Iran Update, September 25, 2023

Andie Parry and Ashka Jhaveri

The Iran Update covers provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates weekly on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday. For more on developments and in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Key Takeaways

1. The People’s Republic of China and Syria signed several development and technology cooperation agreements on September 22, which may compete with reconstruction agreements that Iran and Syria signed in May.
2. A drone strike near Mayadin City on September 25 caused multiple casualties among the Iranian-affiliated Arab tribesmen who were deploying to Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-controlled territory in eastern Syria. The deployment of Arab tribesmen to combat the SDF is consistent with ISW’s assessment that the tribal insurgency will likely support Iran’s efforts to establish a grassroots resistance to expel US forces from Syria.

Iranian Activities in the Levant

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Syria signed several development and technology cooperation agreements on September 22, which may compete with reconstruction agreements that Iran and Syria signed in May.[1] Syrian President Bashar al Assad and PRC President Xi Jinping elevated the countries’ bilateral relations to a “strategic partnership” on September 22.[2] Syria was already a member of the Belt and Road Initiative, and the PRC has expressed a willingness to assist in Syrian reconstruction for several years, however.[3] The PRC has more economic resources than Iran to support reconstruction projects in Syria.

• The establishment of a “strategic partnership” with Syria is a common PRC foreign policy practice. The PRC has strategic partnerships with over 100 states and uses the relationships instead of bilateral treaties to structure its bilateral political and economic relations.[4]
  It has “strategic partnerships” or stronger ties across the Middle East and even established a strategic partnership with the Palestinian Authority in June.[5]
• The strategic partnership with Syria includes economic and reconstruction memoranda of understanding (MOUs) PRC Prime Minister Li Qiang said would provide support for reconstruction and consolidation of stability.[6] Neither the PRC nor the Syrian regime specified the projects the PRC will support or the amount of money they entail, however.
• Iran and Syria signed MOUs covering oil, energy, transportation, reconstruction, and communications technology in May 2023 and have since held several follow up meetings.[7] Iran is particularly interested in developing a rail link through Iraq and Syria to the Mediterranean.[8]

The Syrian regime will continue to rely on Iran and Russia for military support. Xi and Assad have not released any security cooperation announcements, nor did Syrian military officials accompany Assad to China.[9] Iran, however, has built up a large military footprint in Syria, as ISW has previously reported.[10] Iran reasserted its military commitment to Syria on September 21 during a joint Iran-Syria military exercise led by commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force.[11] Russia has also remained active in Syria despite the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and has provided critical air support to regime forces in the conflict against rebels in Idlib Province.[12]

A drone strike that destroyed a bridge near Mayadin City on September 25 caused multiple casualties among the Iranian-affiliated Arab tribesmen who were deploying to Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-controlled territory in eastern Syria, according to Syrian opposition media.[13] The tribesmen were crossing the bridge to support the Arab tribes’ fight against the US-backed SDF, which has been ongoing since mid-August and has developed into an insurgency that is fracturing the SDF.[14] ISW previously reported that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force is forming a tribal militia to strengthen the Arab tribe's control of SDF-controlled territory and fight SDF forces.[15] The deployment of Arab tribesmen to combat the SDF is consistent with ISW’s assessment that the tribal insurgency will likely support Iran’s efforts to establish a grassroots resistance to expel US forces from Syria.

 

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[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-iran-sign-strategic-coop... ; https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202309/1298729.shtml

[2] https://sana dot sy/?p=1968575

[3] https://www.fmprc dot gov.cn/fyrbt_673021/202309/t20230920_11145944.shtml

[4] https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents... ; https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/13691481221127571

[5] https://apnews.com/article/china-abbas-palestinian-israel-saudi-dd55f1cc...

[6] https://www.almanar dot com.lb/10972106

[7] https://www.farsnews dot ir/news/14020213000875 ; https://sana dot sy/?p=1941334

[8] https://www.irna [dot] ir/news/85106100/%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%87-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%A2%D9%87%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%B4%D8%AA-%D8%A2%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D9%87%D9%81%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%A2%DB%8C%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B6%D8%A7-%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%AF

[9] https://sana dot sy/?p=1966852

[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-17-2023

[11] https://www dot tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1402/06/30/2959797/%D8%B3%D9%81%D8%B1-%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87-%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%88%DB%8C-%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B3-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%B1%DA%A9-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%87

[12] https://t.me/SAM_Syria0/6576

[13] https://twitter.com/Sada_AlSharqieh/status/1706333735568675292

[14]https://twitter.com/Sada_AlSharqieh/status/1706333735568675292; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/syrian-democratic-forces%E...

[15] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-15-2023

Russia in Review: May 14 - June 11, 2019 (Part 1)

Russia in Review is a weekly intelligence summary (INTSUM) produced by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). This ISW INTSUM series sheds light on key trends and developments related to the Russian government’s objectives and its efforts to secure them. Receive future Russia in Review INTSUM products via-email by signing up for the ISW mailing list.

Reporting Period: May 14 - June 11, 2019 (read the previous Russia in Review here)

Part 1 of 2 (read the second part here)

Authors: Mason Clark and Nataliya Bugayova

Key Takeaway: Russia and China signed numerous agreements to boost economic cooperation and attempt to limit dependence on the West during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s June 5-7 state visit to Russia. The Kremlin risks ceding strategic ground to China in the long term as it seeks additional sources of cash and international partnership in the short term.

Russia and China promoted their strategic partnership during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s June 5-7 state visit to Russia. Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed nearly 30 agreements during Xi’s visit to Russia, including a joint statement on Sino-Russian strategic cooperation.[1] Putin and Xi claimed relations between Russia and China have reached an unprecedented level.[2] Xi highlighted his personal ties with Putin and described Putin as his "best friend," while Putin framed the Russo-Chinese relationship as a strategic alignment.[3] Xi’s visit focused on economic cooperation with limited comments on international affairs.[4] Putin accused the U.S. of attempting to “extend its jurisdiction to the whole world” as Putin and Xi continued to frame themselves as champions of a multipolar international order in opposition to U.S. hegemony.[5] Putin and Xi discussed linking the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).[6] This idea supports Putin’s vision to create a Great Eurasian Partnership that would include the EAEU and BRI among others.[7]

Russia and China boosted cooperation in the energy, technology, and agricultural sectors. Putin and Xi designated 2020 and 2021 as years of Russian-Chinese scientific, technical, and innovation cooperation.[8] The Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and the state-owned China Investment Corporation agreed to invest $1 billion in the newly created Russia-China Science and Technology Innovation Fund.[9] The RDIF and Chinese e-commerce giant Alibaba Group will invest $100 million each in a joint venture involving Russian phone operator Megafon and internet company Mail.ru to expand e-commerce in Russia.[10] Chinese telecommunications manufacturer Huawei signed a deal with Russian telecom company MTS on June 5 to develop a fifth-generation wireless technology network (5G) in Russia. Huawei also purchased the rights to use facial recognition software developed by Russian company Vocord on June 3.[11] The U.S. has recognized Huawei as a security threat and is attempting to disincentivize U.S. partners from using Huawei.[12] China is likely the driver of the 5G deal with Russia as Huawei is facing resistance in its international business development and seeks Russia as a potential market.

