ISW Blog: Iraqi Kurds

Monday, September 18, 2023

Iran Update, September 18, 2023

Johanna Moore and Amin Soltani

The Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates Monday through Friday. To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) with support from the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute launched an interactive map of Iran and the Middle East. The map depicts events in Iran that affect the stability of the Iranian regime, namely anti-regime protests and reported poisoning incidents. It also shows developments in Syria that jeopardize regional stability and pose threats to US forces and interests, including Iranian and Iranian-backed militia positions.

Key Takeaways

The IRGC deployed forces to the Iran-Iraq border, likely to coerce the Iraqi government and Kurdistan Regional Government to stop threats from anti-Iran opposition groups in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region.
Iran could also use the recent deployments to conduct attacks against Iraqi Kurdistan should coercion fail.
Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani threatened on September 16 to retaliate against the United States for its decision to unload seized Iranian oil from the Suez Rajan tanker.

Iranian Activities in Iraq

This section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout Iraq. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates.

The IRGC deployed forces to the Iran-Iraq border, likely to coerce the Iraqi government and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to stop threats from anti-Iran opposition groups in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR). The Iranian and Iraqi governments signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in March 2023 stipulating that the Iraqi government is responsible for disarming and removing Kurdish opposition groups from the IKR.[1] Iranian officials threatened last week to conduct attacks on the IKR if Iraqi authorities do not fully implement the security agreement by September 19. Iranian officials have more recently acknowledged that the Iraqi government is meeting most of the stipulations in the MOU.[2] Protests around Mahsa Amini’s death anniversary on September 16 did not materialize to the extent that regime officials and Western media expected. This provides the regime with an opportunity to use the northwest deployments to instead degrade Kurdish militants in the IKR without facing bandwidth constraints from suppressing protests, as CTP previously assessed.[3]

The IRGC Ground Force deployed tanks, artillery, and multiple launch rocket (MLRS) systems to unspecified locations on Iran’s northwestern borders on September 13.[4] IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency claimed on September 13 that the deployments were meant to maintain border security.[5] Iran has previously used artillery and MLRS, in addition to missiles and drones, to target anti-regime groups in the IKR.[6]
IRGC Operations Deputy Brigadier General Abbas Nilforoushan stated that if the Kurdish opposition groups are not completely disarmed and their headquarters are not properly dismantled, Iran will “protect the security of the country.”[7] Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Nasser Kanani stated on September 18 that the Iraqi government had met many of the stipulations under the security agreement but was still in the process of fulfilling outstanding components.[8]
Iranian security forces interdicted two separate Kurdish separatist groups in Kurdistan Province and Ilam Province between September 15 and 17 attempting to smuggle weapons into Iran from the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR) to arm protesters and conduct attacks.[9] Iranian officials, however, did not suggest that these arrests posed an increased risk to Iranian security and maintained that the Iraqi government was still working to fully implement their security agreement.

Iran could also use the recent deployments to conduct attacks against Iraqi Kurdistan should coercion fail. These deployments are suitable for both securing the border against armed militants and conducting attacks into the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR). Iranian officials and media continue to highlight the threat Kurdish militants in the IKR pose to Iranian security.[10] Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Mohammad Reza Ashtiani stated on September 18 that Iran will consider taking military action after the September 19 deadline, considering the regime’s rhetoric in recent weeks.[11] Protests around Mahsa Amini’s death anniversary on September 16 did not materialize to the extent that regime officials and Western media expected. This provides the regime with an opportunity to use the northwest deployments to instead degrade Kurdish militants in the IKR without facing bandwidth constraints from suppressing protests, as CTP previously assessed.[12]

Iranian Domestic and Political Affairs

This section covers factors and trends affecting regime decision-making and stability. CTP will cover domestic politics, significant protest activity, and related issues here.

Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani threatened on September 16 to retaliate against the United States for its decision to unload seized Iranian oil from the Suez Rajan tanker. Ashtiani further warned that Iran can disrupt maritime energy trade in the Persian Gulf.[13] The United States unloaded Iranian oil on August 20 off of the Suez Rajan tanker it seized in late April.[14] IRGC Navy Commander Rear Admiral Ali Reza Tangsiri similarly threatened on July 20 that Iran would hold the United States and US companies responsible for confiscating and unloading Iranian oil.[15] CTP previously assessed that Iran would likely retaliate by harassing or seizing US commercial and military vessels and personnel in the Gulf.[16]

[1] https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/04/world/middleeast/iran-kurds-iraq.html ; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/21/iran-attacks-positions-in-nort... ; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/13/missiles-hit-iraqs-kurdish-capi...

