UA-69458566-1

Wednesday, August 9, 2023

Iran Update, August 9, 2023

Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Brandon Kanell, and Nicholas Carl

The Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates Monday through Friday. To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) with support from the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute launched an interactive map of Iran and the Middle East. The map depicts events in Iran that affect the stability of the Iranian regime, namely anti-regime protests and reported poisoning incidents. It also shows developments in Syria that jeopardize regional stability and pose threats to US forces and interests, including Iranian and Iranian-backed militia positions.

Key Takeaways

  1. IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani met with LH Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut on August 6 according to Israeli and Arab media.
  2. The IRGC Quds Force is pressuring local Syrians to join Iranian-backed militias by only providing medical services to families tied to these militias. Increased recruitment into Iranian-backed militias could provide the IRGC Quds Force additional manpower for counter-US and counter-ISIS missions in eastern Syria.
  3. Iranian state media claimed on August 9 that Iran has developed supersonic cruise missile technology. Iran possibly developed this technology with Russian assistance.
  4. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian traveled to Pretoria, South Africa on August 9, likely as part of the Raisi administration’s ongoing efforts to convince BRICS members to accept its request to join this organization.

Iranian Activities in the Levant

This section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout the Levant especially in Syria. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates.

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani met with Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut on August 6, according to Israeli and Arab media.[1] This visit comes after Ghaani traveled to Deir ez Zor Province, Syria on August 3 reportedly to inspect the combat readiness of Iranian-backed militants.[2] Ghaani, as commander of the IRGC Quds Force, is responsible for covert operations and cooperation with Iranian proxy and partner militias abroad. Ghaani’s travel often includes discussions to coordinate the Axis of Resistance’s campaigns and lines of effort, such as attacks into Israel and weapons shipments around the Levant.[3]

It is unclear what Ghaani discussed with Nasrallah, but CTP outlines below significant regional activity that they may have covered. These topics are not mutually exclusive.

  • LH forces are operating around the line of contact with the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in eastern Syria. Tensions have flared with the SDF since June 2023, as Iranian, Russian, and Syrian regime actors have accused the US-led International Coalition of planning to conduct attacks into territory held by the Syrian regime. CTP has assessed that Iran, Russia, and the Syrian regime are amplifying these rumors and deploying forces to the line of contact, among other actions, to coerce—or possibly compel—US forces to leave Syria.[4] LH military commanders in Syria have reportedly met to discuss attacking US forces in eastern Syria in the event of an escalation at multiple meetings since August 7.[5]
  • LH is dealing with several immediate domestic issues, including tensions with Israel on the border. LH has mounted a concerted campaign to challenge the border demarcation between Lebanon and Israel since June 2023.[6] Israeli and LH officials have both noted publicly the increased risk of conflict over these disputed areas.[7] Palestinian militant groups have separately clashed in the Ain al Hilweh camp in southern Lebanon, killing several and injuring dozens since late July 2023.[8]
  • Palestinian Islamic Jihad leader Zayed Nakhleh disclosed in July 2023 that LH has coordinated with Palestinian militant groups to provide arms and intelligence to groups in the West Bank.[9] CTP previously assessed that Palestinian militants in the West Bank would likely receive Iranian assistance to rebuild the military capabilities that the Israel Defense Force tried to degrade in July 2023.[10] Iran and the broader Axis of Resistance have repeatedly messaged about the importance of arming militants in the West Bank against Israel.[11]

The IRGC Quds Force is pressuring local Syrians to join Iranian-backed militias by only providing medical services to families tied to these militias.[12] The Iranian al Shifa Center—a clinic in Hatla, Deir ez Zor Province—announced on July 19 that it will stop providing free examinations to individuals not affiliated with the Iranian-backed militias. Locals rely heavily on IRGC-provided medical services as corruption and the devaluation of the Syrian Pound have dramatically increased the cost of medicines in Deir ez Zor Province. Families have begun to register their children in Iranian-backed militias to get access to medical services, according to local Syrian media.[13] These outlets also reported on August 7 that the IRGC Quds Force appointed one of its officers—Hajj Reza—to direct the Iranian al Shifa Center, demonstrating the control of the IRGC Quds Force over the clinic.[14] Increased recruitment into Iranian-backed militias could provide the IRGC Quds Force additional manpower for counter-US and counter-ISIS missions in eastern Syria.