Putin and Xi also signed a number of energy deals. Putin and Xi agreed that Russian state nuclear energy corporation Rosatom would build several more nuclear power units in China, including a “demonstration fast neutron reactor.”[13] The Kremlin is continuing its campaign to capture global nuclear energy markets with projects underway in Europe, Africa, and Asia. Putin and Xi also announced that the Power of Siberia gas pipeline, intended to deliver 38 billion cubic meters of gas annually to China, will become operational in December 2019. China Petrochemical Corp Sinopec has secured a 40 percent stake in Russia’s Amur Gas processing plant project.[14] Sinopoc will also help Russian gas company Novatek market Russian LNG produced in the Arctic to end-users in China. Novatek announced the sale of a 20 percent stake in its gas liquefaction project in the Arctic to Chinese CNODC, a subsidiary of China National Petroleum Corporation, in April.[15] ISW assessed that increased Russian cooperation with China in the Arctic can limit U.S. freedom of movement in the region.

China seeks to reduce its dependence on American technology – the key premise of its Made in China 2025 strategy. China likely has the manpower and industrial strength to take advantage of Russian technical knowledge. The Kremlin seeks additional forms of cash, as Western sanctions dried up foreign direct investment into Russia. The Kremlin might be using its technological cooperation as a means to secure Chinese investment in other areas, such as energy and Arctic development projects. The U.S. must consider the long-term implications of technology transfers between Russia and China, in particular from the standpoint of military capabilities and governance. China is using technology to aid its authoritarian population control policies; the Kremlin might also be heading in this direction as Putin’s value proposition to his population declines. China has already been spreading its censorship-enabling technologies. China National Electronics Import & Export Corporation (CEIEC), which develops surveillance systems for the Chinese government, exported its technology to numerous authoritarian governments in countries such as Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Angola. CEIEC lists Moscow as its only European office.[16]

China is additionally turning to Russia as an agricultural source as China curbs its food imports from the U.S. and Canada.[17] Russian and Chinese officials discussed increased Russian food exports to China and Chinese investment in agricultural development in Russia’s Far East during Xi’s visit.[18]

Putin and Xi continued to attempt to limit Russia’s and China’s dependence on the Western financial system. Both leaders pledged to grow bilateral trade, which increased to $108 billion in 2018, exceeding the $100 billion goal.[19] Putin and Xi signed an agreement pledging to promote trade in the ruble and yuan instead of the dollar. The agreement also focuses on “ensuring uninterrupted banking services for transactions in conditions of instability in global markets.” Both countries seek to insulate themselves from shocks in the Western financial system. Putin accused the U.S. of using its financial system as a weapon on June 7. The Kremlin is heavily pushing for the de-dollarization of its economy to buffer itself from future U.S. sanctions. The Central Bank of Russia has grown the share of its yuan foreign currency reserves from 2.8% to 14.2% since 2018.[20] China is also looking for ways to mitigate the effects of the ongoing trade war with the U.S. and potential future shocks. The efforts have produced limited success thus far as companies in Russia still prefer transactions in dollars.[21] Russian and Chinese efforts to build an alternative to SWIFT interbank financial telecommunication system have also been progressing slowly, with Russia’s alternative service facing multiple limitations including limited operating hours, domestic-only transactions, and a lack of connectivity to banks in the Commonwealth of Intendent States (CIS).[22] Russia and China will, however, persist in their effort to build a coalition of countries to move away from the dollar.

The Kremlin will continue to boost its ties with China in search of additional resources and international coalitions while risking ceding ground to China in the long-term. Russia and China, continue to face several points of strategic divergence and imbalance in the relationship despite new agreements and rhetoric about strategic partnership. China has the upper hand with Russia in many respects given the size of the Chinese economy and population. The technology cooperation agreement that Xi and Putin signed likely benefits China more than Russia. Russia gains additional sources of cash through Chinese investment, but also provides China with critical resources such as energy and, potentially, food in the longer term. The Kremlin is likely not content with Chinese expansion in Russia’s backyard in Central Asia and in Russia’s Far East. Increased Chinese investment in Russia is also unpopular among the Russian population. The Kremlin has recently faced protests in Russia’s Chuvashia region against reported Chinese pressure on local farmers to sell land to Chinese companies. Over a million Russians signed a petition against a Chinese-backed water bottling plant near Lake Baikal earlier this year. The Kremlin needs Chinese investment to develop the Arctic, which is one of Putin’s stated strategic goals. The Kremlin is wary, however, of facilitating a longer-term Chinese military presence in the region. And while Putin and Xi agreed to link the Russia-led EAEU and China’s BRI, it is unclear how much leverage Putin has in shaping the terms of this cooperation.[23] The Kremlin is certainly aware of the risk of a closer relationship with China, but might think it can control the ties, which may simply not be true in the long run.

