Pages

Monday, July 31, 2023

Iran Update, July 31, 2023

Johanna Moore, Karolina Hird, and Nicholas Carl

The Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates Monday through Friday. To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) with support from the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute launched a new interactive map of Iran and the Middle East. The map depicts events in Iran that affect the stability of the Iranian regime, namely anti-regime protests and reported poisoning incidents. It also shows developments in Syria that jeopardize regional stability and pose threats to US forces and interests, including Iranian and Iranian-backed militia positions.

Key Takeaways

  1. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Russia is not seeking a confrontation with the United States in Syria but is prepared for “any scenario,” likely to deflect accountability in the event of an escalation between US and Russian forces in Syria. Putin’s comments suggests that Russian aggression in Syria will continue but does not indicate whether the activity will escalate further.
  2. Iran hosted a delegation of senior Syrian officials in Tehran on July 31 as part of an effort to expand its economic and political relationships with Bashar al Assad’s regime.
  3. Iran and Belarus are discussing deepening bilateral military cooperation over the backdrop of their mutual support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine. They may have discussed establishing Shahed kamikaze drone factories in Belarus to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
  4. Iran has exported a record high of around one million barrels of oil per day (bpd) to China since January 2023, which reflects deepening the economic cooperation between the two countries.

Iranian Activities in the Levant

This section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout the Levant especially in Syria. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates.

Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Russia is not seeking a confrontation with the United States in Syria but is prepared for “any scenario,” likely to deflect accountability in the event of an escalation between US and Russian forces in Syria.[1] CTP previously assessed that Russia, Syria, and Iran are coordinating military activity as part of a coercive campaign to expel the US from Syria.[2] Russian officials have repeated false claims that US aircraft have violated Russian airspace in Syria in conjunction with an increase in Russia’s violations of US airspace and aggressive maneuvers endangering US aircraft in Syria. Russian Deputy Head of the Reconciliation Center for Warring Parties in Syria Oleg Gurinov claimed on July 29 that US aircraft have dangerously approached Russian aircraft in Syria 23 times since January 2023.[3] He also claimed that US aircraft have locked weapons systems on Russian aircraft 11 of those 23 times, causing Russian jets to deploy flares. Putin’s comments suggests that Russian aggression in Syria will continue but does not indicate whether the activity will escalate further.

Iran hosted a delegation of senior Syrian officials in Tehran on July 31 as part of an effort to expand its economic and political relationships with Bashar al Assad’s regime. The delegation included Foreign Affairs Minister Faisal Mekdad and Economy and Foreign Trade Minister Mohammad Samer al Khalil.[4] Iranian officials met with Mekdad and Samer al Khalil to follow up on Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s visit to Damascus in May 2023, during which he signed 15 cooperative agreements on energy, trade, and transportation ties.[5] Raisi’s visit was the first trip an Iranian president had made to Syria since the start of the civil war in 2011.

Iranian leaders seek to achieve several effects in expanding economic and political cooperation with the Assad regime.

  • Expanding economic interaction and trade with the Assad regime will help Iranian leaders revitalize their own economy, especially if Arab states send investment and reconstruction funds to Syria. An influx of cash and financial resources into Syria will create opportunities for Iran to circumvent sanctions and leech funds from the Syrian economy. Such circumstances would also empower Iran to send more funds to its proxy and partner militias throughout Syria, further reinforcing its military presence.
  • The regime seeks to secure an unbroken rail line from Iran, through Iraq, to Syria and Lebanon to facilitate trade with and additional material support to the Assad regime, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Palestinian militias. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian stated that the parties addressed removing obstacles to this transportation link during the visit.[6]
  • The Raisi administration used the Syrian delegation’s visit to present a unified front against the presence of US and Turkish forces in Syria. Abdollahian and Mekdad condemned the presence of these forces in a joint conference on July 31.[7] CTP has closely followed coordinated efforts between Iran, Russia, and Assad to pressure the US to leave Syria since June 2023.[8]

Iranian Domestic and Political Affairs

This section covers factors and trends affecting regime decision-making and stability. CTP will cover domestic politics, significant protest activity, and related issues here.

Iran and Belarus are discussing deepening bilateral military cooperation over the backdrop of their mutual support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Gharaei Ashtiani hosted and signed a military cooperation agreement with his Belarusian counterpart, Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin, in Tehran on July 31.[9] They may have discussed establishing Shahed kamikaze drone factories in Belarus to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Ukraine claimed that Iranian engineers traveled to Belarus in May 2023 to modify local factories to produce these drones for Russia.[10]

Iran exported a record high of around one million barrels of oil per day (bpd) to China since January 2023, which reflects deepening economic cooperation between the two countries.[11] Iranian oil exports to China have steadily risen since 2020, when Iran was selling around 325,000 bpd. These growing sales are part of the larger Iranian effort to strengthen strategic partnerships with other revisionist states, such as China and Russia, which CTP continues to assess and cover extensively in these updates. Iranian leaders seek such cooperation with these states to push back against US global influence and build a multipolar world order. Iran joining the Chinese-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization on July 4 is similarly part of this effort.[12]

Iran could derive several benefits from increasing energy sales to China.

  • Iranian leaders will likely use the increasing oil exports to help buoy their deteriorating economy and circumvent US sanctions. The Iranian regime relies heavily on energy sales to generate revenue and finance its annual budget. US sanctions have dramatically limited such sales since 2019, however.[13]
  • Iranian leaders may obtain Chinese support in developing domestic infrastructure in exchange for some oil sales. An Iranian transportation official announced on July 8 that Iran is conducting preliminary negotiations involving China constructing roads connecting Tehran to the Caspian Sea in exchange for Iranian oil.[14] Developing this infrastructure would support the larger Iranian effort of developing the country into a regional and international transportation corridor.

