements in Anbar and Ninewa provinces, and addressing the “legitimate demand”’ of the protesters. The head of the Sadrist Ahrar bloc in parliament, Bahaa al-Araji, announced the same day that Maliki had agreed to the demands and that the Sadrists were therefore considering returning to the cabinet. Araji confirmed on April 1 that the Sadrists had received “positive indications” that progress had been made on the Anbar and Ninewa investigations and the ratification of cabinet rules, and that Sadrist ministers would therefore resume participation in cabinet meetings from April 2. The brief Sadrist withdrawal from government may have served to distance the movement from Maliki’s government in the eyes of some Shi‘a Arab voters in southern electoral battlegrounds. However, in light of the Sadrists’ short-lived budget protest, their deal with Maliki over control of the Accountability and Justice Commission and the position of Judge Medhat al-Mahmoud at the head of the Federal Supreme Court, and their willingness to abandon reservations about taking over the finance ministry, the move once more demonstrates that the benefits to the Sadrists of accommodation with Maliki outweigh those of opposing him more forcefully.

Stephen Wicken is a Research Analyst at the Institute for the Study of War.

2013 Iraq Update #12: Maliki and Sadr Raise Electoral Stakes

March 22, 2013

By Stephen Wicken and Ahmed Ali

Provincial elections scheduled for April 20 have been postponed in Anbar and Ninewa provinces. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki achieved the delay through the Council of Ministers after provincial politicians claimed security was a critical concern. The move enhances the provincial campaigns of Maliki and his allies and directly limits key Sunni rivals, such as Osama al-Nujaifi and Rafi al-Issawi, whose support derives from these provinces. Meanwhile, Muqtada al-Sadr used the decision to his own political advantage by emphasizing Maliki’s inability to provide security and leading his bloc to boycott the Cabinet as a result. The next four weeks of electoral campaigns will likely concentrate upon Sunni rivalries in Salah ad-Din and Diyala as well as intra-Shi'a rivalries in southern Iraq.

Maliki unilaterally postpones elections in Anbar and Ninewa

On March 19, the Iraqi Council of Ministers, headed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, announcedthat the provincial elections in Anbar and Ninewa will be postponed for a maximum of 6 months. The council attributed the decision to the security situation in both provinces and the need to prevent “terrorists from reaching to the provincial councils.” Mohsen al-Musawi, spokesperson for the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), indicated that IHEC did not have “prior notification” of the decision and only heard about it when it was announced, insisting that IHEC was ready to hold elections in all provinces.

The Council of Ministers took into account the decision on March 11 by the Anbar Provincial Council to postpone the elections and an expressed concern by some parties and personalities in Ninewa that the security environment is not conducive for campaigning. The provincial vote was surprising, given reportsthat, of the 21 Anbar Provincial Council members present, 19 voted to postpone. The only politician whose interests are apparently enhanced by this delay is Mutlak, whose relationship with the Sunni in Anbar has declined over the course of the protest movement; however, Mutlak’s affiliates do not have a majority on the council. The Iraqi Islamic Party is eager for elections to occur as soon as possible, as is Ahmad abu Risha, the former head of the al Sahwa movement. The lack of transparency on the vote makes it difficult to discern why the shift occurred.

Reportedly, the Ninewa-based “Loyalty to Ninewa” bloc also requested that the elections be delayed. The bloc is headed by former Ninewa governor Ghanim al-Baso, who was in office between 2003 and 2004. While it is possible that this bloc and others in Ninewa similarly stand to gain politically by postponing elections, it is also worthwhile to note that AQI is most active in Ninewa, to the degree that IHEC acknowledged that elections preparations were facing particular difficulties there. As of March 23, 14 candidateshave withdrawn from Ninewa elections because of threats from AQI, and a number of poll workers have also withdrawn. It is therefore possible that the security threat in Ninewa is a more genuine impediment to elections.

  

Nevertheless, Ninewa Governor Atheel al-Nujaifi considered the decision a “punishment” against anti-government protesters who have been demonstrating since December 2012 and indicated concerns about the legal status of the councils after their term is finished by April. Similarly, the Iraqi Kurds rejected the decision and condemned the cabinet for voting to postpone the elections despite the absence of the Iraqi Kurds and representatives of the Sunni Iraqiyya coalition at the session. The postponement was also met by angry reactions from Iraqi Shi’a parties. Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) leader Ammar al-Hakim describedthe decision as a “dangerous and very worrying step” and expressed concern that it might set a precedent for postponing the elections in other provinces. Generally, critics of the decision characterized it as a political decision rather than a security precaution. 