Iranian Domestic and Political Affairs

This section covers factors and trends affecting regime decision-making and stability. CTP will cover domestic politics, significant protest activity, and related issues here.

Iranian state media claimed on August 9 that Iran has developed supersonic cruise missile technology. Iran possibly developed this technology with Russian assistance. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency reported that Iranian defense industry experts have “attained the technology to design and construct supersonic cruise missiles.”[15] Tasnim added that Iran is currently “testing” a supersonic cruise missile. Senior military commanders have previously expressed the regime’s interest in developing supersonic missiles. IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami expressed such an interest in February 2023, for example.[16] Supersonic missiles travel at speeds between 1 and 5 Mach.[17] CIA Director William Burns revealed on July 20 that Russian technicians are assisting Iran with its Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) and missile program.[18] The technologies associated with SLVs are more relevant to the development of ballistic missiles rather than cruise missiles, as CTP previously noted.[19] Russia possesses supersonic cruise missiles, however, making it plausible that Russia could be helping Iran with the technology necessary to produce such weapons in addition to the Russian support to the SLV program.[20]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian traveled to Pretoria, South Africa on August 9, likely as part of the Raisi administration’s ongoing efforts to convince BRICS members to accept its request to join this organization.[21] Abdollahian plans to attend an Iran-South Africa Joint Economic Cooperation Commission meeting during his visit. South Africa will host the 15th annual BRICS Summit in Johannesburg between August 22-24. Iran hosted an ‘Iran and BRICS: Prospects for Partnership and Cooperation’ conference in Tehran on August 8. Abdollahian framed Iran as an important intermediary between BRICS members, stating that Iran can connect China to Brazil and South Africa.[22] Abdollahian added that Iran is a “reliable and effective” partner due to its “geostrategic position.”




[1] https://twitter.com/arabfile/status/1688278474962710528 ; https://www[dot]i24news.tv/en/news/middle-east/levant-turkey/1691542210-...

[2] https://alalamsyria[dot]ir/news/41724 ; https://twitter.com/VivaRevolt/status/1687519809846571008

[3] https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-is-recruiting-militant-allies-to-launc...

[4] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-russia-and-syrian-regime-...

[5] https://www.syriahr.com/en/306972/ ; https://www.syriahr.com/%d9%82%d9%8a%d8%a7%d8%af%d9%8a-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%...

[6] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1676875448855277568 ; https://almanar[dot]com.lb/10755582 ; https://israel-alma.org/2023/07/12/hezbollah-a-clear-pattern-of-escalati...

[7] https://www[dot]timesofisrael.com/gallant-warns-hezbollah-against-escala...

[8] https://en[dot]mehrnews.com/news/204008/Heavy-clashes-in-Ein-al-Hilweh-r...

[9] https://alresalah[dot]ps/post/287379/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%8...

[10] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-5-2023

[11] https://farsi[dot]khamenei.ir/others-dialog?id=50786

[12] https://eyeofeuphrates dot com/index.php/ar/news/2023/08/06/9348

[13] https://eyeofeuphrates.com/index.php/ar/news/2023/08/06/9348

[14] https://eyeofeuphrates.com/index.php/ar/news/2023/08/06/9348

[15] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/05/18/2938092

[16] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85040054

[17] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/05/18/2938092

[18] https://ru.usembassy.gov/fireside-chat-with-director-william-burns-aspen...

[19] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-21-2023#_edn54...