[2] https://www dot tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1402/06/27/2957734/%DA%A9%D9%86%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-5-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B2-%D8%A2%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D9%88%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%AD%D8%B6%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%81-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B9-%D8%AF%D9%88-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA

[3] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-14-2023

[4] https://www dot tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/22/2955761 ; https://www dot tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/22/2955640

[5] https://www dot tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/22/2955640

[7] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/22/2955640/%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B2%D8%B1%D9%87%DB%8C-%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%88%DB%8C-%D8%B2%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B6%DB%8C%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%DA%A9%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%84%DB%8C ; https://www dot iranintl.com/en/202309136356

[8] https://www dot tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1402/06/27/2957734/%DA%A9%D9%86%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-5-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B2-%D8%A2%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D9%88%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%AD%D8%B6%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%81-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B9-%D8%AF%D9%88-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA

[9] https://www dot tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1402/06/25/2956898/%D8%AE%D9%86%D8%AB%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B2%DB%8C-%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%BA%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D9%82%D8%B2-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%DA%AF%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%B4%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%AF ; https://www dot tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1402/06/25/2957052/%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AA%DB%8C%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D9%88-%D9%85%D9%87%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AC%D9%86%DA%AF%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%88%DB%8C%D8%B1 ; https://www dot tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1402/06/24/2956696/%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%A6%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA-%DA%86%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86 ; https://www dot irna.ir/news/85229413/%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B6%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%87-%DA%AF%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%87%DA%A9%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%DA%AF%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%B4%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%AF ; https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1402/06/24/2956701/%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA...

[10] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/24/2956696 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/24/2956701 ; https://www.irna dot ir/news/85229413 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/25/2956966 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/25/2956898 ;

[11] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/26/2957190 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2023/09/17/2957363 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/22/2955761 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/22/2955640 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/04/21/2924658; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/04/20/2924321

[12] https://x.com/IranNuances/status/1703036380350238820?s=20

[13] https://x.com/IranNuances/status/1703036380350238820?s=20

[14] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/iranian-oil-cargo-seized-by-us-b... ; https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/08/us-finally-unloads-iranian-... ; https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/06/us/politics/iran-oil-sanctions-violat...

[15] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/04/29/2928597 ; https://www.irna dot ir/news/85175663

[16] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-20-2023-64b9d7... ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-august-4-2023

Thursday, September 14, 2023

Iran Update, September 14, 2023

Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Amin Soltani, and Nicholas Carl

Key Takeaways

The IRGC Quds Force and LH are trying to significantly increase their military infrastructure in Mayadin in eastern Syria. The expanding presence there in part supports the Iranian campaign to expel US forces from Syria.
Iranian-backed political actors in Iraq are preparing to coopt legal procedures and requirements to disqualify opponents in the upcoming Iraqi provincial elections in December 2023.
Iranian leaders are using a combination of military threats and foreign diplomacy to resolve three simultaneous security challenges around northwestern Iran.

Iranian Activities in the Levant

This section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout the Levant, especially in Syria. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) are trying to significantly increase their military infrastructure in Mayadin in eastern Syria. The IRGC Quds Force plans to build up its nearby Soleimani base into the largest Iranian military base abroad, according to local reports on September 13.[1] This plan involves transferring unspecified weapons from the Imam Ali base on the Iraq-Syria border to the Soleimani base. The Imam Ali base is the largest Iranian military base abroad, which the IRGC uses to house drones, missiles, and fighters.[2] CTP previously reported that the IRGC Quds force and LH established a joint headquarters in Mayadin in June 2023 and prepared a runway to support drone operations near Mayadin in August 2023.[3]

This expanding presence in Mayadin in part supports the Iranian campaign to expel US forces from Syria. CTP has reported extensively on how Iran has sought to create an increasingly hostile operating environment for US forces in Syria to this end. The buildup of military infrastructure in Mayadin is consistent with fostering this kind of environment. Mayadin is an especially noteworthy location given that it is across the river from US positions in eastern Syria.