[1] https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-753036

[2] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-20-2023-64b9d7ab38bc6

[3] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/18403741

[4] www.irna dot ir/news/85186070

[5] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-updates-may-3-2023

[6] www.irna dot ir/news/85186070

[7] www.irna dot ir/news/85186070

[8] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-28-2023

[9] http://www.defapress dot ir/fa/news/607168

[10] https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-742605

[11] https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/487358

[12] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-5-2023

[13] https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/24/us/politics/iran-sanctions.html

[14] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-7-2023

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 31, 2023

 Karolina Hird, George Barros, Grace Mappes, and Mason Clark

July 31, 2023, 5:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:00pm ET on July 31. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 1 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Wagner Group may be supplanting the Russian military as the Belarusian military’s key training partner. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on July 30 that Wagner personnel conducted company-level training with unspecified elements of multiple Belarusian mechanized brigades.[1] The training included tactical maneuver for dismounted infantry and focused on force concealment from enemy UAVs and coordination between companies, platoons, and squads.[2] The training also reportedly featured Belarusian infantry conducting a combined arms assault with tank and artillery support.[3] The Wagner Group’s new role in Belarusian company-level training is notable. The Belarusian military typically conducts such exercises with Russian trainers and relies on Russian planners for any multi-brigade exercises, which ISW has not yet observed Wagner Group participating in. ISW previously observed Wagner personnel training with a Belarusian airborne brigade that historically trains with the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division and forecasted that the Wagner Group may seek to supplant legacy Russian–Belarusian unit relationships.[4]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) likely succeeded in recruiting an unknown number of Wagner personnel following Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s failed rebellion, though Prigozhin reportedly ordered remaining Wagner fighters to assemble in Belarus by August 5. Prigozhin announced on July 30 that “unfortunately a few [Wagner personnel] agreed to transfer from the Wagner Group” and joined other unspecified Russian security services — likely the Russian MoD).[5] Prigozhin thanked former Wagner personnel for their service, stated that neither he nor Wagner’s Council of Commanders banned Wagner personnel from joining different Russian “security structures,” and expressed hope that the departed Wagner members would “keep in touch” so that they can rejoin Wagner should there ever arrive a time when the Wagner Group must reform a force.[6] Prigozhin also reiterated known details about how the Wagner Group will continue to train Belarusian forces and operate in Africa.[7] The Ukrainian Resistance Center also noted on July 31 that Prigozhin ordered all Wagner personnel currently on rest and recuperation to arrive at Wagner’s field camps in Belarus no later than August 5 to attend unspecified events that Prigozhin will personally lead on August 5.[8] Prigozhin stated that most Wagner fighters are on “vacation” as of July 30.[9]

Prigozhin stated that the Wagner Group stopped recruiting in Russia and claimed that the Wagner Group does not need to recruit more personnel and has sufficient reserves. Prigozhin stated on July 30 that Wagner has sufficient personnel and does not plan to conduct another recruitment drive until it needs more fighters.[10] A Wagner recruitment Telegram page announced on July 30 that Wagner is indefinitely suspending regional recruitment centers in Russia due to Wagner having sufficient reserves.[11] The exact reason the Wagner Group suspended recruitment is unclear, however. The Wagner Group was reportedly still recruiting fighters from across Russia as of early July 2023.[12] The Kremlin may have recently banned the Wagner Group from recruiting within Russia, and Prigozhin may simply be attempting to save face by claiming he voluntarily suspended recruitment efforts. ISW cannot independently confirm the Wagner Group’s current strength or depth of reserves.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu made largely boilerplate comments framing the Russian state as adequately supporting long-term force-generation efforts and meeting Russian weapons demand through domestic production and international cooperation.[13] Shoigu claimed that over 15,000 students enrolled at Russian military universities for the coming school year, 10 percent of whom have combat experience fighting in Ukraine. Shoigu announced the resumption of instruction at the Donetsk Higher Combined Arms Command School in occupied Donetsk, one of the combined arms academies the Russian military requires officers to attend before commanding at the brigade or regiment level. Shoigu also reiterated positive rhetoric about the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and actively seeking international military-technical cooperation to support the war effort. Shoigu stated that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) will sign contracts worth over 433 billion rubles (roughly $4.7 billion) with defense enterprises at the Army-2023 international military-technical forum. The claimed overall value of these contracts is at least 13.4 percent less than the over 500 billion ruble (roughly $5.45 billion) value of contracts the MoD signed at the Army-2022 and 2021 forums but a substantial increase over the 2020, 2019, 2018, 2017, and 2016 forums, the overall contract values of which were roughly 1.16 trillion rubles ($17.4 billion), 1.03 trillion ($10.9 billion), 130 billion ($1.4 billion), 170 billion ($1.8 billion), and 130 billion, respectively.[14] Shoigu stated that Russia invited the heads of over 108 defense departments to attend the Army-2023 forum.[15]

Imagery posted on July 30 and 31 visually confirms damage to the Chonhar Bridge following a Ukrainian strike on July 29. Satellite imagery posted on July 30 reportedly shows damage to the Chonhar railway bridge.[16] Social media sources additionally circulated an image taken by someone standing on the bridge itself reportedly showing damage to the railway bridge.[17] One source speculated that the pictures taken from the bridge do not match the location of the damage as shown on available satellite imagery, which suggests that the full extent of the damage to the bridge is still unclear.[18] Russian milbloggers maintained their silence on damage to the Chonhar Bridge on July 31, possibly supporting ISW’s previous assessment that the Kremlin may have directed Russian commentators to refrain from covering the strike in an effort to exert greater control of the information space.[19]

Kremlin-appointed Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova confirmed on July 31 that Russia has transferred 4.8 million Ukrainians, including over 700,000 children, to the Russian Federation since the beginning of the war.[20] In a report on the activities “authorized by the President of the Russian Federation for children’s rights” in 2022, Lvova-Belova claimed that Russia has “received” 4.8 million Ukrainians since February 2022 and noted that the vast majority of the 700,000 children who arrived to Russia did not have parental or guardian supervision.[21] The report carefully frames these activities as humanitarian gestures of goodwill. International humanitarian law, however, defines the forced transfer of civilians to the territory of an occupying power as “deportation.” And the circumstances of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the situation in occupied territories are likely sufficiently coercive to mean that most “transfers” of Ukrainian civilians to Russia meet the threshold of forced deportation, which is prohibited under Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, regardless of Russia’s claimed motive.[22] ISW continues to assess that Russian authorities are conducting a large-scale campaign to deport Ukrainians to the Russian Federation.[23]

