2013 Iraq Update #10: Tensions on the border and in parliament

March 8, 2013

By Stephen Wicken and Ahmed Ali

Escalation in cross-border violence this week is the most serious since the Syrian uprising began two years ago, and in particular the ambush of Syrian soldiers returning after seeking refuge in Iraq further threatens to accentuate tensions between the Iraqi government and anti-Assad forces. In domestic politics, the recent budget vote in the face of a boycott by most other political parties has demonstrated the willingness of the National Alliance to use its parliamentary majority to work without the input of other parties. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki continues to favor a going-it-alone strategy, with the establishment of a new military command without consulting local leaders in Anbar, Ninewa, or the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).         

Syrian conflict spills over into Iraq

A series of incidents along the border between Iraq and Syria this week heightened concerns that the Syrian conflict may be bleeding into Iraq. On February 28, four mortar shells fired from Syrian territory landed on the Iraqi side of the Yaarabiya-Rabia border crossing in Ninewa province [Map Point 1]. They were followed on March 1 by a Scud missile, also fired from Syria, which landed near the village of Yos Tapa [Map Point 2]. Then, following three days of fighting with Syrian regime forces, Syrian rebels seized control of half of the border town of Yaarabiya on March 2. Iraqi forces fired warning shots to prevent the fighting from reaching the border post, but residents of Rabia reportedly were forced to flee after shells landed on the Iraqi side of the border.  On March 5, Syrian rebels were reported to have looted Yaarabiya, requesting that Iraqi forces not enter the area. A source at Sinjar hospital subsequently stated that six Iraqi soldiers had been killed during clashes with Syrian rebels along the border between Rabia and Baaj [Map Point 3].

The Iraqi government ordered the army to close the Rabia border post on March 3 “because of the Syrian government’s lack of control over the other side of the post.” By this point, however, a number of Syrian regime soldiers had fled into Iraq to escape the fighting at Yaarabiya. According to the Iraqi government, the soldiers had been transferred to Baghdad for medical treatment and were being escorted to the Al Walid-At Tanf border crossing in Anbar province when they were ambushed at Akashat [Map Point 4]. 48 Syrians and 9 Iraqis were reported killed.

The escalation in cross-border violence is the most serious since the Syrian uprising began two years ago. Since the uprising’s beginning, segments of the Iraqi public -- particularly its Shi’a majority -- and officials have expressed fears about a post-Assad Syria including the possibility that it could renew an Iraqi civil war. The week’s events, coupled with anti-Iraqi government statements from FSA commanders, will further accentuate tensions between the Iraqi government and anti-Assad forces.              

Budget vote raises fears of majority government

The Iraqi parliament voted on March 7 to pass the 2013 federal budget law after five months of failed attempts. 168 MPs were present at the vote, just passing the quorum level of 163. The vote was boycotted by members of the Kurdistan Alliance and half of Iraqiyya’s MPs, but passed with support for Maliki’s State of Law Coalition from the Sadrists. The 17 percent allocation of the federal budget to the KRG was retained, but with a number of conditions that in practice will lessen this allocation considerably. Reports indicate that the Kurds did comparatively well out of the vote in some senses: a motion to decrease the KRG’s allocation to 13 percent was defeated, and the budget makes provisions for payments in advance to the Kurdish Peshmerga Ministry. However, Kurdish demands for an additional $3.5 billion for payments to oil companies working in the Kurdistan region were rejected, with the vote restricting these payments to $645 million. 

The Kurdistan Alliance’s immediate responses were to threaten an appeal to the Federal Supreme Court (FSC) and to cease oil exports. With Maliki ally Medhat al-Mahmoud returned to his position at the head of the FSC, an appeal is unlikely to benefit the Kurds. A refusal to export oil via Baghdad, moreover, will almost certainly prompt the federal government to refuse to make the payments earmarked for oil companies working in the Kurdistan region. Companies working in Kurdistan already will be aware of the legal and economic ambiguities surrounding the issue; the hardening of the Baghdad-Erbil dispute, however, may cause some companies to reconsider their positions in the long term.

The vote provides further evidence of recent developments with serious implications for Iraqi politics. Firstly, Iraqiyya once more demonstrated its internal divisions over the budget vote, with Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlak reportedly leading a group of Iraqiyya MPs into parliament to ensure quorum for the vote. Mutlak’s pro-Maliki stance was so evident that even Sadrist MP Awad al-Awadi commented publicly, noting that Maliki was using Mutlak to “dissolve” Iraqiyya. Iraqiyya MP Jaber al-Jaberi, who boycotted the budget vote, argued meanwhile that voting without the Kurds meant that parliament had “laid the foundation stone in the project of dividing Iraq”. Given Mutlak’s previous inconsistencies regarding accommodation with Maliki, and given that Parliamentary Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi does not appear to have intervened to prevent the budget from being passed despite his high-profile opposition to Maliki, Iraqiyya’s stance on the budget remains somewhat unclear. Nujaifi may have allowed the budget vote to come to the floor knowing that a defeat for the Kurds would play well with his Sunni Arab base in Ninewa.

The Sadrist’s support for the budget law, moreover, confirms their willingness to side with Maliki, particularly against the Kurds, whose demands they have opposed as inflated and “unjust.” The Sadrists in recent weeks have abandoned the pretense of supporting anti-government protests in predominantly Sunni areas; accepted acting control of the Finance Ministry at Maliki’s request; and made a deal with the premier over control of the Accountability and Justice Commission. Although the Sadrists continue to position themselves to compete with Maliki at the provincial level, they appear increasingly reliable as members of the Shi’a National Alliance at the national level. Evidently highlighting this trend, State of Law Coalition MP Abd al-Salam al-Maliki stated on March 8 that the experience of passing the budget law in the face of Kurdish and Iraqiyya opposition had only encouraged the National Alliance to work as a parliamentary majority in the future as a precursor to forming a majority government. Such a development threatens to shut Sunni Arabs and Kurds not willing to work with the Maliki government out of government entirely, with serious implications for their continued willingness to engage in the political process.

Agriculture Minister resigns as ‘Last Chance Friday’ turns violent in Mosul

Anti-government protesters staged “Last Chance Friday” on March 8, with large protests in Fallujah, Ramadi, and Mosul, and smaller protests in Samarra, Baiji, Tikrit, and Dur. Isolated protests also took place in the Baghdad neighborhoods of Athamiyah and Ghazaliyah. 