Iranian Activities in Iraq

Iranian-backed political actors in Iraq are preparing to coopt legal procedures and requirements to disqualify opponents in the upcoming Iraqi provincial elections in December 2023. Judge Haydar Hanoun—the head of the Federal Integrity Commission and affiliated with the Iranian-backed Badr Organization—announced on September 14 that his commission will audit candidates, their families, and their affiliates for corruption ahead of the elections.[4] This announcement comes after the Shia Coordination Framework—a loose coalition of Iranian-backed political parties—approved in March 2023 legal amendments that prohibit individuals charged with corruption from running for office.[5] CTP assessed at the time that the Federal Integrity Commission could use these amendments to marginalize political opponents by charging them with corruption.[6]

Iranian Domestic and Political Affairs

This section covers factors and trends affecting regime decision-making and stability. CTP will cover domestic politics, significant protest activity, and related issues here.

Iranian leaders are using a combination of military threats and foreign diplomacy to resolve three simultaneous security challenges around northwestern Iran.

Regime security forces have deployed units to northwestern Iran in recent weeks to deter and prevent the eruption of anti-regime protests.[7] Iranian leaders have expressed concerns that protests could ignite, especially in Kurdish-majority areas in the northwest, to commemorate the one-year anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s death on September 16.[8] CTP previously assessed that the regime may violently suppress demonstrations that erupt in northwestern Iran in the coming days.[9]
Iranian leaders are negotiating with Iraqi authorities to disarm and relocate anti-Iranian regime Kurdish militias operating in Iraqi Kurdistan.[10] Iranian leaders frequently accuse these militias of fueling unrest in Iran and have warned that they would conduct attacks into Iraqi Kurdistan if Iraqi authorities do not disarm and relocate the groups by September 19.[11] Senior Iranian officials have indicated that the Iraqi central government will meet their demands, making a potential Iranian attack on Iraqi Kurdistan unlikely in the coming days.[12]
Iranian leaders have engaged Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Turkish officials in recent weeks to discuss rising tensions in the Caucasus.[13] Iranian leaders have repeatedly expressed concerns that Azerbaijan seeks to establish a land corridor that connects Azerbaijan proper, through Armenia, to its Nakhchivan enclave.[14] Such a corridor would directly connect Azerbaijan to Turkey and hamper Iranian economic access to European and Russian markets. The repeated engagements in recent days underscore Iranian leaders’ desire to diffuse tensions through diplomatic means.

[1] https://eyeofeuphrates (dot) com/ar/news/2023/09/13/9670

[2] https://www.jpost (dot) com/Middle-East/Iran-is-building-tunnels-in-Syria-near-Iraq-border-for-weapons-610501; https://twitter.com/Step_Agency/status/1171818667182645248; http://syria.tv/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%88%... https://eyeofeuphrates.com/ar/news/2023/03/20/8018 ; https://israel-alma dot org/2023/03/23/the-imam-ali-base-in-albukamal-a-central-military-anchor-in-the-iranian-corridor-to-syria-and-lebanon/

[3] https://eyeofeuphrates (dot) com/ar/news/2023/06/29/8987; https://www.syriahr.com/en/306240/

[4] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%87%D9%8A-%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B7%D9%84%D9%82-%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%84%D9%83-%D9%87%D8%B0%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%B4%D8%AD%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3-%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B8%D9%81%D9%8A%D9%86

[5] https://iq.parliament dot iq/blog/2023/03/20/%d9%85%d8%ac%d9%84%d8%b3-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%86%d9%88%d8%a7%d8%a8-%d9%8a%d8%a8%d8%a7%d8%b4%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d8%b5%d9%88%d9%8a%d8%aa-%d8%b9%d9%84%d9%89-%d9%82%d8%a7%d9%86%d9%88%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%86/

[6] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-20-2023

[7] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-11-2023 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-august-18-2023 ; https://twitter.com/HengawO/status/1692466035981455534 ; https://twitter.com/HengawO/status/1694692803798794393 ; https://twitter.com/HengawO/status/1694605358411509896 ; https://x.com/HengawO/status/1701283662644338998?s=20 ; https://x.com/HengawO/status/1701171074824565020?s=20

[8] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-12-2023 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-11-2023 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-6-2023 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-august-18-2023

[9] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-12-2023 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-11-2023

[10] https://www dot irna.ir/news/85227830/ ; https://www dot tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1402/06/22/2955761 ; https://www dot shafaq.com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA-%D9%83%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7 ; https://www dot ina.iq/193443--.html ; https://www dot tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1402/06/20/2954568 ; https://www dot irna.ir/news/85227830

[11] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/04/20/2924321/ ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/22/2955761 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/22/2955640 ; https://amwaj dot media/media-monitor/iraqi-pm-on-iran-charm-offensive-as-deadline-to-disarm-kurdish-groups-looms