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 31. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued attacking northwest and southwest of Bakhmut, in the western Donetsk–eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[24] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that over the past week, Ukrainian forces liberated an additional 2 square kilometers of territory in the Bakhmut area and 12.6 square kilometers in the Berdyansk (western Donetsk–eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area) and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[25]

Iran and Belarus are deepening bilateral cooperation over the backdrop of their mutual support for Russia’s war in Ukraine. Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin arrived in Iran on July 31 and met with his counterpart, Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani, to sign a Memorandum of Understanding and a bilateral military cooperation plan for 2023.[26] Ashtiani is primarily responsible for negotiating military acquisitions and sales in his role as Iranian Defense Minister, so Khrenin and Ashtiani likely discussed arms deals during their meeting. Belarus may have also been seeking to secure an agreement on Iranian production of Shahed drones on the territory of Belarus following initial reports that Iran was seeking to convert a plant in Belarus’ Gomel Oblast into a Shahed production plant.[27]

Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak stated on July 30 that Kyiv and Washington will begin consultations on providing Ukraine “security guarantees” as soon as the week of August 6 – 13. Yermak stated that the security guarantees for Ukraine — including “concrete and long-term commitments that will ensure Ukraine's ability to win now and deter Russian aggression in the future” — will cover the period before Ukraine acquires NATO membership.[28] Yermak described the security guarantees as an “important prerequisite” for Ukraine’s recovery and noted that the security guarantees include financial support for Ukraine and sanctions and punitive measures against Russia.[29]

Key Takeaways:

  • The Wagner Group may be supplanting the Russian military as the Belarusian military’s key training partner.
  • The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) likely succeeded in recruiting an unknown number of Wagner personnel following Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s failed rebellion, though Prigozhin ordered remaining Wagner fighters to assemble in Belarus by August 5.
  • Prigozhin stated that the Wagner Group stopped recruiting in Russia and claimed that the Wagner Group does not need to recruit more personnel and has sufficient reserves.
  • Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu made largely boilerplate comments framing the Russian state as adequately supporting long-term force generation efforts and meeting Russian weapons demand through domestic production and international cooperation.
  • Imagery posted on July 30 and 31 visually confirms damage to the Chonhar Bridge following a Ukrainian strike on July 29.
  • Kremlin-appointed Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova confirmed on July 31 that Russia has transferred 4.8 million Ukrainians, including over 700,000 children, to the Russian Federation since the beginning of the war, very likely violating the Fourth Geneva Convention.
  • Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 31.
  • Iran and Belarus are deepening bilateral cooperation over the backdrop of their mutual support for Russia’s war in Ukraine.
  • Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak stated on July 30 that Kyiv and Washington will begin consultations on providing Ukraine “security guarantees” as soon as the week of August 6 – 13.
  • Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna and Avdiivka-Donetsk City lines and made claimed gains in Luhansk Oblast.
  • Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut.
  • Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Donetsk and western Zaporizhia oblasts.
  • Russian forces conducted limited counterattacks in western Donetsk and western Zaporizhia oblasts.
  • Russian President Vladimir Putin ratified a law on July 31 increasing the fine for mobilized personnel’s or conscripts' failure to arrive at a military registration office after being summoned.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Svatove on July 31 and made unconfirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful offensive operations east of Berestove (20km northwest of Svatove) and near Novoselivske (14km northwest of Svatove).[30] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Russian forces attempted to advance south of Novoselivske and push Ukrainian troops across the Oskil River, which runs west of Svatove.[31] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces took up more advantageous positions near Kuzemivka (13km northwest of Svatove).[32] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced up to the shoreline of the Oksil River, and other milbloggers reported heavy fighting is ongoing near Novoselivske, Novoyehorivka (15km southwest of Svatove), and Nadiia (13km southwest of Svatove).[33]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted an unsuccessful attack near Novoselivske on July 31.[34]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Kreminna on July 31 and made unconfirmed gains. The Russian Center Grouping of Forces spokesperson claimed that Russian forces captured eight Ukrainian strongholds on the borders of Raihorodka (35km northwest of Kreminna) and Chervonopopivka (5km northwest of Kreminna).[35] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in the Serebryanske forest area (southwest of Kreminna) towards Lyman.[36] A Russian milblogger also reported that Russian forces tried to attack towards Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna) from the southeast but were unsuccessful.[37]

Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces conducted several unsuccessful counterattacks west and south of Kreminna on July 31. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian troops repelled attempted Ukrainian attacks near Kreminna itself, Kuzmyne (2km southwest of Kreminna), Bilohorivka, Berestove (30km south of Kreminna), and Spirne (25km south of Kreminna).[38] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian troops unsuccessfully counterattacked in the Serebryanske forest area, and one Russian source noted that Ukrainian forces stabilized the line of defense near Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna) after deploying reserves to the area.[39]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut on July 31 and did not make any confirmed or claimed gains. Russian milbloggers reported that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks northwest of Bakhmut near Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km northwest) and that heavy battles continue southwest of Bakhmut near Andriivka (9km southwest) and Klishchiivka (6km southwest).[40] Russian sources indicated that elements of the 11st Guards Air Assault (VDV) Brigade and 4th Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Brigade are fighting in the Bakhmut area.[41]

Russian forces did not conduct any claimed or confirmed ground attack in the Bakhmut area on July 31.