Given the securityatmosphere and requests by local governments and politicians to postpone the elections, Maliki appears to feel that he had solid political cover to postpone the elections, despite the fact that that elections were held in Anbar and Ninewa in 2005 in the face of crippling security conditions. Regardless, this is an opportune moment for Maliki to achieve a number of objectives. First, Maliki needs to outmaneuver the protesters and their organizers, who can mobilize in support of Maliki’s opponents in Anbar and Ninewa.  Parliamentary Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi, strong in Ninewa, and former Finance Minister Rafia al-Issawi, strong in Anbar, are employing the protests to rally their bases, and as venues for electoral campaigning. Holding the elections in April will only help them gain votes and increase their influence.

Second, Maliki needs to exhaust his political opponents and deprive them of ready access to voters. Key Sunni politicians, such as al-Nujaifi and Issawi, who would be best positioned in April to consolidate their efforts upon Salah ad Din and Diyala provinces. The decision also means that Maliki can focus on campaigning while undermining his opponents’ abilities to do the same. Third, postponing the elections will benefit Maliki’s political allies in Anbar and Ninewa, such as Mutlak, who are direct competitors to the opponents mentioned above. A delay in the elections will give them the chance to organize and recruit.

Maliki’s decision is a warning about the health of Iraq’s political system. By all accounts, Maliki took the decision unilaterally without consulting IHEC, the Iraqi parliament, or other political blocs. The postponement again raises questions about Maliki’s reach within the Iraqi state and his willingness to use any tools to target opponents. 

                      

Sadrists Intensify Election Campaign with Boycott Threat

The Sadrist Trend announced on March 19 that its ministers would boycott cabinet sessions. The announcement came after a week of intensifying Sadrist criticism of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki that focused on Maliki’s failure to provide services and security – key themes in the Sadrists’ attempts to fashion a populist image. The threat of a boycott suggests an attempt to disassociate the Sadrists from the failures of the Maliki government, an important task given the Sadrists’ hold on a number of service ministries and their consistent, if reluctant support for Maliki since the 2010 elections. At the same time, given Maliki’s willingness to buy Sadrist support through provincial governorships, ministerial appointments, and dealsover the control of independent institutions, it is possible that the Sadrists are using the boycott tactic in order to gain further concessions from the prime minister.

Muqtada al-Sadr began 2013 with moves intended to pressure the premier, voting to limit Maliki’s term as prime minister and threatening to boycott cabinet meetings in protest at the government’s failure to meet the demands of anti-government protesters. The Sadrists were brought on board, however, by an offer to take overthe Finance Ministry from Iraqiyya and a dealover control of the Accountability and Justice Commission. The Sadrists also used the issue of the budget to presentthemselves as populists concerned primarily with Maliki’s failure to provide services and employment, while providing essential support to Maliki in votingfor the budget itself.

On March 15, Sadrist spokesman Salah al-Obaidi criticized Maliki for refusing to meet with Sadr at the latter’s house in Najaf. The next day, the Sadrist Trend organizedits second annual “Day of the Oppressed” mass rally in the city of Kut on March 16. Hundreds of thousands, reportedly including Arab League envoy Naji Shalgham, listened to a televised statement from Muqtada al-Sadr in which the cleric lamented “injustice emanating from tyrannical rulers,” an implicit condemnation of Maliki.

In the past week, the Sadrists’ key complaints have been the security breaches that allowed the high-profile attack on the Ministry of Justice in Baghdad, as well as major bombings in Basra and the capital around the tenth anniversary of the beginning of the U.S.-led war in Iraq. Sadrist MPs called for Maliki to answerquestions in parliament and even to resignover these security breaches. The Sadrists have also been critical of the decision to postpone the provincial elections in Anbar and Ninewa, claimingthat those who voted for the postponement were being “unjust to Iraq and the Shi‘ites,” possibly a general anti-Maliki campaign slogan. Sadrist parliamentary leader Bahaa al-Araji subsequently calledthe decision to postpone “unconstitutionaland unlawful.”

Muqtada al-Sadr heightened the criticism on March 19, issuing a statementcalling Maliki’s government “a subsidy to sin” and insisting that Sadrist involvement with it would be “harmful.” Sadr then roundly criticizedMaliki’s government, accusing the premier of “selling” Iraqi land to Kuwait, allowing al-Qaeda to reappear in Iraq, failing to install a replacement for absent Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, weakening Iraq’s parliament, and politicizing the judiciary. Sadr also stressedhis rejection of “the injustice incurred upon the Sunni sect.” The latter comment marks the first time in some weeks that Sadr has expressed support or sympathy for Sunni anti-government protesters and a departure from his movement’s support of hardline de-Baathification, which has primarily affected Sunni Arabs. This further emphasizes the expansive nature of Sadr’s criticism of Maliki. 