[12] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-13-2023 ; https://www dot irna.ir/news/85227830/ ; https://www dot tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1402/06/22/2955761 ; https://www dot shafaq.com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA-%D9%83%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7 ; https://www dot ina.iq/193443--.html ; https://www dot tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1402/06/20/2954568 ; https://www dot irna.ir/news/85227830

[13] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2023/08/23/2945498 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2023/09/03/2951466 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2023/09/04/2951633 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2023/09/04/2951654 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2023/09/11/2954635 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/20/2954568 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2023/09/14/2956294 ; https://www.irna dot ir/news/85228379 ; https://www.farsnews dot ir/en/news/14020623000340

[14] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-24-2023 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-21-2023

Wednesday, September 13, 2023

Iran Update, September 13, 2023

Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Amin Soltani, Annika Ganzeveld, and Nicholas Carl

Key Takeaways

Pro-Syrian regime forces fired at and injured three protesters at the Baath party headquarters in Suwayda City in southern Syria. The attack could fuel popular anger toward pro-regime forces, especially Iranian-backed militias, in southern Syria in the coming days.
Senior Iranian officials continue to indicate that the Iraqi central government will address their security concerns in Iraqi Kurdistan by their September 19 deadline, making a potential Iranian attack on Iraqi Kurdistan unlikely in the coming days. Iran is nevertheless retaining the option to conduct attacks on Iraqi Kurdistan to address its concerns.
The IRGC has distributed small arms to current and former members in Saghez, Kurdistan Province in recent days to prepare for potential protests, according to Norway-based human rights organization Hengaw.

Iranian Activities in the Levant

This section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout the Levant especially in Syria. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates.

Pro-Syrian regime forces fired at and injured three protesters at the Baath party headquarters in Suwayda City in southern Syria on September 13.[1] The attack is the first well-documented instance of pro-regime forces using violence against protesters in Suwayda since the protests erupted in mid-August 2023. The attack failed to meaningfully reduce protest turnout, as protesters continued to demonstrate and even closed Baath party headquarters in other nearby towns after the attack.[2]

The attack could fuel popular anger toward pro-regime forces, especially Iranian-backed militias, in southern Syria in the coming days. A local Druze leader called for “jihad” against Iranian-backed militias in response to the shooting.[3] Protesters and other Druze sheikhs have blamed Iranian-backed militias for the crackdown as well.[4] These accusations are particularly noteworthy given that the Druze community has played a significant role in leading the current wave of protests. These accusations also follow several reports of Iranian-backed militants traveling to southern Syria in recent weeks to subvert and violently suppress the protests.[5]

Iranian Activities in Iraq

Senior Iranian officials continue to indicate that the Iraqi central government will address their security concerns in Iraqi Kurdistan by their September 19 deadline, making a potential Iranian attack into Iraqi Kurdistan unlikely in the coming days. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met with his Iraqi counterpart Fuad Hussein in Tehran on September 13 and stated afterward that Baghdad will fully implement the joint security agreement in the coming days.[6] The agreement stipulates that Iraqi authorities will disarm and relocate anti-Iranian regime Kurdish militias operating in Iraqi Kurdistan who Iranian leaders have repeatedly accused these groups of stoking unrest within Iran and especially among the Iranian Kurdish community.[7] Iranian leadership has threatened to conduct attacks into Iraqi Kurdistan if Iraqi authorities do not address Iranian security concerns by fully implementing the security agreement by September 19. Abdollahian acknowledged Iraqi and Kurdistan Regional Government efforts to remove Kurdish opposition groups from the border with Iran in a statement on September 11.[8] He later thanked Hussein during their meeting on September 13 for removing Kurdish opposition groups from the Iranian border and voiced his hope that the two countries would continue the path of diplomacy.[9]

Iran may conduct attacks into Iraqi Kurdistan if Iranian leaders conclude that the anti-regime Kurdish groups in Iraqi Kurdistan are fueling unrest within Iran. Iranian forces conducted airstrikes into the Iraqi Kurdistan region between October and November 2022 at the height of the Masha Amini protest movement to stop a perceived threat from Kurdish separatist groups fueling protests within primarily Kurdish towns in western Iran.[10] The IRGC Ground Forces deployed units, including artillery elements, to unspecified locations in northwestern Iran to promote border stability, according to Iranian state media on September 13.[11] Iranian state media framed the deployments as part of the Iranian leaders’ repeated commitment to conduct attacks into Iraqi Kurdistan if Iraqi authorities do not fully implement the security agreement.[12] Iran will not likely conduct attacks, however, because CTP has not yet observed these conditions. Planned protests in Iran to celebrate the anniversary of Masha Amini’s death on September 16 could create such conditions, however, as CTP previously assessed.[13]

Iranian Domestic and Political Affairs

This section covers factors and trends affecting regime decision-making and stability. CTP will cover domestic politics, significant protest activity, and related issues here.