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[1] [“The Beginning of the Russian-Chinese Negotiations in a Narrow Composition,”] Kremlin, June 5, 2019, http://kremlin(.)ru/events/president/transcripts/60670; [“Xi Jinping Holds Talks with Russian President Putin,”] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, June 6, 2019, https://www.fmprc(.)gov.cn/web/tpxw/t1670124.shtml.
[2] [“The Beginning of the Russian-Chinese Negotiations in a Narrow Composition,”] Kremlin, June 5, 2019, http://kremlin(.)ru/events/president/transcripts/60670
[3] “Beijing, Moscow to Sign around 30 Deals during Xi’s Russia Tour, Says Chinese Diplomat,” TASS, May 30, 2019, http://tass(.)com/world/1060743; [“Press Statements Following Russian-Chinese Talks,”] Kremlin, June 5, 2019, http://kremlin(.)ru/events/president/news/60672.
[4] [“Press Statements Following Russian-Chinese Talks,”] Kremlin, June 5, 2019, http://kremlin(.)ru/events/president/news/60672.
[5] [“Press Statements Following Russian-Chinese Talks,”] Kremlin, June 5, 2019, http://kremlin(.)ru/events/president/news/60672; [“Plenary Session of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum,”] Kremlin, June 7, 2019, http://kremlin(.)ru/events/president/news/60707.
[6] [“Plenary Session of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum,”] Kremlin, June 7, 2019, http://kremlin(.)ru/events/president/news/60707.
[7] “Plenary Session of St Petersburg International Economic Forum,” Kremlin, June 17, 2016, http://en.kremlin(.)ru/events/president/news/52178; “Meeting of Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives of Russia,” Kremlin, July 19, 2018, http://en.kremlin(.)ru/events/president/news/58037.
[8] [“Press Statements Following Russian-Chinese Talks,”] Kremlin, June 5, 2019, http://kremlin(.)ru/events/president/news/60672.
[9] [“Russia and China will Create a $1 Billion Science and Technology Innovation Fund,”] TASS, June 5, 2019, https://tass(.)ru/ekonomika/6511955; “RDIF and CIC to Invest in Russia-China Science and Technology Innovation Fund,” Russian Direct Investment Fund, June 5, 2019, https://rdif(.)ru/Eng_fullNews/4095/.
[10] “RDIF, Alibaba Group, MegaFon and Mail.ru Group Announce Signing of Definitive Documents for Joint Venture in Russia and the CIS,” Russian Direct Investment Fund, June 5, 2019, https://rdif(.)ru/Eng_fullNews/4096/.
[11] [“Huawei Bought Face Recognition Technology from a Russian Company,”] Novaya Gazeta, June 3, 2019, https://www.novayagazeta(.)ru/news/2019/06/03/152209-huawei-kupila-u-rossiyskoy-kompanii-tehnologii-raspoznavaniya-lits.
[12] "Addition of Entity to the Entities List," Bureau of Industry and Security, May 21, 2019, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/05/21/2019-10616/addition-of-entities-to-the-entity-list.
[13] [“Press Statements Following Russian-Chinese Talks,”] Kremlin, June 5, 2019, http://kremlin(.)ru/events/president/news/60672; “Putin: Moscow, Beijing Agree on Building Several More Russia-Designed Nuclear Power Units,” TASS, June 7, 2019, http://tass(.)com/economy/1062602.
[14] “Sinopec Signs Agreement With Russian Oil Company,” O&G Links, June 10, 2019, https://oglinks.news/sinopec/news/signs-agreement-with-russian-oil-company-1140591; Sibur, Amur GCC Project, 2019, https://www.sibur(.)ru/en/about/investments/16906/; Zheng Xin, “Sinopec Signs Agreement with Russian Oil Company,” China Daily, June 9, 2019, http://www.chinadaily(.)com.cn/a/201906/09/WS5cfc7871a31017657723015d.html; Andrey Ostroukh, Katya Golubkova, “Russia’s Sibur eyes Moscow IPO no Earlier Than 2020: CEO,” Reuters, June 7, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-forum-sibur/russias-sibur-eyes-moscow-ipo-no-earlier-than-2020-ceo-idUSKCN1T811K
[15] “NOVATEK and CNODC Sign Entrance Agreement to Arctic LNG 2,” Novatek, April 25, 2019, http://www.novatek(.)ru/en/press/releases/index.php?id_4=3173.
[16] CEIEC, Business Network, http://www.ceiec(.)com/content/business_networks.
[17] “Russia, China to Boost Energy, Agricultural Trade Due to US Trade War – Scholars,” Sputnik, June 1, 2019, https://sputniknews(.)com/analysis/201906011075519959-russia-china-us-trade/; Laura Zhou, “Russia Ready to Fill China’s Food Gap Left by US in Trade War Fallout,” South China Morning Post, June 7, 2019,
https://www.scmp(.)com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3013549/russia-ready-fill-chinas-food-gap-left-us-trade-war-fallout; Naomi Powell, “Canadian Soybean Exports to China Plunge 95% After Hitting Record High, as Diplomatic Dispute Continues,” Financial Post, May 17, 2019, https://business.financialpost.com/business/canadian-soybean-exports-to-china-plunge-95-after-hitting-record-high-as-diplomatic-dispute-continues.
[18] [“Russia Will Expand the Supply of Agricultural Products to China,”] Ministry of Agriculture of the Russian Federation, June 5, 2019, http://mcx(.)ru/press-service/news/rossiya-rasshirit-postavki-selkhozproduktsii-v-kitay/; Ekaterina Burlakova, [“A Large Chinese Holding Will Invest Almost 10 Billion Rubles in Russian Agriculture,”] Vedemosti, June 6, 2019, https://www.vedomosti(.)ru/business/articles/2019/06/06/803577-holding-vlozhit.
[19] [“Press Statements Following Russian-Chinese Talks,”] Kremlin, June 5, 2019, http://kremlin(.)ru/events/president/news/60672.
[20] Irina Malkova, [“The Central Bank Transferred its Assets from the United States to China and Halved its Share of Assets in Dollars,”] The Bell, May 8, 2019, https://thebell(.)io/tsb-perevel-svoi-aktivy-iz-ssha-v-kitaj-i-vdvoe-snizil-dolyu-aktivov-v-dollarah/.
[21] [“Russia and China Prefer Settlements in Dollars and Euros, Rather Than in National Currencies,”] Reporter, May 31, 2019, https//topcor(.)ru/8996-rossija-i-kitaj-predpochitajut-raschety-v-dollarah-i-evro-a-ne-v-nacvaljutah.html.
[22] [“Stretched String: Is it Possible to Disconnect Russia From SWIFT,”] Forbes Russia, March 15, 2018, https://www.forbes(.)ru/finansy-i-investicii/358573-natyanutaya-struna-vozmozhno-li-otklyuchenie-rossii-ot-swift.
[23] [“Plenary Session of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum,”] Kremlin, June 7, 2019, http://kremlin(.)ru/events/president/news/60707.

Iran Crisis Update, November 8

Nicholas Carl, Johanna Moore, Zachary Coles, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan

November 8, 5:30 pm ET

The Iran Crisis Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). To receive Iran Crisis Updates via email, please subscribe here.

Protests may increase in the coming days to commemorate the regime’s brutal crackdown in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province on September 30. November 9 marks the 40^th day since security forces indiscriminately shot and killed civilians, including children, as they gathered for Friday prayers and protested in Zahedan on September 30.[1] Protester death tolls from that day range from 66 to 96, although the actual number could be higher.[2]  Iranian mourners and protesters have regularly gathered for 40-day commemorations for killed demonstrators in recent weeks and may do so again on November 9 for those killed in Zahedan.[3] This commemoration is primarily a Shia tradition, and most of Sistan and Baluchistan Province’s population is Sunni. Protesters may still gather there and elsewhere throughout Iran on November 9 in solidarity with the people of Zahedan. Protest organizations have called for countrywide demonstrations, and especially in Zahedan, on Friday, November 11 as well.[4] Friday protests have become common across Sistan and Baluchistan Province since the September 30 crackdown.[5]

[The following paragraph was also published in ISW’s Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 8.] Iranian state-run outlet Nour News Agency reported that Russian National Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev arrived in Tehran on November 8, likely to discuss the potential sale of Iranian ballistic missiles to Russia.[6] Nour News Agency announced Patrushev’s arrival in an English-language tweet, stating Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Shamkhani invited Patrushev and noted that Patrushev will also meet with other high-ranking Iranian political and economic officials to discuss Russo-Iranian cooperation.[7] Nour News Agency is affiliated with the SNSC. The SNSC likely announced Patrushev’s arrival in Iran to highlight the deepening cooperation between Moscow and Tehran to an international audience (rather than domestically), as well as to implicitly highlight that a high-ranking Russian official turned to Iran for help in Ukraine. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani notably traveled to Moscow in 2015 to appeal to Russia to intervene in the Syrian Civil War.[8] Tehran is likely eager to publicly signal this rebalancing of its strategic partnership with Moscow, especially to regional Iranian adversaries with which the Kremlin occasionally cooperates such as Israel and Saudi Arabia. Patrushev’s visit to Iran notably comes amid reports that the Iranian regime is seeking Russian help with protest suppression, although it is unclear if this will be discussed by Patrushev and his Iranian counterpart.[9]

Patrushev’s visit comes amid some domestic criticism of Iranian military support to Russia. Masih Mohajeri—the editor of Iranian newspaper Jomhouri Eslami—criticized on November 7 the regime’s decision to support the Kremlin.[10] Mohajeri added that the regime should have told Russia not to use Iranian drones in Ukraine. Mohajeri’s remarks reflect the reservations among some in Iran about pursuing the strategic partnership with Moscow that Supreme Ali Khamenei has supported.