[20] https://www.kyivpost dot com/post/19661

[21] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85194242

[22] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85193219

Wednesday, July 26, 2023

Iran Update, July 26, 2023

Amin Soltani, Annika Ganzeveld, and Andie Parry

The Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates Monday through Friday. To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) with support from the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute launched a new interactive map of Iran and the Middle East. The map depicts events in Iran that affect the stability of the Iranian regime, namely anti-regime protests and reported poisoning incidents. It also shows developments in Syria that jeopardize regional stability and pose threats to US forces and interests, including Iranian and Iranian-backed militia positions.

Key Takeaways

1)           An Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force (IRGC QF) commander, Iranian security officials, and Hamas leadership discussed capitalizing on Israeli unrest in a three-hour meeting in mid-July, according to an Iranian diplomat and a Hamas source who spoke with Reuters.

2)           Bolivian Defense Minister Edmundo Novillo Aguilar expressed interest in purchasing Iranian drones on July 25. CTP previously assessed that Iran may seek to sell drones to Bolivia as part of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) that the two signed on July 20.

3)           The Raisi administration seeks to bolster electricity cooperation with Russia. Connecting Iran’s electricity grid to Russia’s could increase domestic stability in Iran.

4)           Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian met with newly-appointed Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of a Friends of BRICS National Security Advisors meeting in Johannesburg, South Africa on July 24. 

Iranian Activities in the Levant

 This section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout the Levant especially in Syria. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates.

An Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force (IRGC QF) commander, Iranian security officials, and Hamas leadership discussed capitalizing on Israeli unrest in a three-hour meeting in mid-July, according to an Iranian diplomat and a Hamas source who spoke with Reuters.[1] The leaders decided to refrain from “direct interference” in Israel’s social unrest. Axis of Resistance leadership and media have devoted considerable attention to the judicial reform protests in Israel. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency recirculated former Israeli officials' comments on a coming civil war and the disintegration of Israeli society in the past week.[2] Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) leader Hassan Nasrallah claimed Israel was on a path of collapse and fragmentation on July 24, referring to Israeli judicial reform.[3]

CTP is considering several hypotheses for how Iran and the Axis of Resistance may capitalize on internal Israeli unrest.

  • Iran may give priority to rebuilding capabilities in the West Bank. CTP previously assessed Iran would likely help Palestinian militants rebuild the military capabilities the Israel Defense Forces degraded during a July 2023 raid in Jenin.[4] Iranian leaders have stressed the importance of cultivating an armed resistance in the West Bank.[5]
  • Iran may build up weapon stockpiles in Syria. Iran may have used Israeli preoccupation with domestic and Palestine issues to move advanced weaponry through eastern Syria and avoid Israeli targeting in May 2023.[6] Israel targeted weapons sites in Damascus in an airstrike on July 18 amid domestic unrest, however.[7] Israel has long sought to prevent the Iranian transfer of personnel and weapons into Syria.
  • Iran may not take provocative actions. Iranian leadership may calculate ongoing Israeli unrest will be more disruptive for Israel than any direct Iranian action. LH-affiliated media Al Manar has repeatedly published that political and military divisions in Israel benefit Axis of Resistance objectives.[8]

Iranian Domestic and Political Affairs

This section covers factors and trends affecting regime decision-making and stability. CTP will cover domestic politics, significant protest activity, and related issues here.

Bolivian Defense Minister Edmundo Novillo Aguilar expressed interest in purchasing Iranian drones on July 25.[9] CTP previously assessed that Iran may seek to sell drones to Bolivia as part of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) that the two signed on July 20.[10]Novillo stated on July 25 that Iranian drones would help Bolivia monitor mountainous areas and secure its borders against drug traffickers.[11] Ashtiani stated on July 19 that Iran’s defense industry can provide Bolivia with “advanced technology” and separately stated on July 20 that Iran can help Bolivia with “border control” and “confronting drug smuggling.”[12] Drones are frequently used to bolster border security and combat smuggling.

