Iraq Prime Minister’s Cabinet Reshuffle May Lead to No-Confidence Vote

by Patrick Martin

Key Take-Away: Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi announced a major cabinet reshuffle on February 9 in an attempt to reform his government. Political blocs are unlikely to tolerate losing control over their ministries, however, and could unite to override the prime minster if he attempts to undercut them. Shi’a religious leader Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who formerly backed the prime minister’s reforms, has ceased to give political sermons, depriving PM Abadi of his public backing. Meanwhile, PM Abadi’s political opponents and Iranian proxy militias have escalated their efforts to restrict his powers over the past month. PM Abadi’s survival in office may be tenuous at best, and there is a possibility that the cabinet reshuffle could backfire against him, weakening him further or leading to his removal. Actors who previously supported PM Abadi’s reform programs may consider ousting him in the event of non-implementation of the reform agenda. Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr, who previously expressed strong support for PM Abadi’s reforms, gave him only 45 days to implement wide-ranging reforms, threatening to “withdraw confidence within the Council of Representatives” in the event of failure. PM Abadi’s weakening and possible removal would strike a serious blow to the U.S.’s ability to support the ISF in the fight against ISIS in Iraq, as it is likely that a pro-Iranian – and anti-Coalition – political figure would secure the premiership.

Context of the Cabinet Reshuffle Announcement

Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi announced in a televised speech on February 9 a “radical cabinet reshuffle” with the intent of replacing members of his Council of Minister (CoM) with technocrats and academics. He has announced no details of what the reshuffle will look like or to what extent the CoM will change. The Speaker of the Council of Representatives (CoR) and a senior member of the Sunni Etihad bloc, Salim al-Juburi, noted that any reshuffling of the CoM would have to be approved in the CoR in accord with the constitution. PM Abadi, when strong, has been able to make changes. He reduced the size of the CoM and reshuffled positions on August 9 and 16, 2015 during a brief period when his opponents were hesitant to openly oppose the reforms, particularly because he had the public backing of Shi’a religious authority Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. In theory, PM Abadi can accomplish major reforms and fundamentally change the composition of his government.

In practice, it will be nearly impossible for PM Abadi to replace senior leaders of political blocs with technocrats and maintain his seat as prime minister. PM Abadi does not command a strong majority in his own Dawa party, let alone the support of other political blocs participating in his tenuously balanced unity government. Political blocs covet control over ministries as sources of patronage and political influence, and divergent parties will likely set aside their political differences to block any attempt to deny them control over ministries. The move could therefore unite the political blocs against him and generate a meaningful threat of a no-confidence vote. An attempt by PM Abadi to change the composition of the government would thus be likely to fail and may constitute political suicide. 

Rumors first emerged of PM Abadi’s cabinet reshuffle on January 19, when anonymous sources claimed that PM Abadi would replace members of the CoM, most of whom are senior members of political blocs, with less senior members. He later confirmed that he was pursuing a cabinet reshuffle during a conversation with media on January 25 but offered no further details. Unconfirmed reports list six ministers as being targets for replacement. They include Education Minister Hussein al-Shahristani of the State of Law Alliance (SLA); Interior Minister Muhammad al-Ghabban of the Badr Organization; Bayan Jabr of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI); Electricity Minister Qasim al-Fahdawi of the Loyalty to Anbar bloc; Industry and Minerals Minister Muhammad al-Darraji of the Sadrist Trend; and Finance Minister Hoshyar Zebari of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). If true, these reports indicate that PM Abadi is not attempting to cut any one party out of the CoM or targeting any particular bloc. However, the inclusion of Ghabban is noteworthy, as he is a senior member of a proxy militia and subordinate to Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri, who rejected earlier reports of his rumored removal on January 20. The Badr Organization values its control over the Interior Ministry, as it provides Amiri and his Iranian backers with a large degree of control over the country’s police forces and a number of security agencies.

The other ministers on the list are also powerbrokers in their parties. Hussein al-Shahristani is the former Minister of Oil in the Maliki government and a relative of Ayatollah Jawad Shahristani, Sistani’s son-in-law and representative in Iran. Bayan Jabr was Maliki’s Minister of Finance and a prominent figure in the Badr Organization when it was still a subsidiary of ISCI. Qasim al-Fahdawi was the former governor of Anbar and is a prominent Sunni politician. Hoshyar Zebari served as Maliki’s Foreign Minister and has been the leading KDP official in Iraqi national politics. Muhammad al-Darraji was Maliki’s Housing Minister and remains a top Sadrist official. 

PM Abadi’s announcement came after a month of brazen impunity by PM Abadi’s primary opponent, the Iranian proxy militias, who demonstrated their intent to undermine Abadi’s rule through four major developments in 2016.