Russian forces conducted ground attacks southwest of Donetsk City on July 31 and did not make any claimed or confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops unsuccessfully attacked near Marinka and Pobieda (both on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City).[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted assault operations within Marinka but were unsuccessful.[43]

Ukrainian forces did not conduct any claimed or confirmed ground attacks along the Avdiivka–Donetsk City line on July 31.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations along the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and reportedly made marginal advances on July 31. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources reported that Russian forces, including the 247th Airborne (VDV) Division, repelled Ukrainian ground attacks near Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[44] Some Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Staromayorske is contested while other milbloggers conceded that Ukrainian forces control the settlement.[45] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces withdrew to positions on the north (left) bank of the Mokryi Yaly River south of Staromayorske to defend against Ukrainian advances further south, and that Ukrainian forces advanced near Pryyutne (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting is ongoing near the T0518 Urozhaine-Velyka Novosilka highway and that the Donetsk People‘s Republic (DNR) “Kaskad” Operational Tactical Combat Formation is defending near Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[47] One Russian milblogger expressed concern about Russia’s ability to defend Urozhaine and assessed that Ukrainian forces will capture the settlement within the next three days.[48]

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Donetsk–Zaporizhia Oblast border area and may have made marginal advances on July 31. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces conducted counterattacks near Staromayorske and recaptured lost positions in the area.[49] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled the Russian attacks, however.[50]

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced on July 31. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces made unspecified advances in the Mala Tokmachka (6km southeast of Orikhiv) and Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) directions.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled a limited mechanized Ukrainian attack near Robotyne and a smaller ground attack on the Pyatykhatky-Zherebyanky line (23–26km southwest of Orikhiv).[52]

Russian forces conducted an Iskander-M missile strike against a residential area in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on July 31. Ukrainian officials reported that one Russian missile struck a multi-story school building, and a second missile struck a high-rise residential building.[53] Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes killed six civilians, including one child, and injured over 75.[54]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian President Vladimir Putin ratified a law on July 31 increasing the fine for failure to arrive at a military registration office after being summoned for mobilized personnel or conscripts.[55] The law increases the previous fines, which ranged from 500 to 3,000 rubles ($5 to $32), to a flat 30,000 ruble fine ($327).[56] The law also introduces new fines of 400,000 – 500,000 rubles ($4,360 – $6,540) and 60,000 – 80,000 rubles ($654 – $872) for legal entities and Russian government officials, respectively, which fail to submit military registration lists to recruiters.[57]

Republic of Bashkortostan Governor Radiy Khabirov announced on July 31 that authorities in Bashkortostan are forming another volunteer battalion — the “Almaz Safin Battalion.”[58] Khabirov did not specify the battalion’s planned specialized role or end strength, benefits for its members, or the timeline for its formation. Once formed, the Almaz Safin Battalion will be Bashkortostan’s seventh volunteer battalion.[59]

Russian authorities have reportedly mobilized 55,000 – 60,000 residents in Russian-occupied Crimea since early 2022. Representative of the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Andriy Chernyak stated on July 30 that Russian authorities have mobilized 55,000 – 60,000 men from occupied Crimea since the beginning of 2022.[60] Chernyak stated that Russian authorities deployed many of these mobilized men to frontlines in Ukraine despite telling them that they would serve in rear areas on the second or third line.[61]

Russian civilians reportedly continue conducting arson attacks against Russian military registration and enlistment offices in Russia and occupied Ukraine. Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) reported on July 31 that a Russian pensioner attempted an arson attack against a military registration and enlistment office in Severodvinsk, Arkhangelsk Oblast, on July 29.[62] Russian media aggregator Baza reported that residents in Kazan and occupied Feodosia, Crimea, attempted to set fire to Russian enlistment offices in their respective cities on July 29.[63]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian authorities continue integrating occupation legal, economic, and infrastructure structures in occupied Ukraine into Russian federal structures. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law regulating the appellate courts of the occupation administrations of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, Crimea, and the city of Sevastopol.[64] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration reported that the (occupation) Kherson Oblast Industrial Development Fund and Moscow Industry and Entrepreneurship Support Fund signed an agreement on agricultural and industrial integration, further expanding the occupation administration’s connections with Russian federal subjects.[65] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian authorities laid cables to connect communications and internet in occupied Mylove, Luhansk Oblast to Russian communications services.[66]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

See topline text.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.


[1] https://t.me/modmilby/30182 ; https://t.me/modmilby/30183 ; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/2574

[2] https://t.me/modmilby/30182 ; https://t.me/modmilby/30183 ; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/2574

[3] https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/2574

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-21-2023

[5] https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/9251; https://newsfrol dot ru/24/12086/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-9-2023

[6] https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/9251; https://newsfrol dot ru/24/12086/;

[7] https://newsfrol.ru/24/12086/

[8] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/prygozhyn-vidklykaye-vsih-vagnerivtsiv-z-vidpustok/

[9] https://t.me/grey_zone/19764

[10] https://t.me/grey_zone/19764

[11] https://t.me/wagner_employment/88

[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-9-2023

[13] https://telegra dot ph/Vstupitelnoe-slovo-Ministra-oborony-RF-generala-armii-Sergeya-SHojgu-na-tematicheskom-selektornom-soveshchanii-s-rukovodyashchim-07-31; https://t.me/mod_russia/28795

[14] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/articles/2022/08/16/936285-ministerstvo-oboroni-podpisalo-29-kontraktov-na-summu-bolee-500-mlrd-rublei; https://tass dot ru/info/15466265; https://iz dot ru/1211783/2021-08-24/minoborony-na-forume-armiia-2021-zakliuchilo-kontrakty-na-500-mlrd-rublei; https://ria dot ru/20210824/kontrakty-1747026116.html; https://www.militarynews dot ru/story.asp?rid=0&nid=555921&lang=RU; https://mil dot ru/departament_informashion_system/news/more.htm?id=12380756@egNews

[15] https://telegra dot ph/Vstupitelnoe-slovo-Ministra-oborony-RF-generala-armii-Sergeya-SHojgu-na-tematicheskom-selektornom-soveshchanii-s-rukovodyashchim-07-31; https://t.me/mod_russia/28795