Key Takeaways

• Protests may increase in the coming days to commemorate the regime’s brutal crackdown in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province on September 30.
• Iranian state-run outlet Nour News Agency reported that Russian National Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev arrived in Tehran on November 8, likely to discuss the potential sale of Iranian ballistic missiles to Russia.
• At least 12 protests took place in nine cities across eight provinces.
• The Jaish al Adl spokesperson claimed that the regime crackdown in Zahedan on September 30 has increased the group’s recruitment, according to UK-based Midstone Centre.
• The IRGC may have deployed some of its Iraqi proxies to support the protest crackdown.
• SNSC-affiliated Nour News Agency accused unnamed American and Mossad officials of meeting with anti-regime Kurdish militant groups in Iraqi Kurdistan over the past two months.

Anti-Regime Protests

At least 12 protests took place in nine cities across eight provinces on November 8. CTP assesses with moderate to high confidence that protests occurred in the locations below.

Note: CTP is using asterisks to denote protests that included mourners commemorating killed protesters.

Karaj, Alborz Province (population: approximately 1,970,000)

• Several dozen likely high school students chanted “death to Khamenei,” “freedom, freedom, freedom,” and other anti-regime slogans on Karaj streets.[11]

Najafabad, Esfahan Province (population: approximately 293,275)

• Several dozen Azad University in Najafabad students protested on campus and chanted anti-regime slogans.[12]

Siahkal, Gilan Province (population: approximately 19,924)

• Security forces fired tear gas at an undetermined number of protesters on a Siahkal street.[13]

*Marivan, Kurdistan Province (population: approximately 136,654)

• Approximately 50 protesters gathered at a cemetery in Marivan to memorialize Nasrin Qadri, a protester killed by security forces on November 5.[14]

Tehran City, Tehran Province (population: approximately 8,700,000)

• Dozens of University of Science and Culture students protested on campus.[15]
• Approximately two dozen University Beheshti students demonstrated on campus to protest against security forces arresting students for participating in protests.[16]
• 100-200 Sharif University students demonstrated on campus to protest against the university suspending students that participated in protests.[17]
• An undetermined number of Ershad-Damavand University students protested and chanted “death to the dictator” on campus.[18]

CTP assesses with low confidence that protests occurred in the locations below.

Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province (population: approximately 414,069)

• An undetermined number of protesters set fires in Sanandaj streets.[19]

Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province (population: approximately 1,185,000)

• A dozen likely high school students chanted “freedom, freedom, freedom” and “death to the dictator.”[20]

Kermanshah City, Kermanshah Province (population: approximately 946,681)

• An undetermined number of protesters set fires and chanted “death to the dictator” on a Kermanshah street.[21]

Gorgan, Golestan Province (population: approximately 350,676)

• Several dozen likely high school students chanted “freedom, freedom, freedom” on school grounds.[22]

Jaish al Adl spokesperson Hossein Baloch claimed that the regime crackdown in Zahedan on September 30 has increased the group’s recruitment, according to UK-based Midstone Centre.[23] Jaish al Adl is a Salafi-jihadi militant group operating around the Iran-Pakistan border. CTP cannot verify this report. Jaish al Adl has called for armed resistance against the regime and expressed support for the protests in recent weeks, as CTP previously reported.[24]

The IRGC may have deployed some of its Iraqi proxies to support the protest crackdown. Five buses carrying Iraqi militants crossed the border into Iran from Iraq on November 6, according to a UK-based human rights organization.[25] The Iraqi militants allegedly traveled through the Mehran border crossing, which is also the location of a prominent IRGC Quds Force headquarters that oversees some operations in Iraq.[26] CTP cannot verify the reports of Iraqi militants traveling to Iran.

SNSC-affiliated Nour News Agency accused unnamed American and Mossad officials of meeting with anti-regime Kurdish militant groups in Iraqi Kurdistan over the past two months on November 8.[27] Nour News Agency claimed that these parties met to plan operations against the regime.

Intelligence and Security Minister Esmail Khatib threatened the UK for hosting anti-regime outlet Iran International on November 8.[28] Khatib added that the regime now views communicating with Iran International as cooperating with terrorists and threatening national security. Khatib’s remarks follow reports of an IRGC threat to two British-Iranian journalists working for Iran International in London. The London Metropolitan Police informed them that the IRGC posed an “imminent, credible, and significant [threat] to their lives and those of their families.”[29]

IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency reported on November 8 that the IRGC Intelligence Organization has used drones to support the suppression of political dissent.[30] Tasnim News Agency published a video boasting about the IRGC Intelligence Organization’s use of drones to identify and arrest disaffected citizens in Kouh Chenar, Fars Province.

Armed Forces General Staff spokesperson Brigadier General Abol Fazl Shekarchi emphasized the need for the regime to communicate its ideology and narratives to Iranian youth via the media on November 8.[31] Shekarchi accused the US of conducting a hybrid war against the Islamic Republic to create societal divisions and unrest. He added that pro-regime journalists are on the frontline fighting against the United States’ “soft war” against Iran. The Iranians use this term, “soft war,” to refer to the West’s perceived use of nonmilitary means, such as economic and psychological pressure and information operations, to erode the regime’s legitimacy, cultivate domestic opposition, and propagate Western values in Iran. Shekarchi made these remarks while meeting with media officials in Bushehr Province.

Economic Affairs and Finance Minister Ehsan Khandouzi stated on November 8 that the protests have contributed to the depreciation of the Iranian rial. The Iranian rial dropped to an all-time low of around 366,500 to the US dollar on November 7.[32] Khandouzi stated that the Central Bank of Iran will try to stabilize the rial in the coming days, possibly by injecting hard currencies such as the dollar into the market.

Axis of Resistance and Regional Developments

There was nothing significant to report today.

---

[1] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-september-30

[2] https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/14/world/middleeast/iran-zahedan-crackdown.html

[3] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-november-4

[4] https://twitter.com/iran_javanan/status/1589705927699365890

[5] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-november-5

[6] https://twitter.com/nournewsen/status/1590047857830002689

[7] https://twitter.com/nournewsen/status/1590047857830002689; https://twitter.com/nournewsen/status/1590048409213620224

[8] https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-iran-russia/iranian-commander-soleimani-meets-putin-in-moscow-idUKKBN0TZ1NY20151216

[9] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-october-26

[10] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/07/row-brews-in-iran-over-use-of-its-drones-in-ukraine-war-by-russia

[11] https://twitter.com/ManotoNews/status/1589929057214693377?s=20&t=OeLdnAAtZexFsA8onJkc5g; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1590010933304524801?s=20&t=i_uDgfaIeMLoxqUXPjfElw

[12] https://twitter.com/ManotoNews/status/1589923827047600129?s=20&t=ryv68tGblWf-iACYbEDCUg; https://twitter.com/ManotoNews/status/1589960720594395136?s=20&t=Hda2G-_oPpyQ269UMuWQBQ

[13] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1590044672432701440?s=20&t=0v5FjznNQm8d-UqrxvJJoA

[14] https://twitter.com/HengawO/status/1589933654943629313?s=20&t=YfidPjNlU80O2Wha90ATGw; https://twitter.com/jilamostajer/status/1589951913667067905?s=20&t=AY-C8O4NxaJ0BweoELz9tQ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1589972983309041665?s=20&t=eP7TFXunrvh9EBafMkkzgg; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1589974753455972352?s=20&t=NmbeBNcmtJhO1qyr2J9REQ

[15] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1589943819025645568?s=20&t=7WcTMd_NoGxUFjGTiD4Avw; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1589946501375352833?s=20&t=cdqUbm4D9FShPOUQG2dTEw