1) Iranian proxy militias openly rejected and expelled Iraqi Security Forces in the militia hub of Basra. Security in Basra had deteriorated precipitously due to the forward deployment of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) from the province to the front lines to fight ISIS and secure Baghdad. As a result, militias, often called “criminal gangs” in the Iraqi press, proliferated and violence between rival groups escalated. In response, PM Abadi sent an armored Iraqi Army (IA) brigade to Basra on January 13 to re-impose order and disarm the groups as well as warring tribes. However, a force from the armored brigade got into a confrontation with members of Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, (KSAS), an Iranian proxy militia, during which several KSAS members were injured. Proxy militias then made a joint statement on January 16 rejecting the presence of security forces from outside the province and demanding that it leave. The brigade withdrew from Basra on January 19, one week after it deployed. The successful expulsion of an IA brigade from Basra, Iraq’s main oil-producing province and a major historical hub of militia activity, demonstrated the weakness of PM Abadi’s authority and the willingness of Iranian proxies to openly defy his authority.

2) Iranian proxy militias have been openly maneuvering to undermine the ISF and the U.S.-led anti-ISIS Coalition in Iraq by positioning the Popular Mobilization at the forefront of security operations. Proxy militia leaders have been pressuring PM Abadi heavily to invite them to participate in operations to recapture Mosul while U.S. officials insist that Iranian proxy militias must not engage in any future operations. The participation of Iraqi Shi’a militias in a Mosul operation would enhance the narrative that the Popular Mobilization is the essential ally of the Iraqi government in the fight against ISIS, undercut U.S. influence and participation in a Mosul operation, undermine the legitimacy of the Iraqi Security Forces, and expose the predominantly Sunni province of Ninewa to sectarian abuses and violence. Proxy militia leaders have been meeting under the pretext of discussing the importance of the Popular Mobilization with some frequency since early January. These meetings included a January 14 visit by senior proxy militia leader and U.S.-designated terrorist Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis to the Ministry of Defense (MoD), as well as a meeting between Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri and the leader of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), Ammar al-Hakim, on January 20. Senior proxy leaders Amiri, former U.S. detainee Qais al-Khazali, and Abu Alaa met on February 8 and 9 to discuss Mosul in particular. These attempts to undermine the ISF and the Coalition reduces both PM Abadi’s freedom to operate independent of Iranian control and the ability of the U.S. to assist the ISF in recapturing territory from ISIS.

Above: Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri (far left), Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq leader Qais al-Khazali (second from left), and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada leader Abu Alaa (third from left) at a meeting on February 8 to discuss the Coalition’s insistence on preventing the Popular Mobilization from participating in Mosul operations.

3) PM Abadi’s reform agenda has ground to a halt. PM Abadi launched a major reform initiative in August 2015 following a fiery anti-corruption sermon by the representative of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the supreme religious authority and a key ally of PM Abadi. However, despite an initial flurry of successful reforms and unparalleled popular support for PM Abadi from thousands of civil demonstrators in Baghdad and southern Iraq, his political opponents have successfully blocked his reforms one month into his initiative. Vice President Nouri al-Maliki, in particular, the former PM whose removal was PM Abadi’s top priority in the August 2015 reforms, succeeded in keeping his position within government. Maliki has aligned himself with the Iranian-backed proxy militias for more than a year. He leverages them as a powerful force, and they leverage him as a powerful politician. Since then, political blocs have blocked the passage of all major reforms; an ill-fated attempt to change the salary scales for federal employees even faced resistance from Sistani himself. In addition, no major legislation other than the budget has been able to pass the CoR due to irreconcilable differences between Sunni, Shi’a, and Kurdish parties on the particulars of key laws, such as the National Guard Law, Federal Court Act, and the Justice and Accountability Law. Iranian proxy militias publicly rejected the National Guard Law in September 2015, after which discussions on the draft law withered away. Iranian proxies’ ability to stifle government legislation poses a serious threat to national reconciliation between Iraqi Sunnis and Shi’a, and highlight the weakness of PM Abadi, whose selection in September 2014 was based in part on promises to see that these laws passed.

4) Proxy militias targeted U.S. personnel in Baghdad. An unspecified Iranian proxy militia kidnapped three American contractors in southern Baghdad on January 15, just two days after U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) deployed to Iraq to begin operations as part of a specialized targeting force to target ISIS. It was the first kidnapping of U.S. personnel in Iraq since the U.S. withdrew forces from Iraq in December 2011. The U.S. and the Coalition are PM Abadi’s main allies in the fight against ISIS, but Iranian proxy militias, and Iran by consequence, aim to expel the U.S. and replace Coalition support with Iranian and/or Russian support. The kidnapping was an embarrassment for the Iraqi government and demonstrated the level of impunity that Iranian proxy militias have in Iraq, as well as the threat they pose to the U.S. and its efforts to assist the ISF fight ISIS.