Violence returned to the Mosul protests for the first time since early January, when security forces fired on and wounded four demonstrators in the center of the city. On March 8, one of the Mosul protest organizers, Hussein al-Obeid al-Jubouri, was arrested, reportedly by federal police, on charges of belonging to the insurgent group Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshbandia (JRTN). In response to the arrest, demonstrators were reported to have thrown stones at police units in central Mosul. The police responded by opening fire on the protesters, killing three demonstrators and injuring four. Federal police commander Mahdi al-Gharawi subsequently insisted that local anti-riot police, and not federal police, had opened fire. Seeking to prevent further clashes, security forces quickly imposed a curfew on eastern Mosul.

The shootings were immediately condemned by senior politicians from Ninewa province, particularly Speaker Nujaifi, who immediately announced the formation of a parliamentary committee to investigate the killings. At the same press conference, Izz al-Din al-Dawla, a member of Nujaifi’s Iraqiyoun party within the Iraqiyya coalition, announced his resignation as Agriculture Minister in protest at the shooting, saying that “those who had sent him to Baghdad were today shedding blood.” Dawla lashed out at the Maliki government, criticizing it for failing to meet protesters’ demands.

Dawla’s resignation leaves Iraqiyya with control of only four ministries, and further emphasizes the internal divisions within the bloc. Increasingly, Iraqiyya appears split between a faction led by Saleh al-Mutlak and including Jamal al-Karbouli’s al-Hal party, which favors collaboration with Maliki; and a faction led by recently resigned Finance Minister Rafia al-Issawi and supported by Speaker Nujaifi, which opposes participation in government. Two of the remaining ministers – Education Minister Mohammed al-Tamim of Mutlak’s Hiwar party and Industry Minister Ahmed al-Karbouli of al-Hal – belong to the faction closer to Maliki, while Science and Technology Minister Abd al-Karim al-Samarrai of Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi’s Tajdeed party is thought to oppose cabinet participation, and Minister of State for Provincial Affairs and Acting Communications Minister Turhan Mufti’s National Turkmen Front is allied with Nujaifi and Issawi for the upcoming provincial elections. Should the demands of anti-government protesters grow in response to the latest confrontation, Iraqiyya will be placed in an even more difficult situation. As with Issawi’s resignation last week, moreover, an open cabinet position grants Maliki with yet another opportunity to install an ally and move closer to majority government.

New Operations Command Raises Tensions

In developments reminiscent of the establishment of the Tigris Operations Command in July 2012, Maliki’s decision to set up a new operations command to encompass Anbar and Ninewa provinces has raised tensions in the area. The formation of the Al-Jazeera and Al-Badia Operations Command (JBOC) first came to light after the Ministry of Defense announced it had carried out an operation on February 16, 2013 in the Syria-adjacent al-Qaim area in Anbar province. The JBOC is reportedly commanded by General Hassan Karim Khdheir, who had previously headed the Ninewa Operations Command. Iraqi officials and press reports indicate that the JBOC will be tasked with securing and protecting the Iraqi-Syrian and Iraqi-Jordanian borders encompassing both provinces. The JBOC becomes the tenth operations command established by Prime Minister Maliki.      

The formation of the JBOC has been met with strong opposition by local Ninewa and Anbar officials, who described the step as “illegal,” and by the KRG, with all pointing out that it was formed without their consultation. On March 5, a JBOC contingent attempted to deploy to Sinjar district in western Ninewa and establish a headquarters, but were blocked by Kurdish Peshmerga forces. KRG officials viewed the move as a violation of agreements between Baghdad and Erbil on security forces deployments in areas with disputed internal boundaries. The following day witnessed a demonstration by locals rejecting the opening of a JBOC headquarters in the area. The JBOC forces subsequently withdrew, but reports indicate that on March 7 they blocked a road that connects Sinjar with Dohuk in Iraqi Kurdistan.       

The presence of the JBOC may be the result of Maliki’s apprehension that the current security forces in Anbar and Ninewa are not able to adequately protect the border. This has recently become a bigger concern as the violence in Syria has extended into Iraq. Furthermore, the appointment of General Khdheir indicates Maliki’s desire to entrust security responsibilities with commanders known to him. Khdheir’s appointment may have a political dimension as well, given his past contentious relations with the Iraqi Kurds. Past tensions between the KRG security forces and the current public discontent in Anbar and Ninewa suggest that the JBOC’s role will likely continue to cause controversy as the provincial elections approach. 

2013 Iraq Update #9: Issawi resignation presents opportunities to Maliki

March 1, 2013

By Stephen Wicken

Whether Sunni will continue to participate in the government of Iraq remains crucial to the outcome of the country’s ongoing political crisis. Leading Sunni politician Rafia al-Issawi announced on March 1 that he has resigned as Finance Minister, days after Electricity Minister Karim Aftan al-Jumaili departed Iraqiyya following a dispute over the coalition’s cabinet boycott. These developments further marginalize Iraqiyya, expose deeper political divisions within the coalition, and have exacerbated fractures among the Sunni population at large. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki now has an opportunity either to split the Sunni further by reaching out to those who advocate participation in government, or to appoint political allies to fill the ministerial positions of Iraqiyya members who continue their boycott. Either move would further reduce meaningful Sunni participation in government and move Iraq closer to majoritarian rule.

Government participation question splits Sunnis

Leading Iraqiyya figure Rafia al-Issawi announced his resignation as Finance Minister at an anti-government protest in Ramadi on March 1. In a blistering speech, Issawi toldthe protesters that he had chosento side with ‘his people’ rather than remain part of a Maliki government that had rejected “any principle of partnership”. It was Maliki’s moveagainst Issawi in December 2012 that spurred the wave of anti-government protests that have gone on in Iraq’s predominantly Sunni provinces for 10 weeks. A native Anbari, Issawi has been the Sunni politician on the national stage closest to the protest movement, appearing at the largest protests in Anbar to great reception. Issawi’s resignation is likely a move to bolster his profile further ahead of the upcoming provincial elections, although having left office he remains vulnerable to prosecution of the type that Maliki pursued against Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi in 2012. Following Issawi’s speech, al-Iraqiyah state television quoted Maliki as sayingthat he would not accept Issawi’s resignation until an investigation into “financial and administrative irregularities” had been concluded. It is unclear whether this ‘investigation’ is related to rumorsthat an arrest warrant would be issued against Issawi and Iraqiyya MP Salman al-Jumaili on charges of inciting terrorism. Maliki ally Hanan al-Fatlawi claimedon March 1 that Issawi was resigning in order to return to parliament and regain parliamentary immunity from prosecution. Maliki’s statement may therefore constitute a threat against Issawi, encouraging the latter to discontinue his high-profile criticism of the premier.