[16] https://twitter.com/hwtnv/status/1685701259771482112

[17] https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1685707894476435456?s=20; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1686000671974174720?s=20; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1686003663519551489?s=20; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/3485; https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/28297; https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/28296; https://t.me/istories_media/3222 ; https://twitter.com/hwtnv/status/1685702501507751936?s=20

[18] https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1685707894476435456?s=20; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1686000671974174720?s=20; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1686003663519551489?s=20; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/3485; https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/28297; https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/28296

[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar073023

[20] http://www.deti.gov dot ru/detigray/upload/documents/July2023/7JkHUTqLIsZL45JDp4Xl.pdf; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/30/07/2023/64c6c3119a794777ebcc7766?from=newsfeed

[21] http://www.deti.gov dot ru/detigray/upload/documents/July2023/7JkHUTqLIsZL45JDp4Xl.pdf

[22] https://guide-humanitarian-law.org/content/article/3/deportation-1/

[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070323; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011223; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012823; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020623; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021623

[24] https://t.me/readovkanews/63479; https://t.me/readovkanews/63489; https://t.me/dva_majors/22505; https://t.me/wargonzo/14112; https://t.me/rybar/50274; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/50323; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/93648; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/50292; https://t.me/multi_XAM/606; https://t.me/kommunist/17975; https://t.me/romanov_92/40789; https://t.me/rybar/50271; https://t.me/readovkanews/63480https://t.me/RVvoenkor/50330

[25] https://t.me/annamaliar/978

[26] https://t.me/modmilby/30203 ; https://t.me/modmilby/30210 ; https://t.me/modmilby/30222

[27] https://www.jpost dot com/international/article-723386; https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-742605

[28] https://t.me/ermaka2022/3328

[29] https://t.me/ermaka2022/3328

[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mZsPtqLFW5TzKtu2iJV8KEFsoxi7k7cbuignZYyAZekuuL8mzSU9dv9MAGnyzUCVl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08XhzALxQ4pQqzqcsFMC1R5Q1YhvR6EBFiTAS4caXGSon5EEacXjb6xWsmYdSS4Cnl

[31] https://t.me/annamaliar/978

[32] https://t.me/mod_russia/28809

[33] https://t.me/multi_XAM/606; https://t.me/wargonzo/14112

[34] https://t.me/mod_russia/28809

[35] https://t.me/mod_russia/28768

[36] https://t.me/readovkanews/63479; https://t.me/readovkanews/63489; https://t.me/btr80/9284; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/93660

[37] https://t.me/wargonzo/14112

[38] https://t.me/mod_russia/28809

[39] https://t.me/multi_XAM/606; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/50285

[40] https://t.me/readovkanews/63479; https://t.me/readovkanews/63489; https://t.me/dva_majors/22505; https://t.me/wargonzo/14112; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/37481

[41] https://t.me/readovkanews/63493; https://t.me/sons_fatherland/10815

[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08XhzALxQ4pQqzqcsFMC1R5Q1YhvR6EBFiTAS4caXGSon5EEacXjb6xWsmYdSS4Cnl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mZsPtqLFW5TzKtu2iJV8KEFsoxi7k7cbuignZYyAZekuuL8mzSU9dv9MAGnyzUCVl

[43] https://t.me/wargonzo/14112

[44] https://t.me/mod_russia/28809; https://t.me/rybar/50274; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/50292; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/50323; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/93648; https://t.me/rusich_army/10184; https://t.me/romanov_92/40789; https://t.me/kommunist/17975; https://t.me/wargonzo/14125

[45] https://t.me/rybar/50274; https://t.me/dva_majors/22505; https://t.me/romanov_92/40789; https://t.me/batalyon15/2466

[46] https://t.me/multi_XAM/606

[47] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/50292; https://t.me/readovkanews/63489 ; https://t.me/kommunist/17975; https://t.me/wargonzo/14125

[48] https://t.me/romanov_92/40789

[49] https://t.me/wargonzo/14112; https://t.me/batalyon15/2460; https://t.me/kommunist/17975; https://t.me/readovkanews/63489; https://t.me/batalyon15/2466

[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mZsPtqLFW5TzKtu2iJV8KEFsoxi7k7cbuignZYyAZekuuL8mzSU9dv9MAGnyzUCVl

[51] https://t.me/annamaliar/978

[52] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/50330; https://t.me/readovkanews/63479; https://t.me/rybar/50271

[53] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/6347; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/6356; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/7219; . https://t.me/Klymenko_MVS/142 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/93655; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/93653; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/07/31/rossiyskie-voyska-atakovali-krivoy-rog-rakety-popali-v-universitet-i-zhiloy-dom; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/7216

[54] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/6347; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/6356; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/7219;

[55] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/news/2023/07/31/987776-putin-utverdil-uvelichenie-shtrafa; https://t.me/readovkanews/63504; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/14377

[56] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/news/2023/07/31/987776-putin-utverdil-uvelichenie-shtrafa

[57] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/news/2023/07/31/987776-putin-utverdil-uvelichenie-shtrafa; https://t.me/readovkanews/63504; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/14377

[58] https://t.me/idelrealii/29353 ; https://gorobzor dot ru/novosti/obschestvo/184480-chto-izvestno-ob-almaze-safine-v-chest-kotorogo-nazovut-novyy-bashkirskiy-batalon; https://gorobzor dot ru/novosti/obschestvo/184477-v-bashkirii-sozdadut-esche-odin-dobrovolcheskiy-batalon-imeni-almaza-safina; https://www.bashinform dot ru/news/svo/2023-07-31/v-bashkirii-novomu-dobrovolcheskomu-batalonu-budet-prisvoeno-imya-geroya-rossii-almaza-safina-3365499; https://bash dot news/news/206774-v-baskirii-novyi-dobrovolceskii-batalyon-budet-nosit-imia-geroia-rossii-almaza-safina; https://resbash dot ru/news/Vremya%20geroev/2023-07-31/v-bashkirii-budet-sformirovan-eschyo-odin-dobrovolcheskiy-batalon-dlya-svo-imeni-almaza-safina-3365675