Reasons for the Announcement

The timing of PM Abadi’s announcement was likely deliberate and a product of a combination of motivators. First, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani has shifted away from his political outspokenness to return to the more quietist position he originally favored. The supreme religious authority had supported PM Abadi’s previous reform efforts in August, and his representatives have frequently given sermons on the necessity of passing government reforms and anti-corruption measures. However, he has more recently become frustrated with the government’s inability to combat corruption, calling for a technocratic government as Iraq’s budgetary crisis increased. Sistani’s representative announced on February 5 that his weekly political sermons were suspended unless demanded by new developments. The change may be leverage to prod Abadi into taking reform members, or it may result from Sistani’s declining health. Regardless, Sistani has called for government reforms vigorously between August 2015 and February 2016, making his opinions clear. PM Abadi likely would not even attempt the reshuffle without Sistani’s previous statements. Second, PM Abadi may have privately secured the support of key figures within the political blocs, including senior members of the State of Law Alliance (SLA) who do not support the Iranian proxies, as well as in ISCI and the Sadrist Trend, without necessarily notifying the whole group. Leaders within these groups supported PM Abadi’s previous reform efforts, primarily as a means of weakening their political opponents and increasing their relative power within the government. However, ISCI’s Ammar al-Hakim stated on January 27 that any move to reorganize government must be “justified and non-impulsive,” suggesting that he knew little about the specifics of the cabinet reshuffle. In addition, a member of the Dawa Party, of which PM Abadi is a member, stated that PM Abadi had not brought up the cabinet reshuffle in a recent party meeting. It thus remains unclear to what extent he consulted senior political leaders about the specifics of the cabinet reshuffle prior to its announcement.

PM Abadi may also have initiated the cabinet reshuffle after detecting a move against him by his opponents. An imminent threat to his political survival made by his political opponents and/or Iranian proxy militias might have forced the PM to make a gambit to increase his control over the government and improve its performance while protecting himself from a possible move to oust him. PM Abadi’s opponents have been laying the groundwork for months for PM Abadi’s eventual departure from power and replacement by a figure that is more supportive of Iranian-backed militias. Maliki himself has been attempting to increase his attractiveness as a successor candidate by openly siding with Iranian proxy militias and opposing PM Abadi. 

Reactions to the Announcement

Iraq’s political blocs almost unanimously voiced their approval for a cabinet reshuffle, as was the case with PM Abadi’s previous reforms. Some political leaders used the reform language to attack one other, indicating that they intend to use the reforms to increase their political position at the expense of their rivals. However, recent statements have been laced with threatening language that indicates a growing dissatisfaction with PM Abadi among the Shi’a parties that underscores his precarious position. 

ISCI was the most publicly supportive of PM Abadi’s reshuffle, issuing a statement calling for a government of technocrats. The ISCI Transport Minister, Bayan Jabr, stated his approval of the cabinet reshuffle. Ammar al-Hakim, the leader of ISCI and a supporter of PM Abadi’s prior reforms, voiced his approval for the reform process, adding that the party quota system, wherein ministries and key positions are determined based on party affiliation, needed to end. Hakim did meet however meet on February 14 with Badr Organization Hadi al-Amiri, an Iranian proxy leader, indicating that ISCI is coordinating a response to the reforms with PM Abadi’s opponents rather than fully endorsing PM Abadi’s reform package. Other parties, including the Kurdish Gorran party and the Sunni Etihad bloc, also issued statements of support for the cabinet reshuffle.

Other parties largely distanced themselves from the cabinet reshuffle debate. Iyad Allawi, the leader of the secular Wataniya bloc, expressed skepticism about the process, stating that the current CoM composition was already technocratic, as most of its members held advanced degrees. However, a Wataniya leader later stated that the bloc endorsed reform proposals by the Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr. Similarly, a member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) stated that the reshuffling “does not concern the Kurds” who “paid the price” for putting their trust in the previous government reshuffling in August 2015 which removed Kurds from key positions within the security forces.

The State of Law Alliance (SLA), led by PM Abadi’s primary rival, Vice President (VP) Nouri al-Maliki, used more threatening language in its support for PM Abadi’s reforms. Although the SLA Education Minister, Hussein al-Shahristani, offered to present PM Abadi with his resignation in a show of support for the reshuffle, the move was largely symbolic and obscures the true position of pro-Maliki elements within the SLA. One State of Law Alliance member stated that there was a need to form a single parliamentary group out of multiple political blocs to assign PM Abadi “or someone else” with the formation of the new government, again, threatening no confidence. A large contingent of the SLA has openly discussed removing PM Abadi in the past, issuing a letter on October 27, 2015 threatening to “withdraw their mandate” from PM Abadi due to his lack of consultation with political blocs on his last major reform program regarding salary scales for government employees; at least one Maliki supporter openly speculated about the possibility of replacing PM Abadi. Maliki himself openly opposed PM Abadi’s reforms in October 29, 2015, insisting that PM Abadi’s decision to abolish the post of the Vice President in August was not constitutional and that political blocs could withdraw their “mandate” from PM Abadi. Maliki has been positioning himself to succeed PM Abadi in the event of his removal, and he has secured the support of Iran and its proxy militias. Previously, the pro-Maliki elements of the SLA have used the threat of a no-confidence vote to constrain PM Abadi’s freedom of action, but his most recent reform announcement could open the door the prospect of removing PM Abadi becoming a reality.