Issawi’s public resignation as Finance Minister is a symbolic move: Issawi was in fact replacedin early February by Sadrist Planning Minister Ali al-Shukri on an acting basis. Issawi’s statement that there was no “honor” in taking part in a “sectarian government”, however, was an implicit criticism of Electricity Minister Karim Aftan al-Jumaili, whom Iraqiyya publicly expelledon February 27 after he brokethe coalition’s boycott of cabinet meetings. Aftan justifiedhis decision to return to work by insisting that he is a technocrat and not a political candidate, suggesting that he is likely to continue as an independent rather than join another political bloc: his official biography states that he “does not belong to any political orientation.” His return to the cabinet, however, has further exposed the bloc’s internal divisions and the disagreement within the Sunni Arab community over involvement in government and the political process. Only a day after Aftan’s departure, Iraqiyya MP Talal al-Zobaie criticized the boycott policy, claimingthat it had not been approved by a majority of Iraqiyya members, and he called the list an “inharmonious mixture”. Meanwhile, Rafia al-Jumaili, a representative of Aftan’s tribe, criticizedAftan’s return to government, saying that the tribe “condemns and deplores” the move.

The loss of another ministerial portfolio further marginalizes Iraqiyya within the government and further exposes the bloc’s internal divisions. Today, Iraqiyya retains only five ministerial positions: Education Minister Mohammed al-Tamim, of Saleh al-Mutlak’s Hiwar party; Industry Minister Ahmed al-Karbouli, of al-Hal; Agriculture Minister Izz al-Din al-Dawla of Osama al-Nujaifi’s Iraqiyoun; Water Resources Minister Muhanad al-Sa’idi; and Science and Technology Minister Abd al-Karim al-Samarrai of Hashemi’s Tajdeed party. A source within Maliki’s State of Law Coalition claimedon February 28 that all but Issawi and Samarrai were expected to return to cabinet meetings soon. On March 1, however, Iraqi Awakening Conference leader Ahmed Abu Risha claimedthat Issawi’s resignation would soon be followed by those of other Iraqiyya ministers. However, Abu Risha, who had signed up to Issawi and Nujaifi’s ‘Uniters’ coalition for the provincial elections, himself faced a leadership challengethis week, and may have been sidelined within the Awakening movement.

The question of involvement in government threatens to divide Iraqiyya and the Sunni population it was elected to represent. Iraqiyya’s failure to present a united front on the question of governmental participation threatens further to diminish Iraqiyya’s relevance in Iraqi politics at a time when it is already under pressure from State of Law, other political blocs, and its own Sunni constituency. It also raises the question of Maliki’s response. Maliki statedon January 24 that Iraqiyya ministers boycotting cabinet sessions would be placed on “compulsory leave” and replaced with other Iraqiyya members. It is possible that Maliki will now seek out more pliant members of Iraqiyya in order further to split the bloc. In Issawi’s case, however, Maliki appears to have struck a dealwith the Sadrists to give them the Finance Ministry. Should Maliki repeat this step, installing National Alliance members in the place of Iraqiyya’s few remaining ministers, he would complete Shi’a dominance of Iraq’s government.

Deepening budget impasse presents opportunity to Sadrists

While the prospect of more ministries and greater access to power and resources would no doubt be appealing to the Sadrists, they remain Maliki’s primary opponents in the battle for Shi’a Arab votes. The continuing impasse over the 2013 budget presented an opportunity this week for the Sadrists to demonstrate their populist credentials. The Sadrists have highlighted repeatedly the issue of distribution of oil revenues during the budget process, proposing in December 2012 that surplus oil revenues be distributed to the population, and accusingthe Maliki government of marginalizing southern oil-producing provinces through “centralist” planning. The Sadrists led a protest at the edge of Baghdad’s Green Zone on February 26 at which thousands of demonstrators demanded that parliament pass the budget. Leading Sadrist parliamentarian Dhia al-Asadi insistedthat the protesters opposed the use of the budget negotiations for political gain and demanded the legislation’s passage in order to pay for new service projects and encourage employment – key themes for the Sadrists in their competition with Maliki for political support.

Fearing that the protests might grow and turn violent, the Office of the Commander in Chief was reportedto have declared a state of full alert, and security forces blockedentrances to Baghdad and the bridges between al-Rusafa and al-Karkh. However, the Sadrists ultimately decidedto end the demonstration, although Muqtada al-Sadr threatened on February 27 to call for a second “peaceful sit-in” should the budget impasse continue. The demonstration is a sign both that the Sadrists retain the ability to call out supporters at short notice to demonstrate, and that despite recent transactional alignments with Maliki – over control of the Finance Ministry and the Accountability and Justice Commission – Sadr continues to emphasize both his populism and Maliki’s failure to provide services and employment ahead of his anticipated battle with Maliki for Shi’a votes in the provincial elections scheduled for April 20.

Meanwhile, the standoff between the Kurdistan Regional Government and the central government also continues to stifle budget negotiations. The key stumbling blocks are the enduring issues of the Kurdistan region’s share of the budget, payments to oil companies working in Kurdistan, and paymentof the Kurdish Peshmerga security forces. A deliberative session was heldon February 25, but voting was postponedagain in the face of continued disagreement over the Kurdish share of the budget. Members of the Shi’a National Alliance continue to insistthat parliament is on the verge of adopting the budget, while Kurdish representatives maintainthat they expect no agreement in the near future. A delegation from the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) headed by KRG Natural Resources Minister Ashti Hawrami traveledto Baghdad on February 28 to meet with Iraqi Oil Minister Abd al-Karim al-Luaibi, but returned to Erbil without an agreement after five hours of negotiations.

Mixed signals on Baghdad-Ankara relations

Contradictory statements on Turkey’s hydrocarbons trade with the KRG have highlighted again the tense state of Iraqi-Turkish relations. On February 25, the state-run al-Iraqiyah television network reported an announcementfrom Oil Minister Luaibi that Turkey had officially informed Iraq that it would not support the building of oil and gas pipelines from the KRG to Turkey without Baghdad’s approval. The Turkish government has neither confirmed nor denied the statement. Luaibi’s announcement was contradicted, however, on February 28, when Tony Hayward of the Anglo-Turkish firm Genel Energy predicteda formal agreement between Turkey and the KRG. Hayward pointed to the “symbolic” importance of ongoing exports by truck from the KRG to Turkey, and claimed that good progress was being made on a pipeline that he expected to be operational by 2014.