The MOU is consistent with Iran’s explicitly stated policy in recent years to increase the number of countries that buy Iranian drones. Supreme Leader Military Affairs Advisor and former IRGC Commander Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi boasted in October 2022 that 22 countries—including Algeria, Armenia, Serbia, Tajikistan, and Venezuela—had submitted formal requests for Iranian drones.[13] President Ebrahim Raisi additionally promoted Iranian drone technology during several recent foreign trips, including during his most recent trip to Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe between July 12-14.[14] Iranian media and officials have previously highlighted the desire of other African countries, including Ethiopia, to purchase Iranian-made drones.[15] Iran has, furthermore, established drone manufacturing factories in Tajikistan and Venezuela and is building another in Yelabuga, Russia.[16]

The MOU is also consistent with CTP’s previous assessment that Iran is seeking to increase defense exports to generate revenue for the Iranian economy.[17] Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri emphasized on May 31 that Iran will export its military capabilities to “friendly” countries.[18] Bagheri also called on Foreign Affairs Ministry officials to relay Iran’s willingness to export its defense capabilities to foreign dignitaries on May 30.[19] Defense Minister Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani separately expressed Iran’s willingness to supply Mali with military equipment and small arms on May 29 and offered to sell arms to and help develop Syria’s defense industry on May 8 and 10.[20] Iran is currently facing critical economic conditions, with the value of the rial hovering slightly below 500,000 rials to one US dollar.[21] Iranian media, citing the Iran Statistical Center, reported on July 25 that Iran’s inflation rate is approximately 47.5 percent.[22]

The Raisi administration seeks to bolster electricity cooperation with Russia. Iranian Energy Minister Ali Akbar Mehrabian announced on July 16 that Iran is in “final negotiations” to conduct electricity exchanges with Russia via two routes, one via Azerbaijan and the other via Armenia and Georgia.[23] Iranian officials have discussed connecting Iran’s electricity grid to Russia’s for several years, making it unclear whether Mehrabian’s announcement indicates real progress on this project.[24] Unspecified senior Iranian Energy Ministry officials separately discussed bilateral electricity cooperation with managers of Russian power company Rosseti in Tehran on July 26.[25] Iran currently exchanges electricity with Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and Turkmenistan.[26]

Connecting Iran’s electricity grid to Russia’s could increase domestic stability in Iran. Mehrabian stated that Iranians use more electricity in the summer while Russians use more electricity in the winter and that therefore Iran can export electricity to Russia in the winter and import electricity from Russia in the summer.[27] Power outages during a heatwave previously triggered protests throughout Iran in June 2021.[28] Several Iranian cities have experienced temperatures greater than 115 degrees Fahrenheit in recent weeks.[29] Iranian authorities have additionally shut down numerous offices across Iran for consuming “too much” electricity in recent weeks.[30]

Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian met with newly-appointed Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of a Friends of BRICS National Security Advisors meeting in Johannesburg, South Africa on July 24.[31] Ahmadian and Wang Yi discussed Chinese transportation investments and China’s support for Iranian territorial integrity. This meeting is part of Iran’s broader efforts to establish a parallel world order with other revisionist states that challenges Western “dominance.”[32] Iran recently became a member of the Chinese and Russian-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) on July 4.[33] Iranian media framed Iran’s accession into the organization as part of “the transformation of the world order.”[34] CTP previously assessed that Iran’s membership in this organization may enable it to circumvent sanctions by conducting non-US dollar financial transactions with other SCO countries.[35] Iranian officials have additionally expressed support for Chinese regional infrastructure projects and sought to attract Chinese infrastructure investments in recent weeks.[36]


[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israels-enemies-see-opportunit...

[2] https://www[dot]tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1402/04/29/2928737/%D8%B1%D8%A6%D... ; https://www[dot]tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1402/05/04/2931889/%D9%87%D8%A7%D...

[3] https://english[dot]almanar.com.lb/1875854

[4] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-5-2023

[5] https://farsi[dot]khamenei.ir/others-dialog?id=50786

[6] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-may-15-2023

[7] https://twitter.com/Israel_Alma_org/status/1681614627094904832

[8] https://www[dot]almanar.com.lb/10777120 ; https://almanar[dot]com.lb/1...