Above: VP Nouri al-Maliki (center) attends a memorial service on January 27, 2016, for a Popular Mobilization leader, seated between Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri (right) and Kata’ib Hezbollah leader and U.S.-designated terrorist Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (left). Maliki frequently meets with Popular Mobilization and Iranian proxy leaders and is likely Iran’s preferred candidate for the premiership in the event that PM Abadi be removed from office.

The most alarming reaction came from, Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of the Sadrist Trend, who called for a comprehensive reform program on February 13 but threatened to oust PM Abadi from office. Sadr insisted on wide-ranging reforms that included reform of financial institutions and the judiciary, the formation of a technocratic government, and comprehensive security sector reform that included parliamentary votes of approval on all division leaders and military staff. Sadr’s statement highlighted issues that demonstrated his desire to see the reform program undermine the position of the SLA, Sadr’s primary political rival within the Shi’a political establishment; his insistence on “purging” the judiciary is rooted in Sadr’s insistence that Medhat al-Mahmoud, the head of the judiciary and a long-time ally of SLA leader VP Nouri al-Maliki, must leave office. However, Sadr also stated his frustration with PM Abadi’s inability to pass reforms, and only gave PM Abadi 45 days to implement the reforms and provide a reform program for the upcoming year or he would “withdraw confidence from PM Abadi in the CoR.” The explicit wording strongly suggested that he would pursue either a no-confidence vote, but could be interpreted as a threat to withdraw the Sadrist Trend from the government. Shortly afterwards, leaders in the Sadrist Trend’s al-Ahrar Bloc stated that they would withdraw from the political process if Sadr’s 45-day deadline was not met.

With Sadr’s support, the threat of a no-confidence vote against PM Abadi becomes a genuine possibility. A vote of no-confidence requires a questioning session, a request for the no-confidence vote from at least 50 CoR members, and successful passage of the vote with an absolute majority in the CoR. Previously, it would have been extremely difficult for Maliki’s allies to engineer a successful no-confidence vote. Were the Sadrist Trend to withdraw from government, however, it would be more likely, though not given, that a no-confidence vote could succeed. 

Possible Courses of Action

With the threat of a no-confidence having become more realistic with Sadr’s statements, it is clear that PM Abadi is losing support. How the cabinet reshuffle process plays out could fundamentally change the composition of the government, or result in its collapse. This presents several steps that could be taken over the course of the cabinet reshuffle.

PM Abadi could attempt a genuine cabinet reshuffle that replaces ministers with genuine technocrats possessing few if any political ties. This course of action is highly unlikely; political blocs would immediately obstruct any attempt to oust their ministers from the CoM without their consultation. It would also likely rally numerous competing political blocs together to oust PM Abadi from his post to collapse the CoM. 

PM Abadi could oversee a partial cabinet reshuffle, with some ministers being replaced. Although it is possible that some of the new ministers could be true technocrats, the reality is that political blocs covet control over ministries far more than they value an accountable and functional government. It is far more likely that political blocs compete to oust one another from each other’s cabinet positions. In this case, as with the previous reforms in August 2015, the Sadrist Trend and ISCI would most likely attempt to displace SLA ministers from their positions in the CoM, and vice versa. 

More dangerously, the reshuffle could get bogged down in political competition and fail. If PM Abadi fails to succeed with a cabinet reshuffle, then he would be exposed to a vote of no-confidence, particularly if failure drives the Sadrist Trend from the government. This is a worst case scenario, particularly because if PM Abadi were to leave office, then his replacement would almost certainly be less accepting of the U.S. and the U.S.-led Coalition in the fight against ISIS. The nomination of Nouri al-Maliki as PM in particular would be a heavy blow to the U.S., as he has become vehemently anti-American and has transformed himself into an Iranian proxy actor. This would increase the ability of Iran to increase its involvement in Iraq and expel the U.S. from its leading role in the anti-ISIS fight as well as from the country itself. However, Maliki remains a highly controversial figure, detested by the Sunni and Kurdish blocs as well as the Sadrist Trend, and it is not at all a given that he could secure the nomination. 