Luaibi’s statement, if true, would signal a significant shift in Turkish policy. Turkey has insisted upon the legality of trading in oil with the KRG – in spite of US pressure– and as recently as February 8 Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan criticizedthe Iraqi government’s desire to oversee the KRG’s energy agreements. Turkish-Iraqi relations have been extremely poor for some time, with the Turks granting residence to fugitive Iraqi Vice President and Maliki critic Tariq al-Hashemi, and premiers Maliki and Erdogan repeatedlytradingaccusations. Iraq has been without an ambassador to Turkey for more than two months, although officials on both sides have claimedthat the delay in naming a new ambassador reflects internal disputes within Iraq rather than the status of relations with Turkey. While this is plausible, the fact remains that the vacant role diminishes the prospect of improved relations between Baghdad and Ankara – a relationship that could have the potential to ease regional tensions. Luaibi’s statement, should it prove true, could signal a Turkish attempt to improve bilateral relations, as Baghdad has made clear its oppositionto an independent Turkey-KRG pipeline. However, in the absence of Turkish confirmation and in light of preponderant evidence of Turkey prioritizing economic relations with Erbil over diplomatic relations with Baghdad, Luaibi’s claim seems unlikely.    

2013 Iraq Update #8: Maliki and Nujaifi Struggle over De-Ba’athification

February 22, 2013

By Stephen Wicken

Maliki and Nujaifi Struggle over De-Ba’athification

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Sadrist Trend have reportedly struck a deal over control of the Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC), which oversees de-Ba’athification.  Additionally, a Maliki ally has been installed at the head of the AJC, while Maliki’s key judicial ally has been restored. The deal again raises the question of Sadrist alignment with Maliki and its implications for the consolidation of Shi’a political power in Iraq.Conversely, the premier’s primary opponent among the Sunni Arab population,Parliamentary Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi, has been forced to defend the activities of the AJC that has targeted members of his political constituency. Nujaifi now faces renewed threats of removal from his position by Maliki’s allies.

On February 18, the Accountability and Justice Commission’s (AJC) appeals panel overturned the decision to remove Judge Medhat al-Mahmoud from his position atop the Iraqi judiciary because of his position under Saddam Hussein. The panel announced that it had found no evidence of ties to the Ba’ath Party, and subsequently affirmed on February 20 that rather than having been an agent of the Ba’athist regime, Medhat had been one of its victims. Deputy AJC head Bakhtiar Omar al-Qadhi stated on February 19 that Medhat would be allowed to return to the presidency of the Federal Supreme Court.

While Medhat’s case appears to have been concluded, the larger political struggle behind the de-Ba’athification issue is ongoing. On February 17, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s media adviser Ali al-Moussawi announced that AJC head Falah Hassan Shanshal, a Sadrist, had been removed as the commission’s chairman on the grounds that he had been appointed by Maliki and not by parliament. Moussawi claimed that Maliki had been forced to appoint Shanshal because parliament had failed to elect a chairman and vice-chairman of the AJC; however, he had decided to end Shanshal’s assignment and return the issue to parliament for voting. Independent MP Sabah al-Saadi, an outspoken critic both of Maliki and of Judge Medhat, subsequently claimed that Maliki had countermanded all decisions taken by the AJC under Shanshal’s leadership. Instead of allowing parliament to vote on a replacement for Shanshal, however, Maliki immediately tasked Basim al-Badri, a member of the Dawa Party - Iraq Organization, with heading the AJC. Maliki’s immediate imposition of a new AJC head on the grounds that the outgoing chief was not elected by parliament, and the fact that he did not replace the similarly unelected Bakhtiar Omar, make clear that the premier’s opposition to Shanshal stems from the latter’s move against Medhat, Maliki’s long-time judicial ally.

The AJC has now,however, become part of Maliki’s ongoing conflict with Parliamentary Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi. On February 18, Nujaifi issued a directive stating that the AJC is an independent body tied to parliament and countermanding Shanshal’s removal. The gambit came days after Nujaifi gave an interview to Al-Jazeera while visiting Qatar in which he called on Maliki to resign so that early elections could be held. Nujaifi accused Maliki of targeting Iraqi Sunnis and pointed out that de-Ba’athification procedures had been “applied against the Sunni people in an unjust way.” This raises the question of why Nujaifi should seek to retain the head of the commission that oversees de-Ba’athification. Shanshal has historically been relatively hardline: as the head of the parliamentary committee that reviews the AJC’s activities, he supported the banning of 511 candidates from the 2010 elections, including Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlak. However, Shanshal’s willingness to target Medhat, Maliki’s key ally in the judiciary, made him an attractive potential ally in Nujaifi’s power struggle with the prime minister. Basim al-Badri’s leadership of the AJC, on the other hand, places the commission under Maliki’s control, implying the prospect of further politicized use of de-Ba’athification to target the premier’s opponents.

Nujaifi’s criticisms drew immediate approbation from Maliki allies. State of Law MPs and Jamal al-Bateikh, leader of the pro-Maliki White Bloc, were quick to draw connections between Nujaifi’s accusations and their context, accusing Qatar of supporting sectarianism on the part of Sunni Arab Iraqis. Sadrist MP Uday Awad claimed on February 17 that a majority of MPs were seeking to withdraw confidence from Nujaifi as parliamentary speaker because of Nujaifi’s ‘sectarianism’. State of Law MP Shakir al-Darraji stated, however, that only 120 signatures had been collected, a number which if accurate falls well short of a parliamentary majority. Nujaifi issued a statement on February 20 insisting that as a politician he had done nothing wrong by visiting a neighboring state and calling on the Maliki government to heed the demands of anti-government protesters. Nujaifi drew support from Iraqiyya MPs such as Ahmed al-Masaari, who argued that it was “shameful” for MPs to criticize the head of parliament as they had Nujaifi.

It was in this context that Nujaifi issued his directive countermanding the order to remove Shanshal from the chairmanship of the AJC. It appears, however, that Nujaifi’s directive may have been undercut by a deal between Maliki and the Sadrists, reported on February 22, in which the Sadrists have agreed to Shanshal’s demotion in exchange for control of other,as yet unnamed, commissions. If this report is accurate, the move would echo the Sadrists’ acceptance of acting dominion over the Finance Ministry, providing further evidence of their willingness to soften their opposition to Maliki in exchange for greater access to power and resources.

Nujaifi has faced threats of votes on his speakership in the past. State of Law MPs threatened to vote for his replacement in 2011, claiming that he ran parliament in a biased and unfair manner. The issue was raised again in June 2012 after Nujaifi and allies failed to remove Maliki from the premiership. More recently, Maliki’s allies claimed they had begun a campaign to oust Nujaifi in January 2013 at the same time that Nujaifi announced that he had received requests from MPs to question Maliki in parliament, a precursor to voting on confidence in Maliki himself. Aziz al-Mayahi, another leading White Bloc member, stated on January 7 that 110 signatures had been collected in support of Nujaifi’s dismissal; if Shakir al-Darraji’s estimate of 120 signatures is accurate, this implies that the campaign to oust the speaker has generated modest momentum. Should Maliki’s allies decide to mobilize against Nujaifi, however, as they did in support of State of Law Youth and Sports Minister Jassim Muhammed Jaafar in early February, they could conceivably remove from power the highest-profile Sunni Arab leader in national politics,with serious implications for the balance of power in Iraq.