Later the same day, Sadr’s movement announcedthat Sadrist ministers would boycott cabinet meetings with immediate effect. Planning Minister and acting Finance Minister Ali al-Shukri stated at a press conference that the decision had been made at the headquarters of the Sadrist Trend’s political office in Baghdad, where the ministers had based their consultations with one another on Sadr’s earlier statements. Although no reason was given initially for the boycott, on March 20 Sadrist MP Jawad al-Shahila tied the boycott to the security situation, insisting that the boycott would continue unless security leaders – including Maliki, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, as well as the defense and interior ministers and national security and intelligence chiefs – were held accountable for allowing recent attacks to take place.

Maliki’s reaction to the Sadrist declaration has been to givethe Sadrists until Sunday, March 24, to clarify their intentions. Maliki’s media adviser Ali al-Moussawi stated the same day that Sadrist ministers would not be treated differently from other boycotting ministers and would not be allowed to run their ministries without attending cabinet meetings. This implicit threat followed the more explicit suggestion by State of Law MP Ihsan al-Awadi that Maliki might follow the precedent he set in countering the Iraqiyya boycott, placing absentee ministers on ‘compulsory leave’ and installing acting ministers in their place. This would further empower Maliki, either by granting him more allies at the cabinet table or by allowing him to buy support from other political blocs through ministerial appointments.

Sadrist responses imply strongly that the boycott is intended to place pressure on Maliki and to emphasize the Sadrists’ populism ahead of an anticipated two-horse electoral race in much of Shi‘a-dominated southern Iraq. Bahaa al-Araji told Iraqi media on March 21 that the Sadrist ministers were prepared to return to the cabinet “if necessary” on the provision that Maliki cease his “wrangling.” Araji insisted that the Sadrist ministers were “keen to provide services to the Iraqi people,” and noted the lack of a formal system for suspending ministers from government in the absence of cabinet bylaws. Any attempt by Maliki to suspend ministers, Araji stated, would be a “personal act.”

It was reported on March 21, moreover, that the Sadrists had joined with Iraqiyya to request that Maliki answer questions in parliament about the security situation in Iraq and that Parliamentary Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi had agreed to the request. Sadrist spokesman Salah al-Obaidi subsequently announcedthat Sadr had met with Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlak and senior Iraqiyya figures Jamal al-Karbouli and Haider al-Mulla. Mutlak and Karbouli have formed their own coalition for the provincial elections, Arab Iraqiyya, and they have long been the figures within Iraqiyya most amenable to working with Maliki. Meeting with these figures, rather than more consistent Maliki critics among the Sunni Arab leadership, suggests that Sadr was seeking to demonstrate some willingness to consult outside the Shi‘a National Alliance without harming his image by reaching out to Nujaifi and Issawi.

It remains extremely unlikely that the Sadrists will form a united opposition front with Iraqiyya and the Kurds against Maliki, as Iraqiyya MP Wahida al-Jumaili suggested on March 20. Sadr has used the boycott gambit on a number of occasions in the past: Sadrist ministers refused to attend cabinet and parliamentary sessions for two months in late 2006, protesting a planned meeting between Maliki and President Bush; Sadr warned of his intention to boycott provincial elections originally scheduled for 2008 over the continued presence of American troops in Iraq; and a boycott was threatenedagain during the 2010 government formation process when Maliki announced plans to take control of the security ministries on an acting basis. More recently, Sadr calledhis ministers to Najaf in early February to discuss withdrawing from the government if the demands of anti-government protesters were not met. In that case, not only did Sadr fail to follow through on his rhetoric: he willingly took over the Finance Ministry from the boycotting Rafia al-Issawi, despite Bahaa al-Araji’s public insistencethat Sadrists would not occupy the posts of boycotting ministers.