The removal of PM Abadi would make it dramatically more difficult for the U.S. and the Coalition to conduct anti-ISIS operations; for Iraq to address its political and financial problems; and address political divides between competing parties, especially national reconciliation between Iraqi Sunnis and Shi’a. Coalition initiatives, such as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph Dunford’s proposal of the integration of U.S. advisers present at forward bases and with Iraqi military units in a future Mosul operation, would likely be blocked by a new government. Although announcement of the cabinet reshuffle appears bold, it indicates PM Abadi’s weak position and the threats he faces from his opponents. There is a high likelihood that the initiative backfires and fails to achieve any substantial reform, further weakening of PM Abadi’s powers and increasing the relative ability of his opponents to constrict his freedom of action. Failure could be the pretext of PM Abadi’s ouster, while even a stalled reshuffle could expose him to attack by his pro-Iranian opponents. The U.S. must quickly provide support to PM Abadi and his government, and above all financial support that helps to ease Iraq’s budgetary crisis, strengthens the Iraqi Security Forces, and creates leverage that the U.S. and Abadi can use to accelerate effective reforms.

Iraq’s Prime Minister Implements Reform Agenda

by: Patrick Martin, Sinan Adnan, and Theodore Bell

Key Take-away: Prime Minister (PM) Haidar al-Abadi is implementing major reforms to the Iraqi government as largely peaceful demonstrations against service shortages and corruption continue in Baghdad and southern Iraq. PM Abadi’s federal reforms seek to cut redundancies and counter corruption, a chief complaint of protesters. PM Abadi is also likely moving to obstruct political rivals with the broad backing of most of Iraq’s Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurdish political parties. The Council of Representatives approved of the removal of the three Deputy PM positions, reducing the number of ministers, and voted eliminating the VP posts, which would sideline former PM Nouri al-Maliki, though the process of eliminating the VP position requires additional steps that appear to be out of PM’s authorities at the current time. The clerical establishment in Najaf supports the PM and is now calling for reforms within the Judiciary, which must be undertaken by the Judiciary upon itself because it is constitutionally independent. Should the Judiciary remain unchanged, it will pose an obstacle to PM Abadi’s reforms. The reforms have so far boosted Abadi’s influence as a premier and trimmed the number of ministers in the Council of Ministers. Some of the protests have turned violent in ways that indicate future vulnerabilities to the protests and PM Abadi’s government.

Introduction

PM Abadi’s reform initiative has spurred the Council of Representatives (CoR) into action. Since August 11, the COR passed PM Abadi’s and CoR speaker Salim al-Juburi’s reform bills, in addition to key legislation previously locked in parliamentary review on August 27. The pace of legislative activity indicates active political negotiations and consensus-forming among major Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurdish political actors in the CoR, likely responding to pressure from Najaf and the population. However, dissenters, including PM Abadi’s rivals, will likely challenge the reforms’ constitutionality despite the political and legitimacy bestowed on the reforms by Najaf and the CoR, respectively. 

Demonstrations against provincial service shortages and corruption have also continued throughout southern Iraq amid isolated reports of clashes and attacks on protesters. There are now indications that particular provincial governments are using local security assets to disperse protests, a noteworthy development that may require the central government to intervene to protect protesters to prevent a security escalation in southern Iraq.  

PM Abadi’s Reform Program

The first reform program introduced by PM Abadi on August 9 mandated sweeping changes to government, the most significant of which was the immediate elimination of the Vice President (VP) and Deputy Prime Minister positions. Several senior figures in major political parties were affected: former PM Nouri al-Maliki; Mutahidun leader Osama al-Nujaifi; Wataniya leader Ayad Allawi; senior Sadrist official Bahaa al-Araji; Arabiya leader Saleh al-Mutlaq; and senior KDP official Rowsch Shaways. The package also included reforms to the sectors of administrations, services, economy, and finance. The bill targeted special interests of senior officials, reducing the number of special advisers each official could have, as well as the number of bodyguards, claiming that it freed up “20,000” security personnel to serve in the Ministry of Defense (MoD) or Interior (MoI). This reform program unanimously passed through the Council of Ministers (CoM) on August 9. It also achieved a majority vote and passed in the CoR on August 11. However, dissolving the vice presidency positions requires more than a majority vote in the CoR. It requires a formal request for the elimination of the VP positions from the Presidency to the CoR Speaker. The PM’s spokesperson alluded to this fact on August 27 by stating that some reforms will take time.  

Solidarity in the CoR regarding Abadi’s reform program has granted the government a unique opportunity to force key legislation through the legislative process. The CoR also passed a reform package introduced by CoR speaker Salim al-Juburi on August 11, which was filled with its own anti-corruption measures and administrative reforms. The CoR package mandated that the reforms be implemented within 30 days, the agenda has witnessed limited progress; it invited PM Abadi to dismiss the Electricity Minister Qasim al-Fahdawi of the Loyalty for Anbar List, a component of Juburi’s own Etihad, the major Sunni coalition in the CoR. This reform package has made limited progress, as Fahdawi’s questioning on August 29, 2015 did not result in his dismissal. Power shortage in Iraq is a popular grievance that will likely continue to fuel popular anger.