Budget vote postponed again

The Iraqi parliament failed twice this week to meet to vote on the 2013 budget due to the absence of quorum. State of Law MP Haithamal-Jubouri claimed on February 19 that the National Alliance and the Kurdistan Alliance had reached an agreement that the Kurdistan region would continue to receive 17 per cent of the federal budget in 2013. However, Najiba Najib, a Kurdish MP on the parliamentary finance committee, was quick to deny Jubouri’s statement, insisting that no deal had been reached. Another finance committee member, Ibrahim al-Mutlak of Iraqiyya, confirmed on February 21 that no final deal had been reached, despite continued insistence from State of Law and National Alliance MPs that a vote was imminent. The impasse continues even as figures from across the political spectrum voice their concern that the delay in passing the budget is harming the Iraqi economy significantly.

Protesters hold ‘Iraq or Maliki’ demonstrations

Protests against the government of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki entered their third month on February 22 as demonstrations took place in the provinces of Anbar, Ninewa, Salah ad-Din, Diyala, Kirkuk, and in smaller numbers in the Baghdad neighborhoods of Doura, Ghazaliyah, and Adhamiyah. The theme for the day’s protests was “Iraq or Maliki,” and a member of the coordinating committee for the Anbar protests insisted that the protesters were“determined to topple the Maliki government that ignores the restitution of the usurped rights of the people.” A preacher at Friday prayers in Samarra accused the Maliki government of“encouraging militias to kill and displace the people of Baghdad,” but counseled the demonstrators to continue their protests by “all peaceful means.”Indeed, the protests remained peaceful across Iraq: photos from the Ramadi protest appear to show security guard personnel checking protesters for weapons,suggesting that the protesters or connected tribes are taking measures to ensure that the protests remain nonviolent and to prevent infiltration by extremist or terrorist elements.

2013 Iraq Update #7: De-Baathification Body Ousts Iraq's Chief Justice as Protests Continue

February 15, 2013

By Stephen Wicken and Marisa Sullivan

De-Ba’athification body targets judicial chief

On February 12, the Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC), Iraq’s nominally independent de-Ba’athification body, removed Chief Judge Medhat al-Mahmoud from his position as the head of the Higher Judicial Council, the body that oversees the Iraqi judicial system, on account of his ties to the Baathist regime. Medhat has been the dominant figure atop the Iraqi judiciary since he was appointed to the position in 2005; his influence has been buttressed by the fact that he has also presided over the Federal Supreme Court and had never resigned officially from the presidency of the Federal Appeals Court, to which he was appointed in 2003. A day later, Medhat was also removed from his position on as head of the Federal Supreme Court, Iraq’s highest legal body that has jurisdiction over constitutional matters. On February 14, deputy AJC head Bakhtiar Omar al-Qadhi confirmed that Medhat had been removed from the Higher Judicial Council specifically on de-Ba’athification charges, stating that “strong evidence” had been supplied by parliament but declining to provide details. Federal Appeals Court judge Ibrahim al-Humairi was named as his replacement. Medhat’s replacement on the Higher Judicial Council had been anticipated following the passage of the Higher Judicial Council law in December 2012, but his dismissal from the HJC and FSC on grounds of de-Baathification was an unexpected development. Mahmood has 60 days to appeal the decision, though it is unclear whether he will do so.

As an experienced and high-ranking career judge, it is no secret that Medhat had a lengthy judicial career under Saddam Hussein. He has likely escaped targeting on de-Ba’athification grounds in the past due to his willingness to provide judicial backing to Maliki’s consolidation of power. Medhat’s chief critic in this regard has been independent MP Sabah al-Saadi, who in December 2012 calledMedhat the “engineer of Maliki’s dictatorship.” Deputy AJC head Qadhi confirmed on February 13 that the commission had used documents provided by Saadi in its investigation of Medhat.

While Saadi has been Medhat’s most outspoken critic, it is likely that the move against the judge was instigated by a Sadrist-led coalition of Maliki’s opponents. The AJC was taken over in October 2012 by Sadrist Falah Hassan Shanshal, a hardliner on de-Ba’athification who supported the banning of primarily Sunni candidates ahead of the 2010 elections. It was Shanshal who announced on February 7 that the AJC had begun an audit of a number of judges including Medhat. Bakhtiar al-Qadhi, Shanshal’s Kurdish deputy on the AJC, clarified subsequently that of the seven members of the AJC board, four had voted to remove Medhat, two had voted against, and one had abstained. The Sadrists, Iraqiyya, and the Kurds each have two representatives on the board, while Maliki’s Daawa Party has one, raising the question of which members joined the Sadrists - traditionally proponents of a hardline, expansive approach to de-Ba’athification - in voting for the move, and which members opposed the ruling. Arguably Iraqiyya has been the political bloc most affected by Medhat’s judicial activism on Maliki’s behalf; however, the Sunni-dominated list’s members and constituents have also been the hardest-hit by de-Ba’athification. The move further complicates the question of the Sadrists’ disposition towards Maliki, while also raising the specter of Maliki’s key instrument in the politicization of the law himself falling victim to that process of politicization. 

Maliki’s allies have been quick to criticize the ruling. State of Law MP Ali al-Allaq claimed that “targeting Medhat at this critical stage aims at destabilizing the political situation”. Aziz al-Mayahi of the White Bloc, a Maliki-oriented splinter of Iraqiyya, concurred, also condemning the decision and urging Medhat to appeal. Maliki himself is likely to be displeased by the decision, but his options for opposing it are extremely limited, particularly now that his key ally in the judiciary has been sidelined. Fighting to retain Medhat would put Maliki in the position of having publicly to defend a ‘Ba’athist’; as he has been seeking to discredit anti-government protests by implying that they are in part a Ba’athist plot, mounting a defense of Medhat along these lines would undermine Maliki’s position. It is possible that Maliki will instead attempt to coopt or influence Humairi, Medhat’s replacement, of whom little is known.