In the meantime, however, the absence of Sadrist ministers from cabinet sessions, alongside those Iraqiyya and Kurdish ministers that continue to boycott meetings, would limit Maliki’s ability to propose legislation or push forward decisions with any semblance of legitimacy or consultation. The Sadrists currently hold six ministries among five ministers: Planning Minister Ali al-Shukri is also acting Finance Minister, while the Sadrists also hold the ministries of Housing and Construction (Muhammed al-Daraji), Municipal Affairs (Adel Reza), Labor and Social Affairs (Nasaar al-Rubai), and Antiquities and Tourism (Lawa Sumaysim). With the position of Agriculture Minister empty since the resignation of Iraqiyya’s Izz al-Din al-Dawla, and the Communications Ministry still in the hands of the deputy minister in an acting capacity, the Sadrists may be seeking to access further concessions from Maliki in the form of two contract-heavy ministries.

At the same time, the threatened boycott allows the Sadrists to put significant distance between their movement and Maliki’s in the run-up to the provincial elections, adopting a populist tone that emphasizes Maliki’s failure to provide services and security. The move, like Maliki’s decision to postpone elections in Anbar and Ninewa, makes clear that the provincial elections will be fought with every tactic at key players’ disposal, with little regard for legal, constitutional, or democratic principles.

Stephen Wicken and Ahmed Ali are Iraq Research Analysts at the Institute for the Study of War.

                

2013 Iraq Weekly Update #11: Violence Threatens Electoral Campaign

March 15, 2013

By Ahmed Ali and Stephen Wicken

Violent attacks have targeted at least 10 candidates for the upcoming provincial elections since the candidate lists were announcedin January. The attacks bear the hallmarks of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), suggesting that the group is seeking to disrupt the electoral campaign and dissuade Sunni Arabs from political participation. Meanwhile, recently resigned Finance Minister Rafi al-Issawi defied an arrest warrant by appearing at an Anbar protest, demonstrating his determination to continue his vocal criticism of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Iraqi Kurd ministers boycotted the cabinet meeting to protest the recent passage of the budget and they continue to examine their options with Baghdad.

Violence aims to disrupt politics and shake confidence   

Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) announced on January 4 that 8,275 candidates had been registered for the provincial elections scheduled for April 20. Since then, there have been at least 10 attacks on candidates, primarily in predominantly Sunni areas of northern and western Iraq. The majority of the victims have been candidates running on lists connected to the Sunni Iraqiyya coalition that contested the 2010 parliamentary elections. They have included candidates of Parliamentary Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi and former Finance Minister Rafi al-Issawi’s Uniters list; Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlak’s Arab Iraqiyya list; the United Ninewa Coalition, led by prominent Ninewa tribal leader Abdullah al-Yawar; and the Justice and Construction Gathering, led by Dildar Zeibari who, like Yawar, ran on Ninewa Governor Atheel al-Nujaifi’s al-Hadbaa list in 2009. There have also been attacks on candidates belonging to the National Tribal Gathering of the Mother of Two Springs, a pro-Maliki party in Ninewa, and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq’s (ISCI) Citizens’ Bloc. Although it is possible that some of the attacks may be the result of local or political rivalries, many of the attacks bear the hallmarks of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Historically it has opposed Sunni Arab participation in the political process. Seen in the context of the ongoing anti-government protests in predominantly Sunni areas of Iraq, the attacks may demonstrate renewed attempts on the part of AQI and other militant groups to disrupt the electoral process.

Meanwhile, on March 14, various reports indicate that about five suicide bombers attacked the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and the nearby Foreign Ministry and Communications Institute in central Baghdad, killing 26 and wounding 63 including the attackers. Three suicide car bombs reportedly targeted the MoJ, and two suicide bombers dressed as security forces subsequently entered the ministry before being killed by the responding security forces or blowing themselves up inside the building. Baghdad Operations Command reported that responding Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) cordoned off the area and secured the building. Several MoJ employees reported a confused and disorganized response by the ISF. Maliki is reported to have visited the MoJ after the attack. In response, Iraqi politicians from across the spectrum condemned the attack while calling on the government to improve security measures and intelligence collection efforts.  

 

No groups have claimed responsibility for the attack, but the nature of the attack indicates a possible AQI operation. AQI likely launched the attack to manifest operational capability and send a message that it can still target fortified establishments. These spectacular attacks also seek to undermine the confidence of the Iraqis in their government’s ability to provide security. It remains to be seen if the MoJ was targeted due to its supervisory role of Iraqi prisons, where many AQI elements are held.   

Will the Shi‘a-Kurdish alliance survive?