CoR speaker Salim al-Juburi also used his platform to address the Political Parties Law, a key law that governs political life in Iraq which has been ignored by the CoR for its potential to limit parties’ freedom of receiving external support and maintaining armed wings. The Political Parties law passed unanimously on August 27. The law, if implemented correctly, will negatively affect the interests of all parties that receive funding from foreign countries, which likely extends beyond the realm of Iranian proxy groups to include Sunni parties as well. The law also bans the possession of armed wings by political parties, a condition unlikely to be implemented without the presence of a strong state and robust security apparatus.

PM Abadi also introduced a second reform package on August 16. Though narrower in scope, it sought to decrease the number of ministries by eliminating and merging non-essential ministries that were originally formed to accommodate power-sharing of all winning political parties. Specifically, it eliminated the Women’s Affairs, Human Rights, State Affairs, and Provincial Affairs ministries. It also merged the Municipalities Ministry with the Construction and Housing Ministry; the Science Ministry with the Higher Education Ministry; the Environment Ministry with the Health Ministry; and the Tourism Ministry with Culture Ministry. Combined with the elimination of the Deputy Prime Minister posts, the result was that the number of positions in the CoM reduced from 33 to 22 positions.

Political Parties Affected by PM Abadi’s Reforms

The State of Law Alliance (SLA) lost two positions held by Badr Organization members, a major component of the SLA. The cabinet reshuffle disproportionately upset the Badr Organization, an Iranian proxy group with a prominent armed wing, which demanded an explanation for the removal of two of its members from the CoM. However, the reshuffle did not exclusively target pro-Maliki allies. Sunni parties lost three positions, Kurdish parties combined lost three, and the Sadrist Trend lost one. Smaller parties including the Communist Party and the small Iraq Coalition lost their only positions to SLA members during ministry mergers. If the reforms to eliminate the VP positions go through, SLA would lose Maliki’s post, while Wataniya and Mutahidun would each lose one position as well.

The Sadrist Trend and Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) were left relatively unscathed, preserving nearly all of their ministerial seats. This is likely a result of ISCI and the Sadrist Trend’s occupation of essential ministries. Their early and vocal support for PM Abadi’s reform program might have contributed the preservation of their posts also. The resignation of the Sadrist Deputy PM, Bahaa al-Araji indicated the Sadrist Trend’s support for reforms. Thus the cabinet reshuffle maintained the influence of the Sadrists and ISCI within the CoM but decreased that of nearly every other political bloc.

The majority approval in the CoR of the first reform package was marred only by voiced concerns by VPs Ayad Allawi of Wataniya, a secular Shi’a, and Osama al-Nujaifi, an Iraqi Sunni and the leader of Mutahidun. Both questioned the constitutionality of the reform package, though both emphasized that they support the reform program as a whole. Their complaints were likely a result of the potential loss of their own positions. This concern does not appear to have deterred PM Abadi, who openly explored the possibility of receiving a “mandate from the people” to amend the constitution. PM Abadi nevertheless described major changes of state configuration such as cancelling the constitution and the provincial councils as a “return to dictatorship,” indicating that his vision of reforms is scoped and that he wants to maintain existing political support. Meanwhile, any resistance from the SLA and Maliki has been limited by the vast popular support for PM Abadi and Sistani’s blessing for the reform program, increasing the political cost of publicly pushing back against the reforms.

In addition, the Commission of Inquiry into the Fall of Mosul, a CoR committee led by a senior Sadrist official, released its report on August 16 and named Maliki, among others, as accountable for the loss of Mosul to ISIS. Pro-Maliki members of the SLA have been preoccupied since that date to ensure that Maliki is not subject to legal action. SLA members threatened to resign when the report was released. Having failed to have Maliki’s name removed, they denounced the report. Reportedly, one of the SLA’s members resigned from his post in the CoR in order to allow Maliki to return to the CoR as a member, thus granting him immunity from prosecution. With the SLA and its leader having to address several challenges at once, PM Abadi has faced hardly any resistance from the largest bloc in government, which has elected to avoid voicing its opposition in a likely effort to preserve its image.

PM Abadi’s rivals, such as the Iranian-backed Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), and the Badr Organization, may seek to cause unrest to undermine the image of PM Abadi’s government in response to his political reforms. However, the Iranian proxies’ responses to PM Abadi’s reform initiative have thus far remained relatively muted. Former PM and embattled VP Nouri al-Maliki’s week-long visit to Iran starting on August 14 was likely an attempt by Maliki to garner external support against the current reforms. However, during the visit, Iranian Vice-President Ishaq Jahangiri stated that it was necessary for Iraq to begin PM Abadi’s reforms. Jahangiri’s statement followed a previous statement by the Iranian Chief of Staff of the Armed forces, Hasan Firouz Abadi, who called on Iraqis to support PM Abadi’s government, though he cautioned against “external” interference and called for the demonstrators to exercise “self-restraint.” These statements indicate that Iran is not publically opposing PM Abadi’s reforms. Some Iranian officials may additionally fear an increase in violence or unrest in southern Iraq and Baghdad.