[9] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/07/25/iran-argentina-novillo-t... https://t dot co/LSvidia0pn ; https://www.irna dot ir/news/85175537

[10] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-20-2023-64b9d7...

[11] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85175537

[12] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85175537

[13] https://www.eurasiantimes dot com/22-countries-keen-to-acquire-iranian-kamikaze-drones-that/

[14] https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/203158/Iran-unveils-domestic-Pelican-2-drone-in-Nairobi-VIDEO

[15] https://www.pahpad dot com/fa/news/352

[16] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/02/28/2712908 ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iran-may-be-outsourc...

[17] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-june-21-2023

[18] https://www.foxnews.com/world/iran-prepared-wholesale-export-weapons-all...

[19] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/03/09/2903839

[20] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/592742 ; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/587750

[21] Bonbast dot com

[22] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85180405

[23] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1402042415504

[24] https://www.irna dot ir/news/84027238

[25] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85181794

[26] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1402042415504

[27] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1402042415504

[28] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/after-protests-irans-president... ;

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-57719556

[29] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/729732 ;

https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/730781

[30] https://www.ilna.ir/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8...

[31] https://www.farsnews dot ir/news/14020502001002

[32] https://www.irna dot ir/news/84859472

[33] https://president dot ir/fa/145193

[34] https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/486668/Transformation-in-the-world-order-in-its-operational-phase

[35] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-5-2023

[36] https://www.farsnews dot ir/news/14020422000505 ; https://president dot ir/fa/145187

Friday, July 21, 2023

Iran Update, July 21, 2023

Ashka Jhaveri, Andie Parry, Amin Soltani, Annika Ganzeveld, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Alexa Albanese, Alexander Coffen, and Radhika Bhargava

The Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates Monday through Friday. To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) with support from the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute launched a new interactive map of Iran and the Middle East. The map depicts events in Iran that affect the stability of the Iranian regime, namely anti-regime protests and reported poisoning incidents. It also shows developments in Syria that jeopardize regional stability and pose threats to US forces and interests, including Iranian and Iranian-backed militia positions.

Key Takeaways

  1. Iranian-backed militias transferred air defense weapons to eastern Syria, which likely will jeopardize the US-led International Coalition mission to defeat ISIS.
  2. Iran expanded judicial cooperation with Syria, likely as part of a policy of building institutional links with regional allies.
  3. CIA Director William Burns stated on July 20 that Russian technicians are assisting with the Iranian Space Launch Vehicle and missile program inside Iran. Russian assistance could advance Iran’s development of inter-continental ballistic missiles and a military space program that would enhance Iran’s intelligence gathering capabilities.
  4. BRICS has invited Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi to attend its 15th summit in Johannesburg, South Africa in late August.

Iranian Activities in the Levant

This section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout the Levant especially in Syria. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates.

Iranian-backed militias transferred air defense weapons to eastern Syria, which likely will jeopardize the US-led International Coalition mission to defeat ISIS. Some militias including Lebanese Hezbollah deployed air defense guns and man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADs) such as the Misagh-1 to eastern Syria.[1] The Washington Post reported on June 1 that Iran has been building and training forces to target and kill US personnel and expel US forces from Syria, according to classified documents leaked on the Discord messaging platform.[2] CTP previously reported that the air defense weapons Iran has transferred to Syria are effective for targeting helicopters.[3] Iranian-backed militias could use them to limit US air-support and restrict maneuvering in Syria. Read ISW’s "Salafi Jihadi Movement Update Special Edition: Iran, Russia, and Syrian Prioritization of Challenging the United States over ISIS Will Present ISIS with Space to Grow Its Capabilities, Rest, and Refit," for more analysis on the impacts of Iranian activity in Deir ez Zor on the counter-ISIS mission.[4]