The budget vote in the parliament generated a quick reaction from the Iraqi Kurds, who protested the decision as an attempt to marginalize them and an attack on the principles of the political process. On March 9, Iraqi Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani invited the representatives of the Iraqi Kurdish parties in Baghdad for a meeting in Arbil and a statement was subsequently issued criticizing Prime Minister Maliki and his State of Law Coalition (SLC). The statement also called on the National Alliance – of which the SLC is a member – to take action against Maliki’s policies. Furthermore, the Iraqi Kurds boycotted the cabinet meeting on March 12, presumably to protest the passage of the budget. It is not clear whether the two major Iraqi Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), have a unified position on withdrawing from the cabinet and completely boycott the Baghdad government. 

Although the Iraqi Kurds were involved the discussions leading up to the vote, they remain surprised by the fact that their allies – the Iraqi Shi‘a parties – went ahead and voted on the budget without their presence. Overall, however, their response thus far has been measured. This can be attributed to the fact that their demands for oil company payments can be addressed through political agreements and executive decisions by Maliki. Additionally, toning down the anti-Maliki rhetoric may serve the Iraqi Kurds, depriving the premier of the opportunity to present himself as a defender of a unified Iraq confronting Iraqi Kurdish ambitions. Moving forward, the absence of President Jalal Talabani’s mediating role raises the possibility of increased tensions: both Maliki and the Iraqi Kurds will need a mediator if they are to ensure a continued Iraqi alliance between the Iraqi Shi’a and the Iraqi Kurds.

Renewed protests condemn local politicians

Protesters in Baghdad, Anbar, Ninewa, Kirkuk, Salah ad-Din, and Diyala took to the streets under protests titled “Friday of Supporting Imam Abu Hanifa.” The name refers to the Abu Hanifa mosque in Baghdad’s Adhamiyah area where prayers were disallowed last Friday. During today’s prayers, the mosque’s imam condemned last Friday’s shutdown. It is important to note the reported participation of parliament speaker Osama al-Nujaifi at the protest, in addition to cooperative security forces. In Anbar, protesters likened Maliki to Bashar al-Assad and the situation in Iraq to that of Syria. Moreover, they called on the protesters to withdraw from the political process. Recently resigned Finance Minister Rafi al-Issawi, the subject of an apparent arrest attempton March 12, was in attendance despite a reported arrest warrant against him. Finally, protesters in Kirkuk’s Hawija demanded their local politicians withdraw from the government.     

      

It is evident that protesters are continuing to focus their efforts and energy on condemning Maliki and his policies. Simultaneously, they are seeking to place pressure on Iraqiyya politicians to withdraw from the government in the aftermath of the resignation of both Issawi and Agriculture Minister Izz al-Din al-Dawla.         

  

2013 Iraq Update #10a: Maliki Pursues Issawi – Again

March 13, 2013

By Stephen Wicken

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has once more attempted to sideline recently resigned finance minister Rafia al-Issawi, one of Iraq’s most influential Sunni politicians and the premier’s most vocal critic. Issawi was the target of an apparent arrest attempton March 12 by Iraqi Security Forces.  Maliki’s move to intimidate or arrest Issawi makes clear that the prime minister intends to continue targeting his political opponents – particularly prominent Sunni leaders – through use of the security apparatus. In an atmosphere of rising sectarian tension, such incidents are likely to play well with each side’s political constituency, reinforcing disaffected Sunni Arabs’ sense of victimization and intent to oppose Maliki while drawing support from Shi‘a Arabs who support Maliki’s aggressive line on those they deem as supporters of terrorism.

The apparent arrest attempton March 12 occurred as Issawi was travelling to the funeral of Muthana Jarwan al-Kubaisi, who was the chairman of the district council of Rutba, a town in Anbar province near the Jordanian border. Kubaisi had been a candidate for the upcoming provincial elections running on Issawi’s list until he was assassinatednear Rutba on March 11. Issawi said that he was travelling to the funeral when his convoy was “intercepted” by a “heavily armed military force backed by helicopters.” It does not appear, however, that Issawi’s convoy was stopped, raising the likelihood that the move was intended to intimidate Issawi rather than detain him.

Issawi deniedclaims by a government source that he had sought to fleeto Jordan but had been prevented by the Iraqi embassy in Amman which refused to help him because, having resigned from his position as finance minister, he no longer has “official status.” The management of the Trebil border crossing into Jordan confirmedsubsequently that neither Issawi nor embassy staff had come to the crossing. In a speech to protesters in Ramadi following the incident, Issawi took a confrontational tone, insisting that he would leave Anbar only as a “dead body.”