Judicial Reforms

The religious establishment in Najaf had explicitly called for major judicial reforms during two consecutive Friday sermons on August 14 and 21. However, the PM does not have the authority to make changes in the judiciary given its independent constitutional status. The Higher Judicial Council (HJC), which sits atop the other judicial bodies of the Federal Supreme Court, the Federal Appeal Court, the Public Prosecution Service, the Judicial Supervision Commission, and other courts, is headed by the controversial justice, Medhat al-Mahmud. Mahmud has occupied his post since 2005. He was instrumental in expanding the influence of Maliki and minimizing that of the CoR, and he may represent an obstacle to Abadi’s reforms and to the judicial reforms solicited by Najaf. Mahmud is more likely to act in his own interests than that of Maliki at this time, but actions to reduce his own authority by the judiciary are unlikely to be forthcoming.

In order acknowledge Najaf’s attention to the Judiciary, Mahmud submitted his resignation during an HJC meeting to discuss reforms on August 17, 2015. The resignation was rejected unanimously by the rest of the justices on the HJC on the same day. It is most likely that that the judges rejected the resignation in order to protect their own interests and positions. It is also likely that Mahmud knew this, and offered his resignation as a gesture to placate demands from Najaf without risk. Nonetheless, there is already a report that Mahmud intends to resubmit his resignation. A reform at the top of the judicial hierarchy would set a precedent which would expedite more reforms in the judiciary. Nonetheless, they are expected to be insincere at this point.

Continued protests in Baghdad and southern Iraq

Meanwhile demonstrators continue to protest in Baghdad and other locations throughout southern Iraq in response to service shortages and central government and ministerial corruption. Demonstrations calling for reform in Baghdad have been accompanied by large pro-PM Abadi rallies supportive of his reforms. Demonstrations in Baghdad have also remained peaceful. This is mainly due to PM Abadi’s orders to the ISF in Baghdad to provide protection and to be gentle with the demonstrators. The ISF in central Baghdad placed flowers into the barrels of their weapons to indicate their intention to maintain a peaceful atmosphere. Similarly, demonstrators in Baghdad are also working to maintain the peacefulness of the demonstrations.

However, demonstrations in the south have tended towards violence in some cases. Isolated incidents of violence can generate instability that the ISF are unlikely to contain because major ISF assets have deployed from the south to the front lines of the northern fight against ISIS. Violent protests also have the potential to give PM Abadi’s political rivals means to upset his political platform at a local level.

In Babil, the provincial; government used local police to disperse a protest in the provincial capital of Hilla on August 22. The Babil government stated that PM Abadi had banned demonstrations and imposed a curfew on Hilla on August 23. This accusation of PM Abadi runs counter to his actions toward demonstrators in Baghdad, and PM Abadi denied that his office had banned demonstrations the following day. He also ordered the curfew lifted and dispatched the Iraqi Army (IA) to protect demonstrators in Hilla. The Babil government’s attempt to end protests was most likely an effort to protect the interests and power of the senior officials in the governments such as the governor, a State of Law Alliance member, but it shows how provincial governments can exacerbate the security situation surrounding largely peaceful protests.

In Basra, masked men in military uniforms attacked protesters at a sit-in site outside a provincial government building on August 22 while Iraqi Police (IP) did not intervene. Though the attackers have not been identified, the incident is a harbinger of violence perpetrated by actors outside of the control of the state, including militias, organized criminals, or political parties. The lack of ISF protection to Basra demonstrations, coupled with the attack, prompted the demonstrators to disband the demonstration in fear for their safety. Basra has a notable security vacuum, a result of major ISF deployment to the front lines. Basra is also key terrain for many Shi’a political parties, and former PM and VP Maliki; it is also vulnerable to Iranian interests. However, at this time, no visible politically divisive actions have been noted in response to PM Abadi’s political reforms in Basra. On August 26, PM Abadi ordered the ISF not to fire into the air during demonstrations and stated clashing with protesters constituted “a red line,” likely in reference to reports of violence against protesters over the previous week in Basra and Babil.  

Demonstrators themselves have been responsible for instigating violence on several other occasions. In Karbala, police forces had to disperse demonstrations using batons and water cannons as protesters attempted to force their way into the provincial government building on August 14 and again on August 21. The Karbala protests do not appear to have been provoked by individuals, parties, or other extra-governmental actors. Rather, these incidents reflect the more frustrated nature of civic activist-organized Karbala protesters, who voice more radical reform proposals, such as dissolving the CoR or forming a government of technocrats, than their counterparts in other provinces.