[16] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1589930869107458048?s=20&t=p-UawJRmAgc98tXl7o1N-Q; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1589931869973270528?s=20&t=7s76MjaRypwWiI8uCCJPFQ;

[17] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1589972597252718594?s=20&t=uVSRZE9I9o8L9Ic5auqQAQ

[18] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1589932886580346881?s=20&t=-1qPOYflbTZ2j-Ied44D5w; https://twitter.com/ManotoNews/status/1589994476176830465?s=20&t=6Qw_XLRuSm9lxqoUCEfzzw

[19] https://twitter.com/ManotoNews/status/1590045256221085696?s=20&t=5h5FpO_J_o7xPkoTMQLysw

[20] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1589974107525115906?s=20&t=yVn-Ii6zoQjMfnAllS_-SA

[21] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1590034745014222849?s=20&t=prKmyMFwN2_S5_tWkon38Q

[22] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1590078823923879936?s=20&t=20mFg9D2XcUrT1aMZAcpYg

[23] https://midstonecentre dot com/2022/11/exclusive-trouble-in-iran-an-interview-with-jaish-al-%ca%bfadl-of-baluchestan

[24] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-november-7

[25] https://twitter.com/HengawO/status/1589714145179447298?s=20&t=_2eIG4i-qHwtUUUxkqza-A

[26] See Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor’s The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama

[27] https://twitter.com/nournewsen/status/1589885397542526981; https://twitter.com/nournews_ir/status/1589845373069115397?s=20&t=SJlgpuCMTrJxJWxktFgshQ

[28] http://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/08/17/2801260

[29] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202211076450

[30] www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/08/17/2800910

[31] http://www.defapress dot ir/fa/news/554766

[32] www.bonbast dot com/historical/usd/2022/11

 

Russia in Review: Military Exercises as Geopolitical Tools

Russia in Review is a weekly intelligence summary (INTSUM) produced by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). This ISW INTSUM series sheds light on key trends and developments related to the Russian government’s objectives and its efforts to secure them. Receive future Russia in Review INTSUM products via-email by signing up for the ISW mailing list.

Authors: Nataliya Bugayova and Mason Clark

Key Takeaways: The Kremlin is attempting to expand Russia’s security orbit. Russia will conduct two major military exercises in September — the Union Shield 2019 exercise with Belarus and the Center 2019 exercise with China, India, Pakistan and the members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Russia will use these exercises to demonstrate its ability to operate militarily on multiple borders and deepen ties with key states in South and East Asia. Russia will also incorporate its lessons learned from its military intervention in Syria into the exercises. These types of exercises support Russian President Vladimir Putin’s goal to establish suzerainty over the now independent states of the former Soviet Union – an effort that is advancing in Belarus and Moldova. Union Shield 2019 explicitly aims to practice defending the Union State, a planned but not yet implemented federation-type entity that would ensure the allegiance of Belarus to Russia. Moldova is considering Russia’s offer of a three-year military cooperation agreement – an indicator that Russia’s plan to expand its influence is succeeding. The Kremlin is also attempting to grow security ties with other neighbors, including Mongolia.

Russia likely intends to signal and test its military capabilities to operate on multiple fronts, specifically in its Western, Southern and Northern regions. The two exercises differ in scope but they both focus on countering non-conventional military threats to Russia and the former Soviet Union. Russia hosted another set of exercises in the Southern Military District in July 2019 focused on demonstrating operational capabilities in the Russian Caucasus.[1]




Russia is engaged in a campaign of military learning and seeks to practice specific skills during these exercises.

• Russian military exercises increasingly emphasize the inclusion of partner forces to practice coalition operations and coordination with foreign militaries, as Russia implements lessons learned operating alongside Iran, the Bashar al-Assad regime and other actors in Syria.[2] The Union Shield 2019 and Center 2019 exercises intend to demonstrate Russia’s efforts to build interoperability with the former Soviet states and to engage major Asian players including India, Pakistan, and China.[3]

• Russia is focusing on developing initiative and creativity in junior officers, emphasizing the need to make unconventional decisions in combat.[4] Russian officers with theater command experience in Syria have stressed the need to increase decision-making flexibility.[5] The Union Shield exercise emphasizes non-standard approaches in combatting insurgencies.[6]

• Russia is emphasizing the ability to conduct rapid redeployments over long distances. A stated goal of Belarusian participation in the Union Shield exercise is to give Belarusian forces experience conducting long distance redeployments.[7] Russia is working to increase the maneuverability of its own and partner forces.

• Both exercises will practice defending against non-conventional threats. Center 2019 will practice counter-terrorism operations in Central Asia. Union Shield 2019 will practice defending against illegal armed formations that aim to destabilize the Union State. Belarusian Chief of the General Staff Oleh Belokonev stated that “conflicts usually start with actions of terrorists, separatists, and illegal armed formations with support of outside forces.”[8] Russian military officials also stated that Union Shield 2019 will use the Syrian experience of “clearing inhabited locations without using force.”[9] Union Shield 2019 takes place away from the Russian border, which Russia framed as an effort to reduce regional tensions and avoid antagonizing NATO.[10] Russia might have chosen this location to potentially also practice offensive hybrid scenarios.

Russia seeks to increase its military flexibility in Central Asia and the Arctic region. Russian officials have emphasized the need to increase their security focus on Central Asia, citing concerns about the “spread of militants from Afghanistan into the former Soviet countries in Central Asia.”[11] Russia has legitimate concerns, particularly as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) expands its global presence.[12] The Kremlin, however, also likely seeks to balance American and Chinese influence in Central Asia, especially as Central Asian states such as Kazakhstan undergo leadership changes.[13] Russia might also seek to expand its military footprint in Central Asia and pull Central Asian militaries closer into its security orbit. Russia is also increasingly prioritizing the Arctic. ISW has assessed that the Kremlin intends to expand its military presence and operational flexibility in the Arctic to support a long-term bid to secure resources and gain a strategic advantage over the U.S. and China.[14] Center 2019 will include two motorized rifle brigades testing new Arctic-optimized vehicles and focusing on developing logistical and technical support for Arctic operations, in addition to airborne and Special Forces training in the Arctic along the Northern Sea Route.[15]

The exercises are part of the Kremlin’s broader campaign to establish Russian suzerainty over the former Soviet Union.[16]

• Russia likely intends to exploit the Union Shield exercise to expand the Russian military’s control over Belarussian forces. The Union Shield 2019 exercise explicitly intends to practice defense of the Union State of Russia and Belarus, a planned but not yet implemented federation-type state that would ensure Belarus’ long-term allegiance to Russia.[17] The exercises are the final stage of a two-year cycle of joint combat training between the Russian and Belarusian militaries – another potential indicator of the Kremlin’s efforts to expand control over Belarusian Armed Forces.[18] The Kremlin initiated the process of updating the Union State military doctrine in late 2018.[19] ISW forecasted that Russia would expand its influence in Belarus and its armed forces through the Union State mechanism.[20] Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko continues to attempt to resist Russian pressure, calling for a reset of ties with the U.S. during U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton’s trip to Belarus on August 29.[21] Lukashenko is also reportedly seeking to purchase oil from American suppliers to diversify energy supplies away from Russia.[22]

• Russia is also successfully regaining influence in Moldova, where it seeks a military cooperation deal. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu suggested a three-year military cooperation plan during his unofficial visit to Moldova on August 24, the first time a Russian senior military official visited Moldova in several years.[23] Moldovan President Igor Dodon stated that he will likely invite Shoigu to Moldova for an official visit to discuss a cooperation plan in detail. A military deal between Russia and Moldova would mark progress in the Kremlin’s campaign to expand its influence in Moldova after it suffered setbacks in recent years.[24] ISW forecasted that the Kremlin would exploit Russia’s nominal alignment with the West on Moldova’s formation of a coalition government in June 2019. Russia facilitated that formation process to strengthen Russia-friendly actors inside of Moldova and expand its influence.[25] Dodon also stated on August 26 that Moldova is unlikely to join the EU.[26] Dodon reiterated that Moldova will not choose one side over the other, but military cooperation with Russia would change that status quo.