Maliki likely used armed assets against Issawi while the parliamentarian was in Rutba in order to persuade him to flee Iraq. Such was the case when Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, another prominent Maliki critic, was allowedto leave Iraq for the Kurdistan region in December 2011 despite the arrest of a number of his bodyguards. Hashemi was subsequently sentenced to death after being found guilty in absentia of organizing murders of political opponents and financing terrorism. Hashemi remains in exile in Turkey: he has kept up his criticism of Maliki, but his political party has been critically weakened in his absence. The claim by an “anonymous government source” that Issawi had sought to flee for Jordan may therefore have been intended to discredit Issawi.

Since the arrests of members of Issawi’s protection detail in December, rumorshave circulated of arrest warrants issued for Issawi and Iraqiyya parliamentary leader Salman al-Jumaili on charges of inciting terrorism. Similar rumors have also appearedregarding former Awakening leader and Anbari strongman Ahmed Abu Risha, an ally of Issawi in the upcoming elections. A warrant against Anbari tribal leader Ali Hatem al-Suleiman, who has been extremely vocal in his criticism of Maliki since anti-government protests began, has also been reported; Ali Hatem has denied the existence of the warrant. Most prominently, in February, special forces attemptedto arrest Anbari protest spokesman Said al-Lafi, with whom Issawi has appeared in public, at a mosque in central Fallujah. The attempt was foiled when demonstrators helped Lafi to escapethe scene.

The incident also comes at a time of rising political violence ahead of the upcoming elections. In addition to the murder of Muthana Jarwan al-Kubaisi, a member of the district council of Hit also in western Anbar was also assassinatedon March 11. Two electoral candidates in Ninewa were shot dead by unidentified gunmen in separateincidents in Mosul on March 11-12. The bodyguards of Iraqiyya candidate for Baghdad Sabah al-Khafaji were attackedby unidentified gunmen in western Baghdad while hanging election posters on March 6, while Hussein al-Janabi, an Iraqiyya candidate in Babel, was assassinatedalong with two of his guards in the north of the province on February 22. While these assassinations are likely related to local political rivalries, the increase in political violence will only heighten tension ahead of the voting.

The move against Issawi has been denounced by Maliki’s usual critics, but has yet to draw comment or support from the premier’s allies. In addition to Issawi’s own Iraqiyya list, whose spokeswoman Maysoon al-Damalouji describedthe incident as “terrorist and criminal,” the office of Kurdistan Regional Government President Massoud Barzani condemnedthe attempted arrest as “provocative,” notingthat it would deepen rifts between Iraqi communities. Sadrist MP and parliamentary security and defense committee member Hakim al-Zamili, a former deputy health minister who was accused of using the health ministry to run death squads targeting Sunnis between 2005 and 2007 but released amid rumors of witness intimidation, also criticizedthe move against Issawi, insisting that Iraq’s already fraught political situation “does not need further escalation.”

Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlak calledthe arrest attempt “cowardly” and praised “the positions of the Anbar tribes that have accompanied Issawi.” There has not as yet been any indication that Anbari tribes were involved in preventing Issawi’s arrest as they were in protecteing Said al-Lafi. Mutlak’s statement, therefore, likely was intended to curry favor with the Anbaris who chasedhim from a demonstration in Ramadi in late December because of his continued involvement in the Maliki government. Although Mutlak was reported to have resigned on January 28 in protest at the government’s failure to meet protesters’ demands, he has continued to play an active role, particularly within Deputy Prime Minister Hussein al-Shahristani’s committee tasked with responding to the protesters, the concessions made by which Mutlak has defended. However, while apparently playing a role in helping Maliki to ensure quorum in order to pass the 2013 federal budget, Mutlak was forced to state his “anger and indignation” at the killingof anti-government protesters in Mosul on March 8 in order to have a hope of retaining some credibility with Sunni Arabs.

Given the claims that Issawi was attempting to flee to Jordan and the rumors of an outstanding arrest warrant, Issawi is likely to remain in Anbar, surrounded by his tribesmen and supporters. The latest development diminishes significantly the likelihood that Issawi will seek to return to parliament in order to benefit from parliamentary immunity from prosecution, as Maliki’s State of Law Coalition predictedhe would do following his resignation from the finance ministry. Instead, he is likely to intensify his criticism of Maliki from his home province, amplifying his denunciations as the provincial elections approach. Should Maliki send forces to Ramadi or Fallujah, where Issawi’s support is strongest, in order to attempt to arrest him, the prospects of armed clashes are extremely high. Such confrontations would almost certainly escalate Iraq’s ongoing crisis, with grave implications for Iraq’s security and stability at a time when violence from Syria has begunto spill over the border into Anbar.