The deployment of air defense weapons to eastern Syria may also support Iranian objectives to achieve total hegemony in Deir ez Zor Province. Iran instructed the IRGC QF to achieve total hegemony in Deir ez Zor Province, Syria in May 2023.[5] Syrian state and local media reported the US-led International Coalition in partnership with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) arrested three people in a security operation on July 20 using helicopters in SDF-controlled territory, across the river from Deir ez Zor City.[6] Iranian-backed militias surged forces into Deir ez Zor Province between July 7 and 17 following rumored US-led International Coalition offensives into Syrian regime-controlled territory in late June, as CTP previously reported.[7]

Iran expanded judicial cooperation with Syria, likely as part of a policy of building institutional links with regional allies. Iranian Justice Minister Amin Hossein Rahimi and his Syrian counterpart Ahmed al Sayyid signed a memorandum of understanding on judicial cooperation and discussed forming a joint legal committee in Damascus on July 20.[8] Rahimi’s visit is the first by an Iranian Minister of Justice since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war. Rahimi expressed that Iran aims to create a defense line against sanctions and address international law violations with judicial cooperation.[9] Iran and Iraq implemented a similar judicial cooperation agreement in 2021, demonstrating Iran’s vision of implementing institutional, not just military and economic, links with countries in its Axis of Resistance.[10] This is part of a broader trend of Iran growing ties with Syria. Iran and Syria agreed to cooperation in 15 fields outside of the judiciary during Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi‘s visit to Syria in May.[11] Efforts to institutionalize ties in governance, trade, culture and transportation builds long-term alignment between Iran and its few regional allies.

Iranian Domestic and Political Affairs

This section covers factors and trends affecting regime decision-making and stability. CTP will cover domestic politics, significant protest activity, and related issues here.

CIA Director William Burns stated on July 20 that Russian technicians are assisting with the Iranian Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) and missile program inside Iran. Russian assistance could advance Iran’s development of inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and a military space program that would enhance Iran’s intelligence gathering capabilities. Iran is developing its SLVs with lift capacity and boosters that could be capable of reaching ICBM ranges, potentially reaching the United States, if they were reconfigured, according to the DIA.[12] Advancing Iran’s space program would contribute to its development of ICBMs because SLVs use similar technologies.[13] Iran can use SLVs to launch satellites capable of collecting imagery and maintain an updated target bank for attacks abroad.[14] Iranian state media has reported that the IRGC used launched satellites to collect intelligence on US military positions in the region.[15] The IRGC Aerospace Force Space Command launched its first Iranian military satellite in April 2020 and a second in March 2022.[16] Russia, furthermore, launched a Kanopus-V satellite—alternatively referred to as the “Khayyam” in Iran—into orbit on behalf of Iran in August 2022.[17]

Russia’s assistance to Iran’s SLV program highlights another form of Russian payment for Iranian support in the Ukraine war and the expansion of Russian-Iranian relations.[18] Iranian Deputy Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Brigadier General Hojatollah Qureishi separately discussed unspecified military cooperation with his Russian counterpart Alexander Fomin on July 21 in Moscow.[19] Iran’s Ambassador to Russia Kazem Jalali also stated that Iran and Russia are cooperating on civilian passenger plane development.[20] Russian assistance with Iranian civil aviation could reinforce its proxies in Syria.[21] Iranian civil aviation has been in a state of decay for decades due to international sanctions.[22]

The above developments in Russo-Iranian cooperation follow reports that Iran is no longer expecting Russian delivery of Su-35 fighter jets.[23] Western media previously speculated that Iran could receive Russian military equipment, including Su-35 fighter jets, in return for supplying Russia with drones in the Ukraine war.[24]

BRICS has invited Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi to attend its 15th summit in Johannesburg, South Africa in late August.[25] BRICS is an economic and political organization composed of Brazil, China, India, Russia, and South Africa.[26] Raisi emphasized Iran’s readiness to connect BRICS countries to global energy and economic markets during a speech at the 14th BRICS summit in June 2022.[27] Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian separately emphasized that Iran will be a ”reliable” partner if it joins BRICS during a meeting with BRICS foreign ministers in Cape Town, South Africa on June 2.[28] This invitation comes amid the Raisi administration’s increased emphasis on using multilateral organizations to advance Iran’s political and economic goals, such as undermining Western sanctions. Iran became a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on July 4.[29]