The IRGC has distributed small arms to current and former members in Saghez, Kurdistan Province in recent days to prepare for potential protests, according to Norway-based human rights organization Hengaw.[14] The group previously reported that the Iranian regime recalled retired IRGC and Basij members to service ahead of the one-year anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s death on September 16.[15]Protest organizations have planned anti-regime demonstrations in Iran to commemorate the occasion. The reported security measures are consistent with CTP’s assessment that regime security forces may violently suppress protests that erupt in northwestern Iran in the coming days.[16] The regime has securitized cities in northwestern Kurdistan and West Azerbaijan provinces and sent additional military equipment to these areas in recent weeks.[17]

[1] https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid02NLneEtdpxrVN5owYjB2fpxXe... ; https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid0EaBrFuVswTjzW373EkyQCBRZH...

[2] ttps://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid0tWzNY4vASpPyCAB23wsjEfUNH6dH6CJ3s... ; https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid02PfnF7miwTk7uq8Jjoqmu4UdL... ; https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid02NsNDRdxiuXQvU38Yxgiq6xWN... ; https://www.facebook.com/alraased/posts/pfbid02UHnK5tCmqhdUDSMMdcgU5i2uw...

[3] https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/videos/821774222955471/?__cft__[0]=AZ... ; https://orient-news dot net/ar/news_show/205547

[4] https://orient-news dot net/ar/news_show/205547 https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid02X5daQEimgdtC7z8DUHemA9Fg... ; https://www.facebook.com/alraased/posts/pfbid02ZhKnYygq2nYEQzKmcLTFsSw5A...

[5] https://deirezzor24 dot net/en/the-iranian-revolutionary-guard-militia-relocates-a-huge-number-of-its-elements-outside-deir-ezzor/ ; https://eyeofeuphrates dot com/ar/news/2023/08/31/9557; https://eyeofeuphrates dot com/ar/news/2023/08/28/9537 ; https://eyeofeuphrates dot com/ar/news/2023/09/07/9616

[6] https://www dot irna.ir/news/85227830/%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%B1-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84-%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C ; https://www dot tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1402/06/22/2955761/%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B5%DB%8C-%D8%A2%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%B9-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%B2%DB%8C%D9%87-%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A8-%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%85-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%AE%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%87-%D9%BE%D8%A7%DB%8C%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D9%88%D9%85%D9%84%D9%87-%D9%88-%D8%AF%D9%85%D9%88%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%B2-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82 ; https://www dot shafaq.com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA-%D9%83%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7 ; https://www dot ina.iq/193443--.html

[7] https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/04/world/middleeast/iran-kurds-iraq.html ; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/21/iran-attacks-positions-in-nort... ; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/13/missiles-hit-iraqs-kurdish-capi... ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraq-starts-relocating-iranian... ; https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9

[8] https://www dot tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1402/06/20/2954568/%DA%A9%D9%86%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%A2%D8%B0%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D9%87%D8%B3%D8%AA%DB%8C%D9%85-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%B9-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D9%86%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%AF-%D8%B4%D8%AF ; https://www dot irna.ir/news/85225289/%D9%BE%DB%8C%D8%BA%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A8%D8%A7%DA%A9%D9%88-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%B5%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D9%87-%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%85

[9] https://www dot irna.ir/news/85227830/%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%B1-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84-%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C

[11] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/22/2955761 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/22/2955640

[12] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/04/20/2924321/ ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/22/2955761 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/22/2955640 ; https://amwaj dot media/media-monitor/iraqi-pm-on-iran-charm-offensive-as-deadline-to-disarm-kurdish-groups-looms

[13] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-12-2023 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-6-2023 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-25-2023

[14] https://twitter.com/HengawO/status/1701866499302912086

[15] https://twitter.com/HengawO/status/1701554944124317828

[16] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-12-2023

[17] https://twitter.com/HengawO/status/1694692803798794393 ;

https://twitter.com/HengawO/status/1692466035981455534