The issue of de-Ba’athification has long been a central point of contention in Iraqi politics, and the eruption of anti-government protests primarily among Iraq’s Sunni population has brought the issue to even greater prominence. Sunni protesters have called for a freeze in the execution of the Accountability and Justice Law until it can be repealed entirely by parliament. This demand has had the effect of discouraging support for the protests among Shi’as who may agree with some of the anti-government protesters’ other demands. The Sadrists have stated firm opposition to any loosening of de-Baathification laws, as have representatives of Kurdish parties such as the Gorran (Change) Movement. The Medhat ruling also places Iraqiyya in a difficult position: the list likely supports the removal of the figure that helped sideline them after the 2010 elections, but has been vocal in its opposition to the Accountability and Justice Law. In an increasingly sectarian atmosphere, the prospect remains that the Sadrist-led AJC may seek to pursue their de-Ba’athification agenda with even greater vigor. A key question will be whether they continue to target Maliki allies, particularly figures at the head of Maliki’s security apparatus, or turn again against Iraqiyya and Sunni figures.

Political blocs reach impasse on budget vote

It was announced on February 12 that voting on the 2013 federal budget had been postponed indefinitely as Iraq’s political blocs continued to disagree over key provisions. On February 11, the office of parliamentary speaker Osama al-Nujaifi issued a statement admitting that there were still “significant differences” between the parliamentary blocs over the budget despite “tireless efforts” made by the speaker’s office to reach an agreement. The statement called for political blocs, parliamentary committees, and MPs to continue discussion “without interruption” until the budget was adopted. In an unusual step, the speaker’s office added that the issue of passing the budget “requires the presence of members [of parliament] on a daily basis” until the final adoption of the budget.

The political blocs have reached an impasse as Iraq enters its third month of unauthorized spending. The lack of an approved budget favors Prime Minister Maliki, who has long sought greater control over borrowing and spending. In October 2012, Maliki suspended Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) Governor Sinan al-Shabibi, a longtime critic of Maliki’s economic and fiscal policies. It was rumored on February 13 that Shabibi’s replacement, Abd al-Basit Turki, had also been replaced by the cabinet. Maliki is thought to have been aiming for some time to install Abd al-Hussein al-Anbaki, his economic adviser, at the head of the CBI; the rumor raises the question of whether Turki was inserted in the position as a caretaker in order to avoid the impression that Maliki was ousting Shabibi, an internationally respected economist, with a personal adviser.

The key disagreement is over the share of the budget allotted to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Parliamentary finance committee member Jaber al-Jaberi of the Sunni-secular Iraqiyya bloc told media sources that Maliki’s State of Law Coalition was seeking to reduce the Kurdistan region’s share of the federal budget from the 17 per cent stipulated in 2006 to 12 per cent. Kurdish officials have long claimed that Baghdad has undertaken a range of measures in order to reduce the KRG’s effective share of the budget, including increasing the proportion of the budget allocated to sovereign expenditures, from which the KRG is excluded. The push to reduce the Kurdish budget share is reported to be led by Hanan Fatlawi, a State of Law MP seen as one of Maliki’s most aggressive representatives.

In September 2012, KRG Natural Resources Minister Ashti Hawrami announced an agreement under which the federal government would apportion 1 trillion dinars to the KRG to pay international oil companies (IOCs) working in the Kurdistan region. A first installment of 650 billion dinars was made as agreed in early October; however, in November Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister for Energy Affairs Hussein al-Shahristani announced that Baghdad would not pay the remaining amount, since the KRG had failed to pump the required daily amount of oil stipulated in the agreement. The KRG responded by reducing oil exports to the rest of Iraq by 50 per cent. Baghdad subsequently implied that it intended to withhold the second payment until the KRG agreed to meet a 2013 export target of 250,000 barrels per day and provided accounting of sales and production since 2008, prompting the Kurds to suspend exports to Iraq altogether in late December. The Kurds are now seeking $3.5 billion to pay IOCs working in the Kurdistan region, which they intend to cover retroactive payments dating back to 2010. Maliki’s coalition has insisted that before any further allocations are made, the Kurds should first pay for the barrels per day of oil that they have failed to export since November.

The budget conflict comes amid increasingly clear evidence that the KRG, dominated by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of KRG President Massoud Barzani, is looking to expand its economic horizons through relations with Turkey. On January 29, Hawrami announced that the KRG planned to raise exports to Turkey to around 20,000 barrels per day of crude oil and 10-15,000 barrels per day of condensate. Despite US opposition, Turkey has insisted that trading with the Kurds without Baghdad’s approval is legal. On February 8, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan claimed that under the Iraqi constitution, the KRG has the right to trade “with any country” and that, as a neighbor, Turkey was merely “helping” the Kurds.

This dispute persists in the absence of a federal hydrocarbons law, which Iraqiyya MP and parliamentary oil and energy committee member Adnan al-Janabi claimed on February 7 was “at the bottom of the government’s list” of legislative priorities. With no such law forthcoming, Baghdad and Erbil continue to compete for the business of international oil companies (IOCs), with Baghdad offering a range of threats and incentives to convince IOCs to work only in southern Iraq. In late January, Maliki held a rare meeting with ExxonMobil head Rex Tillerson, at which Maliki is reported to have made a “substantial” offer including improved contract terms to persuade Exxon to discontinue work with the KRG and return its focus to the $50 billion West Qurna 1 oilfield in southern Iraq. Exxon signed exploration contracts with the KRG in October 2011 that would involve drilling in the areas disputed between Iraq and the KRG, and as recently as December 2012, Maliki ally Sami al-Askari threatened that the Iraqi Army would intervene to prevent Exxon from working in these areas. On February 8, it was reported that Exxon had hired former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq James Jeffrey as its representative in Iraq, a move which sources have suggested increases the likelihood that Exxon will ultimately choose Baghdad over Erbil.

The oil dispute is not, however, the only stumbling block for the budget. The Kurds, in particular, seek a share of the Defense Ministry’s budget for the Peshmerga forces. In a statement, Deputy Parliamentary Speaker Arif Tayfur demanded that the federal government fund the Peshmerga as it does the forces under the federal Ministry of Defense. Tayfur noted that salaries had recently been allocated retroactively to “hundreds of thousands of Baathists who participated in the Anfal operation,” while the Peshmerga had an “honorable history of fighting the authoritarian regime.” The deputy speaker added that the government must “take care of all the components of the Iraqi people,” comparing the reluctance to fund the Kurdish forces with the government’s disbursal of salaries for “tens of thousands of Sahwa.” A KRG Finance Ministry adviser, Abdulkhaliq Rafiq, has claimed that under the terms of the Iraqi constitution, Baghdad owes the KRG more than $6 billion in overdue payments to the Peshmerga Ministry since 2005. The federal government insists that the financing of the Peshmerga falls under the aegis of the KRG: in a television interview in November 2012, Maliki stated that he would be willing to fund the Peshmerga only if the Kurdish forces were placed under federal control.