[59] https://www.idelreal.org/a/32527394.html

[60] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SCKlp9-trgU&ab_channel=%D0%A0%D0%B0%D0%B4%D1%96%D0%BE%D0%A1%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B0; https://gur.gov dot ua/content/na-okupovanykh-terytoriiakh-ukrainy-rosiia-prymusovo-mobilizuvala-blyzko-60-000-cholovikiv-andrii-cherniak.html; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/07/31/razvedka-ukrainy-s-nachala-vtorzheniya-60-tysyach-zhiteley-anneksirovannyh-territoriy-prinuditelno-mobilizovali-v-rossiyskuyu-armiyu

[61] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SCKlp9-trgU&ab_channel=%D0%A0%D0%B0%D0%B4%D1%96%D0%BE%D0%A1%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B0; https://gur.gov dot ua/content/na-okupovanykh-terytoriiakh-ukrainy-rosiia-prymusovo-mobilizuvala-blyzko-60-000-cholovikiv-andrii-cherniak.html; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/07/31/razvedka-ukrainy-s-nachala-vtorzheniya-60-tysyach-zhiteley-anneksirovannyh-territoriy-prinuditelno-mobilizovali-v-rossiyskuyu-armiyu

[62] https://t.me/severrealii/18858

[63] https://t.me/bazabazon/20054; https://t.me/bazabazon/20049

[64] https://crimea-news dot com/society/2023/07/31/1144100.html; https://t.me/readovkanews/63507

[65] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/11547

[66] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08XhzALxQ4pQqzqcsFMC1R5Q1YhvR6EBFiTAS4caXGSon5EEacXjb6xWsmYdSS4Cnl

Sunday, July 30, 2023

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 30, 2023

 Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan

July 30, 2023, 4:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:30pm ET on July 30. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 31 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The lack of Russian milblogger reaction to a Ukrainian strike on the Chonhar bridge represents a notable inflection in Russian reporting on the war in Ukraine and may suggest that the Kremlin has directed Russian milbloggers to refrain from covering certain topics. The Ukrainian Armed Forces announced on July 29 that Ukrainian forces successfully struck the Chonhar bridge on the M-18 (Dzhankoi-Melitopol) highway between occupied Crimea and occupied Kherson Oblast.[1] ISW has not observed any Russian milblogger discussion about the Ukrainian strike or Russian milbloggers promoting Kherson Oblast occupation administration head Vladimir Saldo’s claim that Russian forces intercepted 12 Ukrainian Strom Shadow cruise missiles targeting the bridge.[2] The only other Russian source to comment on the strikes was a local Russian news Telegram channel, which amplified alleged claims from Russian tourists in the area about the bridge being closed to traffic.[3] Russian milbloggers responded to a Ukrainian strike on the Chonhar bridge on June 22 with widespread outrage and concern, and Russian milbloggers routinely comment on both successful and allegedly unsuccessful Ukrainian strikes on Russian logistics.[4] The Chonhar bridge is a notable bottleneck along a critical Russian ground line of communication (GLOC), and it is highly unlikely that Russian milbloggers would voluntarily ignore a successful or unsuccessful Ukrainian strike on the bridge. ISW has previously assessed that select Russian milbloggers may be shaping their coverage of the war in Ukraine in ways more favorable to Kremlin narratives out of fear of Kremlin punishment following the removal of prominent critical voices in the Russian information space, particularly pro-war critic Igor Girkin and Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin.[5] General fear of Kremlin punishment would not likely result in such near-universal lack of coverage of a dramatic event, however, and it is more likely that a specific Kremlin directive not to cover disruptions to critical GLOCs caused this lack of reporting.

Russian President Vladimir Putin disingenuously framed the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive as inhibiting prospects for negotiations. During a press conference at the Russia-Africa Summit on July 29, Putin accused Ukraine of launching a large-scale offensive so that Russia cannot discuss a ceasefire while its troops are defending against Ukrainian attacks.[6] Russian officials have previously weaponized the mention of negotiations in order to accuse Ukraine of being the party unwilling to enter into negotiations discussions, and Putin is likely using discussions of the Ukrainian counteroffensive to undermine reports of Ukrainian battlefield successes and accuse Ukraine of continued lack of interest in a potential negotiations process.[7] Russian forces have been conducting their own attacks in Luhansk and around Donetsk City almost continuously since before the Ukrainian counter-offensive began, moreover, a fact that Putin did not, naturally, mention.  Putin also notably lauded the work of Central Military district Commander Lieutenant General Andrey Mordvichev for repelling Ukrainian attacks and securing advances, likely in Luhansk Oblast.[8]

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and made claimed advances in some areas. Ukrainian military sources reported that Ukrainian forces are achieving small successes on the southern flank of Bakhmut and are gradually advancing in the Berdyansk (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area) and Melitopol (in western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[9]  

Key Takeaways:

  • The lack of Russian milblogger reaction to a Ukrainian strike on the Chonhar bridge represents a notable inflection in Russian reporting on the war in Ukraine and may suggest that the Kremlin has directed Russian milbloggers to refrain from covering certain topics.
  • Russian President Vladimir Putin disingenuously framed the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive as inhibiting prospects for negotiations.
  • Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and made claimed advances in some areas.
  • Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Svatove-Kremina and Avdiivka-Donetsk City lines and did not make any confirmed gains in these areas.
  • Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations southwest and northwest of Bakhmut and made claimed gains in this direction.
  • Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast and western Zaporizhia Oblast and made claimed marginal advances.
  • Russian sources claimed that Russian forces counterattacked and regained lost positions in western Donetsk and western Zaporizhia oblasts.
  • Russian sources claimed that Russian officials plan to regulate civilian volunteers who take supplies to Russian forces in Ukraine.
  • Ukrainian partisans reportedly sabotaged Russian military equipment in occupied Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast on July 29.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast) 