The Iranian regime has detained a US national.[30] UK-based Middle East Eye reported on July 21 that Iranian authorities detained the individual in 2022, citing one inside source.[31] US-based Semafor news outlet separately stated on July 21 that it did not disclose the identity of the detainee to avoid jeopardizing negotiations over their release. Semafor added that the United States and Iran have held prisoner swap negotiations in recent weeks and agreed that “the [most recently detained] American will be part of any deal and there are no delays being cause by [the person’s] inclusion.”[32] The Iranian regime is also detaining other American citizens such as Siamak Namazi, Emad Sharghi, and Morad Tahbaz.[33] The United States and Iran conducted prisoner exchanges in 2015 following the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. There is no evidence that suggests current prisoner exchange discussions encompass a nuclear agreement.[34]




[1] https://twitter.com/Sharqya_reporte/status/1679226202693812224; https:/...(dot) net/%d9%85%d9%8a%d9%84%d9%8a%d9%80-%d9%80%d8%b4%d9%8a%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%a5%d9%8a%d8%b1%d8%a7%d9%86-%d8%aa%d9%86%d9%82%d9%84-%d8%b5%d9%80-%d9%80%d9%88%d8%a7%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%ae-%d9%85%d9%8a%d8%ab/

[2] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/06/01/discord-leaks-iran-russi...

[3] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-june-1-2023

[4] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-update-s...

[5] https://eyeofeuphrates[dot]com/ar/news/2023/07/06/9052

[6] https://sana (dot) sy/?p=1935782; https://baladi-news (dot) com/ar/articles/95470

[7] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-20-2023-64b9d7...

[8] https://sana[dot]sy/?p=1935352 ; https://en[dot]isna.ir/news/1402042818587/Iranian-Syrian-Justice-Ministe... ; https://sana[dot]sy/?p=1934913

[9] https://presstv[dot]ir/Detail/2023/07/19/707372/Iran-and-Syria-to-boost-...

[10] https://en[dot]mehrnews.com/news/183763/Iran-Iraq-joint-committee-on-ter...

[11] https://www[dot]irna.ir/news/85100711/%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B6%D8%A7%DB%8C-%DB...

[12] https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Images/News/Military_Powers_Publications...

[13] https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Images/News/Military_Powers_Publications...

[14] https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Pivot-to-Offense-How-Iran...

[15] https://www. tasnimnews.com/en/news/2020/07/29/2317175

[16] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-revolutionary-guards-put...

[17] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/08/04/russia-iran-...

[18] https://jewishinsider.com/2023/07/william-burns-cia-aspen-security-forum...

[19] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1402043019329 ; https://sana dot sy/?p=1935722

[20] https://www.iranintl dot com/202307210727

[21] https://israel-alma.org/2022/12/14/mahan-air-smuggling-weapons-into-syri.... ; https://www.iranintl dot com/en/202212153611

[22] https://gulfif.org/irans-aviation-industry-is-in-dire-straits/

[23] https://www.bourseandbazaar.com/articles/2023/7/13/iran-paid-for-su-35-j... https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/593633 ; https://www.iranintl dot com/202307210727

[24] https://www.forbes.com/sites/pauliddon/2022/08/05/shaheds-for-sukhois-sp...

[25] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85176159

[26] https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/how-brics-got-here

[27] https://en.mfa.gov dot ir/portal/newsview/684680/We-consider-the-transformation-of-global-justice-into-an-all-encompassing-global-discourse-an-undeniable-necessity

[28] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85129536

[29] https://president dot ir/fa/145193

[30] https://www.semafor.com/article/07/20/2023/iran-detains-a-fourth-america...

[31] https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/07/us-seeking-release-fourth-a...

[32] https://www.semafor.com/article/07/20/2023/iran-detains-a-fourth-america...

[33] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202307217907

[34] https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/01/16/463293941/iran-says-i...