Additionally, multiple provincial governments are scapegoating their advisers, aides, and provincial department heads, firing them in the name of reform. Such dismissals have generated follow-on demonstrations in some instances, such as in Dhi Qar on August 11, where protesters voiced their anger over the limited scope of reforms and also the dismissal of particular officials. In one exceptional case, the governor of Muthanna resigned on August 28 in response to protesters’ demands. However, this resignation remains a singular example of a senior provincial official voluntarily stepping down amid the current protests; the governors of Karbala and Diwaniya, the former an SLA member and the latter a member of the Fadhila party, have symbolically submitted their resignations to PM Abadi on August 15 and 28 respectively, but they continue to serve in office. The incident in Dhi Qar shows another way that provincial government dismissals can have an inflammatory rather than calming effect.

The Sadrists Join Protests in Baghdad

Demonstrations in Baghdad may yet evolve and generate instability. The leader of the popular Shi’a Sadrist Trend, Moqtada al-Sadr, called on his Baghdad-based followers on August 24 to participate in the Friday demonstrations on August 28. Importantly, Sadr explicitly ordered his followers to support the pro-reform demonstrations, maintain a nationalist tone, and refrain from religious or political slogans, consistent with his earliest guidance on the current protests. The participation of the large and active Sadrist Trend support base in the demonstrations contributed to “unprecedented” numbers of demonstrators filling the streets in Baghdad on August 28. While the August 28 protests remained peaceful, the Sadrist support base’s participation may yet generate unintended tensions. However, the sheer number of expected participants and the politicized nature of Sadrist supporters’ participation may infuse the demonstrations with religious and political undertones. They may also add more pressure for reforms, especially within the judiciary.

Conclusion

The reform program has empowered PM Abadi, who currently enjoys the greatest degree of power he has experienced in office. The PM currently has momentum, and maintaining it is key to the successful implementation of reforms. Therefore, it is important to watch the degree of support the PM receives from Najaf and the population and whether support remains constant through a lengthy implementation process. Statements by Sistani’s representative calling on Abadi to expedite reforms, or popular anger directed blaming Abadi for the slow pace of reforms, will be indicators of waning support. It is particularly important to watch for the Presidency’s statements and stance on the elimination of the Vice President positions. President Fuad Masoum will have to submit a formal request to the CoR for the elimination of these positions if their elimination is formally to take place. Elimination of the VP posts would likely be accompanied by moves within the CoR to allow the VPs a return to their CoR seats, a likely priority for Maliki, given the immunity CoR membership would grant him from prosecution in light of the Mosul report.

PM Abadi faces several obstacles that will likely reduce the pace at which his reform legislation can pass. He will have to remain cognizant of security developments associated with protests in southern Iraq, where violence has been reported, while continuing with reforms at a national level. Najaf has legitimized PM Abadi’s reform initiative, and the CoR has momentum as a legislative body, but the Iraqi Judiciary may still constitute an obstacle. The Judiciary is unlikely to reform itself and is also an avenue by which PM Abadi’s opponents and rivals may seek to block his reforms. It will therefore remain important to monitor whether Iraqi justices indicate a willingness to work with PM Abadi. The judiciary as a whole is most likely going to remain resistant to comprehensive reforms and retain its current structure, though there is a possibility that Mahmoud may resign, possibly in order to placate demonstrators. It will also be important to identify early moves by PM Abadi’s opponents to take legal action to protect themselves. While the reforms may slow in the central government due to judicial obstacles, the persistence of large demonstrations in Baghdad and southern Iraq, combined with regular support for reform from Sistani’s representative, may apply sufficient pressure on the judiciary to yield to PM Abadi’s and popular demonstrations' demands, even if it has no legal obligation to do so.

PM Abadi will likely continue introducing smaller reform packages that do not require judicial or Presidential approval and can be pushed through a compliant CoR quickly. His opponents will most likely avoid voicing their resistance to Abadi while quietly pressuring the Presidency and the Judiciary to remain obstacles to core tenets of PM Abadi’s reform program. The CoR will likely take advantage of the reform program’s momentum to approve key legislation, as it did with the Political Parties law, though the most contentious proposals, including the Federal Court Act and the National Guard Law, are unlikely to pass in a similar fashion. It is unlikely that popular anger will be redirected towards PM Abadi, as the ire of the demonstrators continues to be pointed at provincial governments, including governors and provincial council chairmen, who have not met the demands of local protesters by resigning from their positions. While the slow process of implementing changes continues, demonstrations are likely to continue growing in size, applying pressure on provincial councils to reform. It is unlikely that provincial councils will undertake comprehensive reforms that endanger their own positions; nevertheless, the composition of provincial councils will likely shift as parties seek to preserve their positions and scapegoat others.