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line on July 30 but did not make confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations east of Berestove (20km northwest of Svatove) and near Novoyehorivka (16km southwest of Svatove) and Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[10] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported that there were seven combat engagements along the Svatove-Kreminna line and that Russian forces are trying to gain the initiative in the area.[11] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces continued offensive operations in the direction of Novoselivske (16km northwest of Svatove) and advanced 300m into Ukrainian defenses.[12] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have established a bridgehead on the west (right) bank of the Zherebets River near Karmazynivka (13km southwest of Svatove) and advanced along a front 8km wide and 7km in depth in the area in the past week.[13] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces are degrading Ukrainian defenses in the Serebryanske forest area south of Kreminna and near Torske (14km west of Kreminna), although he acknowledged that Russian forces are currently not able to launch significant attempts to capture Torske.[14] Russian sources claimed that elements of the 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army, Western Military District) are participating in ongoing Russian offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line.[15]

A Ukrainian official suggested that the increased Russian offensive activity along the Svatove-Kreminna line is a part of a prepared major offensive operation. Cherevaty stated on July 29 that Russian forces planned to conduct a “strategic” operation in the Kupyansk direction this summer and consider it a “major offensive.”[16] Cherevaty stated that Russian forces deployed a considerable amount of poorly trained personnel to the area for this effort.[17] Cherevaty added that Russian forces are relying on available infantry, Russian Airborne (VDV), and BARS (Russian Combat Reserves) formations and units as well as paramilitary companies (PMCs) like ”Veterany” and ”Tigr“ and unspecified Chechen ”Akhmat“ forces to conduct this offensive effort.[18]  Russian forces have only made limited gains since increasing offensive activity in the area, and ISW has not observed visual confirmation of recent Russian claims of extensive advances along the Svatove-Kreminna line.[19]  Russian forces may have recently increased offensive activity on  this axis to take advantage of Ukraine’s operational focus on more critical areas of the front, but are unlikely to make significant offensive progress.

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line but did not advance. The Russian MoD claimed that elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces repelled three Ukrainian attacks near Kovalivka (10km southwest of Svatvoe) and in the Serebryanske forest area.[20]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut area on July 30 and did not make any confirmed gains. Ukrainian military sources reported that Ukrainian troops are achieving small but continued successes on the southern flank of Bakhmut and that Russian forces continue pulling reserves to the area.[21] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian troops continued ground attacks southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka (6km southwest), and one milblogger reported that Russian forces have retreated east of the railway line in the Klishchiivka area.[22] Several Russian sources amplified footage reportedly showing elements of the ”Pryzrak” Battalion of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade attacking Ukrainian positions on the outskirts of Klishchiivka.[23] Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that Ukrainian forces continued attacking Russian positions northwest of Bakhmut near Minkivka (15km northwest), Berkhivka (1km northwest), Bohdanivka (6km northwest), Yahidne (1km northwest), and Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km northwest).[24]

Russian forces did not make any confirmed or claimed ground attacks in the Bakhmut area on July 30. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Russian troops are continuing efforts to hold back Ukrainian advances southwest and northwest of Bakhmut.[25] The Ukrainian General Staff notably did not confirm any Russian ground attacks near Bakhmut throughout the day.[26]

 

Russian forces continued ground attacks on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City on July 30 but did not make any claimed or confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops unsuccessfully attacked near Marinka and Pobieda (both on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City).[27] Ukrainian Tavrisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Valerii Shershen noted on July 30 that Russian forces have increased assault operations in Marinka and are more intensely using ”Storm-Z” assault detachments.[28] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Russian forces have increased the use of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles in assaults on Marinka.[29] Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continued in the western outskirts of Marinka but that Russian forces were unable to advance.[30]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area but did not make confirmed advances on July 30. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on July 29 that Ukrainian forces are gradually advancing in the Berdyansk direction (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area).[31] The Russian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Oleg Chekhov and another Russian source claimed on July 30 that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks in the direction of Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[32]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and made claimed advances on July 30. Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the 218th Tank Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District), 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District), and “Storm-Z” units of the 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) counterattacked near Staromayorske and pushed Ukrainian forces out of positions in the settlement.[33] The milbloggers claimed that elements of the 247th Airborne Assault (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division), also conducted assault operations near Staromayorske, but withdrew after the attack to restore combat capabilities, while another milblogger claimed that the formation is still in Staromayorske.[34] Differing Russian claims about the whereabouts of the 247th VDV Regiment may suggest that the unit suffered significant losses while trying to restore lost positions in Staromayorske.

A Russian source erroneously likened Ukrainian efforts to liberate Staromayorske to Ukrainian control over  Pyatykhatky.[35] The source claimed that Russian forces shell Ukrainian positions in Staromayorske every day, but Ukrainian forces refuse to withdraw.[36] The milblogger is drawing an inaccurate comparison between the situations in Staromayorske and Pyatykhatky, as Russian forces have much deeper and more complex lines of defense in western Zaporizhia Oblast than they do in western Donetsk Oblast, and the terrain and general Russian and Ukrainian force composition differ significantly.

 

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make confirmed advances on July 30. Malyar reported on July 29 that Ukrainian forces are gradually advancing in the Melitopol direction (in western Zaporizhia Oblast).[37] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have advanced northeast of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) in the Verbove direction (17km southeast of Orikhiv) in the past week.[38] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near  Robotyne.[39]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made claimed advances on July 30. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces counterattacked near Robotyne and regained previously lost positions northeast of Robotyne.[40] Footage amplified on July 29 and 30 purportedly shows elements of the “Osman” Spetsnaz formation operating in the Zaporizhia direction and elements of the 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) operating near Robotyne.[41]

 

Russian forces appear to be unwilling or unable to forcibly stop and search neutral vessels headed to Ukraine through the Black Sea despite ostensibly setting conditions to do so. Naval tracking imagery published on July 30 shows three civilian ships advertising their destination of Ukraine over their ships’ automatic identification system (AIS) and sailing to Ukraine without the Russian Black Sea Fleet stopping and searching the vessels.[42] ISW previously forecast that Russian naval elements in the Black Sea appeared to be setting conditions to stop and search neutral vessels at will, and Russian media has reported several such instances over the past week.[43] Reports of three civilian ships sailing to Ukraine unhindered may suggest that Russia is either unwilling or unable to enforce such searches at this time.