The Kremlin is attempting to deepen military cooperation with other neighboring and nearby states, such as Armenia and Mongolia. Russia solicited additional support from Armenia on August 13 for its operations in Syria. Russia has facilitated deployments of Armenian engineering troops and humanitarian workers to Syria since February 2019.[27] Russia is deepening military cooperation with Mongolia.[28] Russia and Mongolia signed a treaty on a comprehensive strategic partnership on September 3 following a visit by Putin to Mongolia.[29] Both Shoigu and Russia’s Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov emphasized Russia’s intent to expand military ties with Mongolia over the past year.[30] Russia and Mongolia held the Selenga 2019 joint drills from August 15-24 that reportedly engaged 1,000 troops from Russia’s Eastern Military District and about the same number of personnel from Mongolia.[31]

The Kremlin intends to demonstrate its ability to engage major players in Asia beyond the post-Soviet space.[32] In contrast, Kazakhstan was the only international participant in Center 2015.[33] Russia recently hosted the 2019 International Army Games with a similar set of countries.[34] Russia will likely leverage its ability to include both India and Pakistan – whose relations have deteriorated further over the issue of Kashmir – in the Center 2019 exercise to frame the Kremlin as a peacemaker and mediator.[35] Russia is building out its military relationship with China while pursuing a parallel goal of counterbalancing China. Russia likely aims to signal to the U.S. and its allies, including Japan, that it has the ability to wield strengthened Russian-Chinese military cooperation to its advantage. Russia is also building connections between its partners. Russia held the Defenders of Friendship 2019 Airborne Forces exercise with Egypt (a historical U.S. partner) from August 19-28, engaging Belarus in the exercises for the first time.[36]

Russia seeks to boost its arms exports through the exercises. The Russian Defense Ministry emphasized that Russia’s most modern equipment would be used in both drills.[37] Russia is finalizing several deals to sell aircraft to the Indian Air Force, following the establishment of a joint factory in India to produce Kalashnikov rifles in March 2019.[38] Russia is in the process of marketing its advanced Su-57 fighter jets to China, South Korea, Vietnam, India, and Brazil.[39] The Kremlin commonly utilizes internationally observed drills and arms expos to market equipment to foreign buyers.[40] Turkish President Erdogan expressed his interest in purchasing the Su-57 during Russia’s MAKS-2019 air show on August 27.[41]

The Kremlin will attempt to expand and link its security partnerships in a broader effort to create a constellation of alliances that gravitate toward Russia. The Kremlin is working to expand and potentially link its military influence in its closest orbit – within and among Belarus, Moldova, and the members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.[42] The Kremlin is simultaneously attempting to expand its security orbit further through engaging major actors in East and South Asia. Russia might use a variety of its unifying tools – including military doctrine, joint exercises and games, the export of weapon systems and of Russian military education, and a call for fighting terrorist threats multilaterally – to cohere these informal networks as both a counterbalance to the U.S (and, increasingly, China) and a tool of Russia’s global legitimacy.

Table - Russia’s Overview of its 2019 Union Shield[43] and Center[44] military exercises:


---
[1] “Two Russian Armies Kickoff Military Exercises Ahead of NATO Drills in Georgia,” Al-Masdar News, July 24, 2019, https://www.almasdarnews(.)com/article/two-russian-armies-kickoff-military-exercises-ahead-of-nato-drills-in-georgia/.
[2] Natalia Balkanska, [“The Defense Ministry Revealed the Timing and Scope of Strategic Exercises ‘Center-2019,’”] TV Zvezda, August 20, 2019, https://tvzvezda(.)ru/news/forces/content/20198192231-FKhPU.html; Catherine Harris and Mason Clark, “Russia in Review: Russia’s Lessons Learned in Syria,” The Institute for the Study of War, November 9, 2018, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2018/11/russia-in-review-russias-lessons.html.
[3] Natalia Balkanska, [“The Defense Ministry Revealed the Timing and Scope of Strategic Exercises ‘Center-2019,’”] TV Zvezda, August 20, 2019, https://tvzvezda(.)ru/news/forces/content/20198192231-FKhPU.html.
[4] [“More Than 10 Exercises Involving More Than 5,000 Troops will be Held Simultaneously in the South of Russia,”] TASS, August 27, 2019, https://tass((.))ru/armiya-i-opk/6802592.
[5] Alexander Dvornikov, [“Staffs for New Wars,”] VPK, July 23, 2018, https://vpk-news(.)ru/articles/43971; Alexander Lapin, [“Syrian Academy,”] VPK, April 24, 2018, https://vpk-news(.)ru/articles/42359; Alexander Zhruavlev, [“The Upcoming Summer Period of Training Will Be Used to the Maximum in the Preparation of Troops,”] Red Star, May 27, 2019, http://redstar((.))ru/s-uchyotom-sirijskogo-opyta-2/?attempt=1#content.
[6] “Over 4,000 Belarusian Military to Participate in Union Shield 2019 Exercise,” BelTA, August 24, 2019, https://eng.belta(.)by/society/view/over-4000-belarusian-military-to-participate-in-union-shield-2019-exercise-123339-2019/.
[7] “Over 4,000 Belarusian Military to Participate in Union Shield 2019 Exercise,” BelTA, August 24, 2019, https://eng.belta(.)by/society/view/over-4000-belarusian-military-to-participate-in-union-shield-2019-exercise-123339-2019/.
[8] [“Exercise ‘Union Shield-2019’ Will Be Held From 13 to 19 September,”] Sputnik Belarus, August 14, 2019, https://sputnik(.)by/defense_safety/20190814/1042399263/Uchenie-Schit-Soyuza-2019-proydet-s-13-po-19-sentyabrya.html; Natalia Balkanska, [“The Defense Ministry Revealed the Timing and Scope of Strategic Exercises ‘Center-2019,’”] TV Zvezda, August 20, 2019, https://tvzvezda(.)ru/news/forces/content/20198192231-FKhPU.html.
[9] [“The West of the Country Under Reliable Protection,”] Red Star, August 21, 2019, http://redstar(.)ru/zapad-strany-pod-nadyozhnoj-zashhitoj/.
[10] [“12,000 Servicemen Will Take Part in the Exercise ‘Union Shield-2019,’”] Russian Gazette, August 14, 2019, https://rg(.)ru/2019/08/14/v-uchenii-shchit-soiuza-2019-primut-uchastie-12-tysiach-voennosluzhashchih-soiuznogo-gosudarstva.html; Sputnik Belarus, Telegram, August 24, 2019, https://t(.)me/sputnikby/965; Georgi Okoshko, [“’Union Shield-2019’ Will Complete the Cycle of Joint Training of Servicemen of the Russian Federation and Belarus,”] RITM Eurasia, August 17, 2019, https://www.ritmeurasia(.)org/news--2019-08-17--schit-sojuza-2019-zavershit-cikl-sovmestnoj-podgotovki-voennosluzhaschih-rf-i-rb-44373.
[11] “Russia Starts Army Drills to Respond to Central Asia Threats,” Federal News Network, June 24, 2019, https://federalnewsnetwork.com/world-news/2019/06/russia-starts-army-drills-to-respond-to-central-asia-threats/.
[12] Brandon Wallace with Jennifer Cafarella, “ISIS Reasserts Global Reach for Ramadan 2019,” Institute for the Study of War, May 1, 2019, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2019/05/isis-reasserts-global-reach-for-ramadan.html.
[13] Craig Nelson and Thomas Grove, “Russia, China Vie for Influence in Central Asia as U.S. Plans Afghan Exit,” Wall Street Journal, June 18, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-china-vie-for-influence-in-central-asia-as-u-s-plans-afghan-exit-11560850203?mod=hp_lead_pos7; Hiroyuki Akita, “Russia and China Romance Runs into Friction in Central Asia,” Nikkei Asian Review, July 29, 2019, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Comment/Russia-and-China-romance-runs-into-friction-in-Central-Asia; Andrew Higgins, “Kazakhstan Gets New Leader, but Old System’s Grip on Power Remains,” New York Times, June 10, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/10/world/asia/kazakhstan-president.html.
[14] Nataliya Bugayova, Alexander Begej, and Darina Regio, “Russia in Review: March 15 – 26, 2019,” Institute for the Study of War, March 26, 2019, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2019/03/russia-in-review-march-15-26-2019.html.
[15] Atle Staalesen, “A Large-Scale Russian Military Exercise is Coming to the Arctic,” Barents Observer, December 20, 2018, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2018/12/large-scale-russian-military-exercise-coming-arctic#.XBumgn2T55A.twitter; [“Russia to Hold Strategic Exercises in the Arctic,”] Izvestia, December 18, 2018, https://iz(.)ru/824776/2018-12-18/rossiia-provedet-strategicheskie-ucheniia-v-arktike.
[16] Suzerainty is “a dominant state controlling the foreign relations of a vassal state but allowing it sovereign authority in its internal affairs.”
[17] [“12,000 Servicemen Will Take Part in the Russian-Belarusian Exercise ‘Union Shield-2019,’”] Russian Ministry of Defense, July 24, 2019, https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12242562@egNews; Nataliya Bugayova, Darina Regio, Mason Clark, and Michaela Walker with Alexandra McClintock, “Russia in Review: Domestic Discontent and Foreign Policy,” Institute for the Study of War, August 6, 2019, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2019/08/russia-in-review-domestic-dissent-and.html.
[18] [“12,000 Servicemen Will Take Part in the Exercise ‘Union Shield-2019,’”] Russian Gazette, August 14, 2019, https://rg(.)ru/2019/08/14/v-uchenii-shchit-soiuza-2019-primut-uchastie-12-tysiach-voennosluzhashchih-soiuznogo-gosudarstva.html.
[19] [“The Draft Military Doctrine of the Union State is Planned to be Approved by the End of the Year,”] Union State, October 26, 2018, http://www.soyuz(.)by/news/joint-programs/41997.html.
[20] Mason Clark and Nataliya Bugayova, “Russia in Review: May 9 - 13, 2019,” Institute for the Study of War, May 14, 2019, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2019/05/russia-in-review-may-9-13-2019.html.
[21] “Belarus Leader Tells Trump Adviser He Wants to Reset Ties with the U.S.,” Reuters, August 29, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-belarus-usa-bolton-reset/belarus-leader-tells-trump-adviser-he-wants-to-reset-u-s-ties-tass-idUSKCN1VJ1F9.
[22] Exclusive: Belarus’s Luashenka, Weary of Russian Union, Seeks to Buy U.S. Crude,” RFERL, August 22, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/belarus-lukashenka-us-oil-purchase-russia-reliance/30124113.html; “Belarus Leader Tells Trump Adviser He Wants to Reset Ties with the U.S.,” Reuters, August 29, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-belarus-usa-bolton-reset/belarus-leader-tells-trump-adviser-he-wants-to-reset-u-s-ties-tass-idUSKCN1VJ1F9.
[23] [“Dodon Talked About Possible Official Shoigu Visit to Moldova,” Sputnik Moldova, August 27, 2019, https://ru.sputnik(.)md/society/20190827/27378388/dodon-rasskazal-o-vozmozhnom-ofitsialnom-vizite-shoygu-moldova.html.
[24] Darina Regio and Nataliya Bugayova, “Russia in Review: Opportunity in Moldova,” Institute for the Study of War, June 24, 2019, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2019/06/russia-in-review-opportunity-in-moldova.html.
[25] Ibid.
[26] [“The President of Moldova Doubts the European Future of the Country,”] Strategic Culture Foundation, August 27, 2019, https://www.fondsk(.)ru/news/2019/08/27/prezident-moldovy-somnevaetsja-v-evropejskom-buduschem-strany-48880.html; Vadim Ghirda, “AP Interview: Moldova President Says Country Needs Russia,” Associated Press, February 21, 2019, https://www.apnews.com/e69fb771689c47dbbe3561338bfe98a4.
[27] “Armenia Sends Deminers to Syria as Part of Russia-Backed Mission,” RFERL, February 10, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/armenia-deminers-russia-mission-syria-aleppo/29761527.html; “Armenia, Russia Send Aid to Syria,” Armenian Mirror-Spectator, August 14, 2019, https://mirrorspectator.com/2019/08/14/armenia-russia-send-aid-to-syria/.
[28] ‘Russia, Mongolia Kick off Selenga-2019 Joint Military Drills,” TASS, August 16, 2019, https://tass(.)com/defense/1073757.
[29] “Putin Praises Milestone Permanent Treaty with Mongolia,” TASS, September 3, 2019, https://tass(.)com/politics/1076151.
[30] Yuri Gavrilov, [“Shoigu’s Five-Year Plan,”] Rossiskaya Gazeta, October 18, 2018, https://rg(.)ru/2018/10/18/rossiia-i-mongoliia-rasshiriat-voennoe-sotrudnichestvo.html; Alexander Boyko, [“Defense Ministry: Ulaanbaatar and Moscow Strengthen Military Cooperation,”] Komsomolskaya Pravda, August 16, 2019, https://www.kp(.)ru/online/news/3575055/.
[31] “Russian, Mongolian Troops Employ New Tactic in Selenga-2019 Joint Drills,” TASS, August 22, 2019, https://tass(.)com/defense/1074574; “Russia, Mongolia Kick off Selenga-2019 Joint Military Drills,” TASS, August 16, 2019, https://tass(.)com/defense/1073757; [“Russia and Mongolia Sign Military Cooperation Program,”] Regnum, October 18, 2018, https://regnum(.)ru/news/2502956.html; “Selenga 2019 Joint Russian-Mongolian Exercise Planning Finishes in Mongolia,” Russian Defense Ministry, February 7, 2019, https://eng.mil(.)ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12239397@egNews. 