The KRG’s share of the budget is not the only allocation to draw criticism, moreover. Provinces within Iraq face reduced shares, and southern oil-producing provinces have been particularly vocal in their demands for higher allocations. The Sadrists have accused the Maliki government of marginalizing the southern provinces, Basra in particular. Abd al-Hussein Resan, a Sadrist MP and member of the parliamentary economic and investment committee, insisted on February 13 that the provincial allocations reflected a centralist tendency on the part of the Maliki government that had been “rejected” by Iraqis. It remains to be seen whether the installation of Sadrist Planning Minister Ali al-Shukri as acting finance minister, in place of Iraqiyya leader Rafia al-Issawi, will have any effect on the Sadrist stance.

Budgetary debates in the past have served as an opportunity for Maliki’s opponents to seek to limit the prime minister’s power. In 2009, Maliki’s rivals on the parliamentary finance committee cut funding to the Maliki-sponsored tribal support councils. It also threatened Maliki’s consolidation of the security apparatus by removing funding from extra-constitutional bodies such as the Counter-Terrorism Bureau and the National Security Council. In the final stages of the budgetary debate, moreover, parliament used the budget to undermine Maliki’s control of the Sons of Iraq, moving funding for the initiative from the Maliki-controlled Ministry of Defense to the Interior Ministry, controlled by Maliki opponent Jawad al-Bolani.

Maliki is in a far stronger position to prevent such challenges today, however. A December 6, 2012 Federal Supreme Court decision rejected a proposal by the Sadrist Ahrar parliamentary bloc to distribute surplus oil revenues to the Iraqi population. The ruling implies that parliament, already robbed of the ability to originate laws by a 2010 decision, cannot add new items to the budget during the debate stage and is restricted to amending spending amounts already proposed by the cabinet. This effectively rules out the possibility of a repeat of the 2009 Sons of Iraq move. Moreover, the recent vote against withdrawing confidence in Youth and Sports Minister Jassim Muhammad Jaafar, a Maliki ally, suggests that the prime minister’s camp has regained momentum in parliament, placing Maliki in a strong position with regard to fighting off challenges to proposed spending on line items.

Protesters postpone Baghdad protest after security crackdown

Tens of thousands of Sunni Arabs gathered in Anbar, Mosul, and Samarra to protest against the government in a day of demonstrations called “Friday of Patience, Baghdad.” The organizers of the Anbar demonstrations had called for a unified prayer at the Abu Hanifa mosque in Baghdad’s Adhamiyah neighborhood, a move that would shift the focus of the protests from Anbar province to the Iraqi capital. Yet a subsequent government security crackdown and the increased likelihood of a violent confrontation ultimately convinced the Anbar popular committees to postpone their plans to move to the capital. In a statement on the Facebook pages of groups associated with the protests, the organizers stated that they had called off the Baghdad protests after “appeals to rebels from religious authorities and tribal leaders.” Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha said the move to Baghdad was postponed because the government did not grant the protesters’ request to travel to the capital. In a Friday sermon, Sheikh Hussein al-Dulaimi said that the Baghdad protests would occur in a week or two once the government prepared to secure the protesters visit.

The proposed demonstrations in Baghdad alarmed Maliki and his political allies, who warned protesters not to move forward with their plan. State of Law MP Sami al-Askari accused foreign interests, Baathists, and terrorists of orchestrating the effort. Kamal al-Saadi, the leader of State of Law in parliament, stated on February 12 that the government had evidence that al-Qaeda in Iraq and Baathists were using the planned demonstrations as a pretext to surround the Green Zone. The Maliki government used this alleged terrorist plot to launch the security crackdown ahead of the Friday protests. A spokesman for the Ministry of Defense said the security forces would respond with an “iron hand” to stop those who might disturb stability. A report from al-Sharqiyah television stated that the Muthanna Brigade, belonging to the Sixth Iraqi Army Division currently deployed near Abu Ghraib, closed the road from Anbar to non-Baghdad residents, while the Baghdad Operations Command blocked the route from Salah al-Din. Security forces also surrounded various Sunni neighborhoods in Baghdad, including Ameriyah, Adhamiyah, Adil, and Saydiyah. Reports also circulated news of preemptive security raids on the Abu Hanifa mosque and elsewhere in Baghdad. These measures remained in place in the capital on the intended day of the protests.

The appeals from clerical and tribal leaders not to provoke a potentially violent confrontation with the government and the popular committees’ willingness to accede to such requests shows that the demonstrators are still seeking to maintain a peaceful protest movement. Yet the demonstrators continue to seek ways to increase the pressure on Baghdad to address their grievances. The proposed move to Baghdad was one such attempt, but it was deterred by the government’s forceful response. As the non-violent alternatives narrow and anger grows, it is unclear how much longer the protesters are willing to maintain the peaceful nature of their movement. 

2013 Iraq Update #6: Protesters stage ‘Friday of No Dictator’

February 8, 2013

By Stephen Wicken and Marisa Sullivan

Anti-government protests continued for the sixth week in Anbar, Ninewa, and Salah ad-Din, with major protests in Fallajuh, Ramadi, Mosul, Samarra, and Tikrit. Protests also took place in Hawija in Kirkuk, Baquba in Diyala, and in the Baghdad neighborhoods of Doura and Ghazaliyah. Protests on Friday, February 8, were labeled variously the “Friday of No Dictator” or “Friday of Restoring Rights,” with protesters denouncing the “tyranny and oppression” of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Anbari tribal leader Ali Hatem al-Suleiman stated that the demonstrations in Anbar will continue until the “legitimate demands” of the protesters are met. Demonstrators in Hawija shouted the slogan, “no to the repressive regime and no to the federal court.”

Tribal leaders in Anbar province held a conference on February 7 in which they rejected sectarianism. They also condemned an attack by a small number of protesters against a delegation of southern tribal chiefs visiting the Anbar protests on February 4. The condemnation drew support from Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) head Ammar al-Hakim, who called for the government to meet the “legitimate” demands of the demonstrators “as soon as possible, in accordance with constitutional and legal mechanisms.” These calls were echoed on February 7 by a number of provincial government heads from predominantly Shi’a southern provinces. These responses suggest that political and tribal leaders continue to oppose violent escalation, even though the Maliki government is failing to address protesters’ demands and al-Qaeda in Iraq is attempting to incite broader violence. 