 


Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization) 

Russian opposition news outlet Mobilization News claimed on July 29 that Russian military registration and enlistment officials are calling men under the guise of needing their updated personal information and asking the men to come into their offices, only to give the men summons for military training when they arrive.[44] Mobilization News claimed that Russian authorities called one man to the military enlistment office to verify his personal information and handed him a summons upon his arrival.[45] Mobilization News claimed that the enlistment office official did not specify what would happen to the man during or after the training and only told the man that he would receive a military rank.[46]

Russian sources claimed that Russian officials plan to regulate civilian volunteers who take supplies to Russian forces in Ukraine. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian authorities plan to implement regulations for volunteers in September 2023 that include requiring volunteers to submit letters from the units they supply with a list of exactly what the units received and requiring volunteers to pay taxes on any money they save purchasing supplies at a lower price than anticipated.[47] A prominent Russian milblogger noted that most civilian volunteers have Telegram channels with millions of followers and typically present a different narrative of the war in Ukraine from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[48] The milblogger suggested that Russian authorities, Russian MoD leadership, and Russian state media would benefit from the regulation of civilian volunteers and their subversive narratives regarding the war in Ukraine.[49] This initiative, if real, is consistent with the Russian MoD’s efforts to consolidate control over the Russian information space.[50]

A Russian insider source claimed to have posted floor plans of the Shahed drone assembly factory in Tatarstan, Russia.[51] The source claimed that the plant is offering to pay local Alabuga Polytech students up to 70,000 rubles (approximately $760) per month to assemble drones at the plant. The source also claimed that local students must participate in physical and psychological tests to qualify for jobs at the plant and claimed that Russian officials will fine the students up to two million rubles ($21,700) and expel them from school if the students reveal information about the plant and their work.[52]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)  

Ukrainian partisans reportedly sabotaged Russian military equipment in occupied Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast on July 29. Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko stated that Ukrainian partisans damaged three military vehicles and a Russian engineering unit’s deployment point on the western outskirts of Mariupol.[53]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus).

The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported on July 30 that at least several thousand Wagner troops have likely arrived at a military camp in Tsel, Belarus, since mid-July 2023.[54]  The UK MoD reported that satellite imagery indicates that hundreds of vehicles, mostly trucks and minibuses, have arrived at the previously empty camp, but that Wagner forces appear to have a few armored combat vehicles, which is consistent with the satellite imagery ISW observed on July 23.[55] The UK MoD stated that it is possible that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) forced Wagner to return its heavy equipment that was used in Ukraine, which is consistent with the Russian MoD’s announcement on July 12 that Wagner had almost completely handed over its weapons and military equipment.[56] The UK MoD reported that Wagner’s future combat effectiveness will depend on its ability to secure heavy equipment and enablers such as air transport.[57] ISW maintains that Wagner forces in Belarus pose no military threat to Poland or Ukraine, for that matter, until and unless they are re-equipped with mechanized equipment. They pose no meaningful threat to NATO even then.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.




[6] https://iz dot ru/1551548/2023-07-30/press-konferentciia-vladimira-putina-po-itogam-sammita-rossiia-afrika-glavnoe; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6135338; https://t.me/rybar/50217; https://t.me/rybar/50218; https://t.me/rybar/50219

[8] https://iz dot ru/1551548/2023-07-30/press-konferentciia-vladimira-putina-po-itogam-sammita-rossiia-afrika-glavnoe; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6135338; https://t.me/rybar/50217; https://t.me/rybar/50218; https://t.me/rybar/50219

[9] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/07/30/syly-oborony-nadali-utrymuyut-inicziatyvu-na-bahmutskomu-napryamku/; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/07/29/bilya-bahmuta-my-vykorystovuyemo-taktyku-malyh-ale-vpevnenyh-krokiv-sergij-cherevatyj/; https://t.me/annamaliar/976

[11] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/07/30/syly-oborony-nadali-utrymuyut-inicziatyvu-na-bahmutskomu-napryamku/

[16] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/07/29/na-kupyanskomu-napryamku-protyvnyk-zmushenyj-vykorystovuvaty-vse-shho-u-nogo-ye-pid-rukoyu-sergij-cherevatyj/

[17] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/07/29/na-kupyanskomu-napryamku-protyvnyk-zmushenyj-vykorystovuvaty-vse-shho-u-nogo-ye-pid-rukoyu-sergij-cherevatyj/

[18] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/07/29/na-kupyanskomu-napryamku-protyvnyk-zmushenyj-vykorystovuvaty-vse-shho-u-nogo-ye-pid-rukoyu-sergij-cherevatyj/

[21] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/07/30/syly-oborony-nadali-utrymuyut-inicziatyvu-na-bahmutskomu-napryamku/; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/07/29/bilya-bahmuta-my-vykorystovuyemo-taktyku-malyh-ale-vpevnenyh-krokiv-sergij-cherevatyj/; https://t.me/annamaliar/976

[25] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/07/30/syly-oborony-nadali-utrymuyut-inicziatyvu-na-bahmutskomu-napryamku/; https://t.me/annamaliar/976; https://t.me/wargonzo/14104; https://t.me/grey_zone/19744; https://t.me/multi_XAM/597

[28] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/07/30/tryvayut-nastupalni-operacziyi-na-melitopolskomu-ta-berdyanskomu-napryamkah-valerij-shershen/