[32] [“The Ministry of Defense Revealed the Timing and Scope of the Strategic Exercises Center-2019,”] TV Channel ‘Zvezda’, August 20, 2019, https://tvzvezda(.)ru/news/forces/content/20198192231-FKhPU.html.
[33] “Russian Military Held Center-2015 Exercise to Practice Struggle against IS,” TASS, October 6, 2015, http://tass(.)ru/en/defense/826605.
[34] Mason Clark, “Russia in Review: Global Military Ties,” Institute for the Study of War, August 13, 2019, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2019/08/russia-in-review-global-military-ties.html.
[35] Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “How Will Recent Tensions Impact India’s Tsentr 2019 Participation?” The Diplomat, August 27, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/08/how-will-recent-tensions-impact-indias-tsentr-2019-participation/.
[36] [“Belarusian Military Arrived in Ryazan for Exercises with Russia and Egypt,”] RIA, August 19, 2019, https://ria(.)ru/20190819/1557639817.html?in=t. “Russia, Egypt, Belarus Hold Joint Military Drill In Russia's Ryazan Region,” UrduPoint, August 22, 2019, https://www.urdupoint(.)com/en/world/russia-egypt-belarus-hold-joint-military-dr-694936.html; Russian Ministry of Defense, Facebook, August 29, 2019, https://www.facebook.com/mod.mil.rus/videos/508506093245531/. 

[37] “Over 4,000 Belarusian Military to Participate in Union Shield 2019 Exercise,” BelTA, August 14, 2019, https((:))//eng.belta.by/society/view/over-4000-belarusian-military-to-participate-in-union-shield-2019-exercise-123339-2019/; [“The Ministry of Defense Revealed the Timing and Scope of the Strategic Exercises Center-2019,”] TV Channel ‘Zvezda’, August 20, 2019,
https((:))//tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/20198192231-FKhPU.html.
[38] Vladimir Karzonov, “India Expected To Sign for More MiG-29s and Su-30MKIs in October,” Aviation International News, August 3, 2019, https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2019-08-03/india-expected-sign-more-mig-29s-and-su-30mkis-october; Manu Pubby, “Joint Venture for AK 203 Rifles Factory at Amethi was the `Fastest Ever’ Created with Russia,” The Economic Times, July 9, 2019, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/joint-venture-for-ak-203-rifles-factory-at-amethi-was-the-fastest-ever-created-with-russia/articleshow/70144865.cms?from=mdr.
[39] “Russia to Pitch Su-57 Fighter Jets to China,” Asia Times, April 2, 2019, https://www((.))asiatimes.com/2019/04/article/russia-to-pitch-su-57-fighter-jets-to-china/;
[40] Mason Clark, “Russia in Review: Global Military Ties,” Institute for the Study of War, August 13, 2019, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2019/08/russia-in-review-global-military-ties.html. 

[41][“Erdogan Did Not Rule Out the Possibility of Buying Su-35 and Su-57 instead of F-35,”] TASS, August 28, 2019, https://tass((.))ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/6810477; [“Turkey May Purchase New Weapon Systems from Russia,”] TV Channel ‘Big Asia’, August 28, 2019, http((:))//bigasia.ru/content/news/politics/turtsiya-mozhet-zakupit-v-rossii-novye-vooruzheniya/.
[42] The Collective Security Treaty Organization includes Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. See: [“Collective Security Treaty Organization,”] Collective Security Treaty Organization, accessed September 4, 2019, http://www.odkb.gov((.))ru/start/index_aengl.htm.
[43] “Over 4,000 Belarusian Military to Participate in Union Shield 2019 Exercise,” BelTA, August 14, 2019, https://eng.belta(.)by/society/view/over-4000-belarusian-military-to-participate-in-union-shield-2019-exercise-123339-2019/; Alexander Alesin, [“Union Shield-2019: Who Minsk and Moscow Mean by the Third Force,”] Naviny, August 20, 2019, https://naviny(.)by/article/20190820/1566280237-shchit-soyuza-2019-kogo-minsk-i-moskva-podrazumevayut-pod-tretey-siloy; [“Up to 950 Units of Military Equipment will be Involved in the Russian-Belarusian Exercise ‘Union Shield-2019,’”] Russian Ministry of Defense, July 24, 2019, https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12242567@egNews; [“Belarusian Military Arrives at the Polygon Mulino to Participate in the Exercise ‘Union Shield-2019,’”] BelTeleRadio Company, August 28, 2019, https://www.tvr(.)by/news/obshchestvo/belorusskie_voennye_pribyvayut_na_poligon_mulino_dlya_uchastiya_v_ucheniyakh_shchit_soyuza_2019/; [“The ‘Union Shield’ Begins: Maneuvers on the Eve of the Exercise of Belarusian and Russian Military Engineers Were Held in Russia at the Combat Training Center of the Western Military District,”] Nationwide Television Belarus, August 30, 2019, https://ont(.)by/news/nachinaetsya-shit-soyuza-manyovry-v-preddverii-ucheniya-belorusskih-i-rossijskih-voennyh-inzhenerov-proshli-v-rossii-na-baze-centra-boevoj-podgotovki-zapadnogo-voennogo-okruga; [“The West of the Country Under Reliable Protection,”] Red Star, August 21, 2019, http://redstar(.)ru/zapad-strany-pod-nadyozhnoj-zashhitoj/.
[44] Natalia Balkanska, [“The Defense Ministry Revealed the Timing and Scope of Strategic Exercises ‘Center-2019,’”] TV Zvezda, August 20, 2019, https://tvzvezda(.)ru/news/forces/content/20198192231-FKhPU.html; [“Strategic Command and Staff Exercise ‘Center-2019’ will be Held for the First Time on the Grounds of the CSTO Member States,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, May 16, 2019, https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12231817@egNews; [“Exercise ‘Center-2019’: Russian Special Forces Landing in the Arctic,”] Regnum, August 8, 2019, https://regnum(.)ru/news/polit/2684713.html; [“Russia to Hold Strategic Exercises in the Arctic,”] Izvestia, December 18, 2018, https://iz(.)ru/824776/2018-12-18/rossiia-provedet-strategicheskie-ucheniia-v-arktike; Atle Staalesen, “A Large-Scale Russian Military Exercise is Coming to the Arctic,” Barents Observer, December 20, 2018, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2018/12/large-scale-russian-military-exercise-coming-arctic#.XBumgn2T55A.twitter; Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “How Will Recent Tensions Impact India’s Tsentr 2019 Participation?” The Diplomat, August 27, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/08/how-will-recent-tensions-impact-indias-tsentr-2019-participation/; Alexander Stepanov, [“Central Outpost,”] Rossiskaya Gazeta,l June 19, 2019, https://rg(.)ru/2019/06/19/aleksandr-lapin-afganistan-stanovitsia-novym-pribezhishchem-dlia-terroristov.html; [“China Will Send Military and Equipment to Russia for Exercises ‘Center-2019,’”] RIA, August 29, 2019, https://ria(.)ru/20190829/1558025375.html; http(:)//eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2019-08/30/content_9606383.htm; “China to Send 1,600 Troops, About 30 Aircraft to Russia’s Strategic Military Drills,” Tasnim News Agency, August 29, 2019, https://www.tasnimnews(.)com/en/news/2019/08/29/2086022/china-to-send-1-600-troops-about-30-aircraft-to-russia-s-strategic-military-drills.