A number of car bombs also on February 8 targeted Shi’a areas in central and southern Iraq. Although no one immediately claimed responsibility, the attacks bear the hallmark of the Islamic State of Iraq, al-Qaeda’s front group in Iraq. Two car bombs targeted a bird market in Baghdad’s Kadhimiyah neighborhood killing at least 17; two more exploded in the town of Shomali, in Babel province, killing at least 14; and one detonated on the outskirts of Karbala city, killing two. ISI has previously demonstrated its capacity to attack the southern provinces of Iraq. In September 2012, the terrorist group launched a wave of attacks the targets of which included the southern cities of al-Nasiriyah and Basra, as well as the shrine of Ali al-Sharqi near al-Amarah in Maysan province. Friday’s attacks demonstrate ISI’s ability to launch attacks into normally well-protected Shi’a areas such as Kadhamiyah and Karbala, suggesting expanded logistical support and coordination. In the context of what has become an increasingly sectarian political crisis, any increase in attacks against Iraq’s Shi’a population has the potential of provoking retaliatory sectarian violence.

Sadrist takes over Finance Ministry from Issawi

Iraqiyya’s ministers continued their boycott of cabinet meetings—a move that has encouraged Prime Minister Maliki to place them on “compulsory leave” and replace them with acting ministers. This week, Muqtada al-Sadr approved the appointment of Ali al-Shukri, the current Minister of Planning, as acting finance minister in place of Iraqiyya leader Rafia al-Issawi. In a statement, Sadr insisted that the decision was taken “to serve national interests.” The decision suggests that the threat issued by Sadr to withdraw his existing ministers from the cabinet if the demands of anti-government protesters were not met was, in fact, a gambit intended to gain concessions from Maliki. It may also shed light on rumors that the head of the Sadrist Ahrar parliamentary bloc, Bahaa al-Araji, is to be replaced. Last week, Araji publicly refused Maliki’s request that Sadrists take up the posts of the Iraqiyya ministers. This raises the possibility that Araji is at odds with Sadr over whether the Sadrists should cooperate with Maliki and is being sidelined. Jaafar al-Moussawi is reported to be one of the contenders to replace Araji as Sadrist parliamentary leader, although Araji was still referred to as head of the Ahrar bloc in the media and on his Facebook page as of February 8.

Shukri’s appointment in Issawi’s place dealt a significant blow to Iraqiyya and raises further questions about how that bloc will posture as protests continue. Iraqiyya has portrayed itself as the primary advocate for the demonstrators’ demands and launched the boycott of cabinet as leverage to achieve them.   Maysoon al-Damalouji, Iraqiyya’s spokeswoman, announced on February 6 that Iraqiyya ministers would only return to cabinet sessions if the protesters’ demands were met, echoing the terms articulated by other Iraqiyya leaders. The same day, however, Ayad Allawi, Damalouji’s coalition and party leader, set a new and higher bar for Iraqiyya’s renewed involvement, imposing the adoption of a cabinet bylaw as a condition for Iraqiyya’s ministers to return. The cabinet bylaw was an item included at Iraqiyya’s behest in the Erbil Agreement during the 2010 government formation process, and was intended to clarify the responsibilities of the prime minister, ministers, and ministerial committees. A draft of the bylaw was presented to the cabinet in August 2012, but was rejected by Iraqiyya. Still, Allawi seems to have inserted his own demands into the debate in bringing up the Erbil Agreement. His action likely represents an attempt to regain greater influence or control over the bloc that he formally heads, but within which he has been marginalized by Issawi and Parliamentary Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi.

Iraqiyya is now in an exceedingly difficult situation: Maliki has made clear that he will not accept Iraqiyya ministers continuing to run their ministries without attending cabinet sessions. Iraqiyya has rebuffed this demand because continued involvement in government and the compromises this participation would require would only further alienate Iraqiyya from the protesters that form the chief constituency for many of the bloc’s members. Yet the current boycott has given Maliki the opportunity to oust Iraqiyya from its most important ministry, namely, finance. The Sadrists have agreed to go along with Maliki’s effort to replace Issawi, unlike in early 2012, when the prime minister tried a similar move and failed. Issawi’s ouster deprives Iraqiyya of its only significant ministerial portfolio and its ability to limit the power of the prime minister through financial oversight. It also leaves Speaker Nujaifi as the only leading Iraqiyya member with a position of national significance.

Iraqiyya’s influence within the parliament is also under pressure. Parliament voted on February 5 not to dismiss Youth and Sports Minister Jassim Muhammed Jaafar, a member of the Turkman Islamic Union and Maliki’s State of Law Coalition who faces corruption charges. The parliamentary session attracted an unusually high attendance, with 255 MPs turning out compared to an average of 180-200; only 102 votes were cast against Jaafar. The high turnout and low proportion of votes to remove Jaafar suggest significant mobilization of Maliki’s allies, and was likely intended to underscore support for the prime minister in parliament. The strong pro-Maliki showing is a response to two initiatives aimed at limiting the prime minister’s power, both of which face legal hurdles and are unlikely to succeed. In early January, Nujaifi initiated the first stage in a no-confidence vote against Maliki; weeks later, MPs voted to limit the terms of the prime minister, president, and parliamentary speaker.

The next test of Maliki’s strength in parliament likely will be the vote over the 2013 budget, which is reported to have been postponed until February 9 on account of continued disputes between parliamentary blocs. In 2009, disparate anti-Maliki parties came together to limit the prime minister through the allocation of financial resources. For example, they threatened funding for Maliki initiatives, such as the tribal support councils and the Counter-Terrorism Bureau. The outcome of the upcoming budget debate will depend on the relative strengths of the pro- and anti-Maliki blocs in parliament. Right now, the pendulum appears to have swung in Maliki’s favor. If this situation persists, the pro-Maliki bloc may place significant pressure on Nujaifi (and potentially threaten his removal), while ensuring funding for Maliki-favored projects and diverting resources away from his political rivals.

Another major political test will be the provincial elections, currently slated for April 20, 2013. This week, Muqdad al-Sharifi, the chief electoral officer of the Iraqi High Electoral Commission (IHEC) board and a member of the Shi’a National Alliance, suggested that elections might be delayed on account of the security concerns prompted by the ongoing anti-government protests. Sharifi claimed that IHEC staff in northern and western Iraq had received threatening letters, which could hinder their ability to conduct the vote on schedule. Sharifi also stated that the names of a number of candidates in the upcoming provincial election had been submitted to the Accountability and Justice Commission for audit. He gave no further information on the names or affiliations of the barred candidates. The move echoes the de-Baathification crisis that preceded the 2010 parliamentary election, in which mostly Sunni candidates were disqualified in an opaque and politicized process. The termination of de-Baathification law has been one of the protesters’ demands. The threat of postponing elections or removing Sunni Arabs through de-Baathification raises concerns that Sunni Arabs will be further alienated from the political process and may choose to pursue their objectives through violence.